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THE ROLE OF THE EXAMPLE (*DṚṢṬĀNTA*) IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LOGIC

EDITED BY

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ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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Introduction

This collection of papers is the result of an informal discussion during the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference 1997 in Hiroshima. It was decided that the general knowledge of classical Indian logic had advanced enough over the previous decades to make an attempt to understand its specific nature more clearly worthwhile. One of its more prominent features, the 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta*), was proposed as the subject of this communal effort. We hoped that this would help to clarify the functional significance of the examples, their logical role on one hand, and, on the other hand, would bring together more informative textual sources from major logical thinkers than had hitherto been available through scholarly interpretations. Subsequently Katsura and Steinkellner offered to organise the panel "The Role of Examples in Indian Logic" at the Twelfth Conference of the International Association for Buddhist Studies in Lausanne in 1999 which, in the end, was carried through by Katsura alone.

One of the main reasons for the lack of detailed explanations of conceptions concerning the role of examples is the fact that the ideas of Dignāga, the most prominent author in this context, had not yet been sufficiently analysed. Katsura was prepared to present the core of Dignāga's ideas on the basis of his studies of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)*, thus providing the necessary centre piece around which it seemed feasible to arrange presentations about other influential masters and traditions of Indian logic.

Historically seen, the centuries before and after Dignāga's activity were considered to contain key information. Although it was our intention to include contributions covering all the important logical traditions of this very creative period, lasting from the fifth to seventh centuries A.D., we did not entirely succeed. Even in regard to

important areas such as that of Kumārila's logical thought, we were unable to find a specialist willing and able to cover it. Because of the more important questions that have currently been singled out, as well as the various foci of the scholars participating, this volume is twofold in character: on the one hand historical and descriptive, and on the other systematic and interpretative. Two points are prominent or at least touched upon in several papers: the indications for inductivity and its degree in Indian logic and the possible role of the examples in this issue, and Dignāga's conceptions and their impact on later logicians.

In particular, TOM TILLEMANS fuses the results of his earlier research on the development of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* concepts in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist logic as well as their consequences for the interpretation of the *asādhārano hetuḥ* with the quest for the inductiveness or deductiveness of the respective logic. He focuses on the questions of what the supposition means that pervasion is established on the basis of examples, whether the *bahirvyāptivāda*-insistence on examples may be understood as being a sign of inductiveness, and whether the optionality of examples in *antarvyāptivāda*-logic is a sign of deductiveness.

On the basis of clearly defined concepts of 'inductive' and 'deductive' reasoning, and accepting the characterisation of Dharmakīrti as an *antarvyāptivādin,* Tillemans criticises Matilal's final ideas (proposed in 1986 and published in 1998) that the use of examples is an indication of inductiveness. However, he also recognises the change from *bahirvyāptivāda* to *antarvyāptivāda* as "a shift from an inductive logic to one which is more deductive" as being due to change in the notion of *sapakṣa* excluding or including the subject. The fact that *sapakṣa* ("similar instance") and *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* ("similar example") are not synonymous opens a way to hypothesising examples that are not "fair examples" upon which to base induction, and which function rather as paradigms or prototypes.

In his conclusion, Tillemans makes remarkable comments concerning Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvapratibandha* solution for the problem of establishing pervasion by induction as in the case of the "Dignāga/Īśvarasena method of *adarśanamātra*." Tillemans is clearly sceptical about the success of Dharmakīrti's theory to resolve "doubts about pervasions being founded", and proposes "to abandon the rosy picture of the history of Buddhist logic as being an ever increasing progress on the road to certainty."

CLAUS OETKE, in order to assess the role of examples in the Indian theory of inference, goes beyond the mere 'empirical' identification of intended meanings in individual textual passages, with which most of the other contributors in this volume are concerned, and tries to discover an a priori component of the theory. He assumes that one of the roots of "Ancient Indian Logic" is a common-sense inference that resorts to an exploitation of the principle of the coherence of experience in order to acquire knowledge. The adduction of examples functions to establish whether certain hypothetical states-of-affairs exhibit normality or deviance from the norm. In addition, according to Oetke, another root is whether tenets in debates and the role of examples therein are justified to assess the question of whether the concomitance of two properties conforms to normality or not. In this way Oetke suggests a few 'hidden' theoretical assumptions in the Indian theory of inference which possibly explain the role of examples in Indian logic. His conclusion will force students of Indian logic to reassess the results of their purely philological investigations.

The need for clear interpretations of the logical theorems that are context-related can be seen in the slight preponderance of "historical" papers. The pre- and post-Dignāgean context of the early traditions of Indian dialectics as attested by the *Carakasaṃhitā,* the *Nyāyasūtra*, as well as the *Nyāyabhāṣya* are closely scrutinized in the paper of ERNST PRETS with regard to their conceptions of the role and function of examples in a proof. The early Vaiśeṣika is

also included in this survey. Since the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not deal with proof, presented are the ideas and definitions of Praśastapāda who follows Dignāga rather closely.

Based on the fourth chapter of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya-(vṛtti)* – for a summary of this chapter cf. note 2 of his paper – SHORYU KATSURA offers a succinct overview of a number of Dignāga's conceptions concerning the role of examples, including, to mention only the more important, the process of inference (*svārthānumāna*) and its relationship to proof (*parārthānumāna*); the function of examples in relation to the three characteristics of an inferential mark (*hetu*), as well as the exact manner of the formulation of examples and its importance in expressing the logical relation (*vyāpti*); and the difference between examples by similarity and examples by dissimilarity and the question of their necessity in the same proof notwithstanding their logical equivalence. This is the first clear and detailed presentation of Dignāga's logical thought since Hidenori Kitagawa's pioneering translations and study of 1965 (in Japanese). The paper also gives a good impression of the sublime precision and mature creativity in Dignāga's late logical thought and shows how all later Indian logicians depended upon him in much more detail than has hitherto been suspected.

Naturally, the papers on Dharmakīrti's logic gain most from Katsura's clarification of Dignāga's thoughts. The earliest conceptions of Dharmakīrti on the examples' role in inference and proof are culled in ERNST STEINKELLNER's paper from an unexpected place in Dharmakīrti's work of his youth, the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with the so-called *Svavṛtti* (PVSV). Here, Dharmakīrti uses *dṛṣṭānta*-related passages from Dignāga to prove, in this way adducing authority, the validity of his new theory of an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) as the real basis of a logical nexus (*vyāpti*). At the same time, in consequence of this new theory, he divests the examples of all their logical force and

necessity, but provides purpose for them in the didactic and social realm.

TAKASHI IWATA investigates the role of examples by examining the arguments developed to explain the uncommon reason (*asādhāraṇo hetuḥ*) both in Dignāga and in chapters 2 and 3 of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* IWATA first clarifies the issue of how to establish the reason's absence in non-existent instances, and then examines Dharmakīrti's analysis in PVin 3 of the *kevalānvayī hetuḥ* proposed by the Naiyāyikas, as well as of the *asādhāraṇo hetuḥ* as treated in PVin 2 and 3. Contrary to Dignāga, who emphasizes establishing the absence of this reason in both the similar and dissimilar instances, Dharmakīrti underlines the uncertainty of its presence or absence in a domain that is contradictorily both divided and inclusive of all things. This, IWATA concludes, would imply the possibility of examining the logical concomitance without dependence on concrete examples.

While historically important areas of the topic are missing from this volume, two papers are seemingly outside of the intended frame in terms of the period or even of the problem dealt with, namely, those of Pascal Hugon and Birgit Kellner.

PASCAL HUGON's presentation of gTsaṅ nag pa's conceptions offers a thorough introduction to the main problems and solutions developed in the early pre-Sa skya Paṇḍita period of Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti's ideas on examples, on the subject (*pakṣa*), and similar and dissimilar instances. She thereby provides a valuable illustration of Tibetan Dharmakīrti exegesis, showing where the master's explanations remained open to diverging later interpretations.

BIRGIT KELLNER's paper does not deal with examples at all, but with Dharmakīrti's conception of the function of inferential ascertainment in its relationship to sense perception, perceptual ascertainment, and to error or doubt. Her paper is included here because

of its particular value in revealing the import of the psychological, and in the end soteriological, aspects in Dharmakīrti's ideas on the function and purpose of inference. On a deeper level, moreover, the simple absence of the term *dṛṣṭānta* in Kellner's contribution is significant. For this absence can be considered as providing additional information as to where to look for the real reasons within Indian, or at least within Dharmakīrtian inference theory that allow for inferences to correctly and usefully operate, even largely independent of examples.

The paper by Kyo Kano, "From *trairūpya* to Universal System – *antarvyāpti, sarvopasaṃhāra,* and *dṛṣṭānta*", unfortunately could not be included in this volume for technical reasons and will appear at a later date.

We would like to thank Helmut Krasser for going through the task of preparing the manuscript of this volume, of organizing the proofs, and of checking for consistency, as well as Anne MacDonald and Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting the English in almost all contributions. And we would like to apologise to our contributors, the participants at the Lausanne conference panel, and to our respected readers for the very late appearance of this volume that is entirely due to the undersigned editors being highly overworked.

November 2003

Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima

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Why Infer and not just Look? Dharmakīrti on the Psychology of Inferential Processes

Birgit Kellner, Vienna

As is well known, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti contains an extensive exposition of the theory of "exclusion" (*apoha*) (PVSV 24,16-93,5), whose central tenet is that words and logical marks do not refer to real entities directly, but have the "exclusion of the other" (*anyavyavaccheda*) as their object-content. As the common example goes, the word "cow" does not refer to the real cow, but to the exclusion of all that is not a cow.

In defending this central tenet, Dharmakīrti also makes important remarks about the psychology of inference, which he embeds in a larger discussion of the relationship between sense perception (*pratyakṣa*), deficient mental events such as error (*bhrānti*) and doubt (*saṃśaya*), and ascertainment (*niścaya*). An inquiry into the pertinent sections of PVSV reveals a peculiar connection between the psychological function of inference and the very nature of ascertainment. By contextualising the discoveries of this inquiry with descriptions of inferential processes that can be found in later treatises of the school, it becomes moreover possible to reconstruct a more comprehensive conception of the psychology of inferential processes.

Perception and conceptualisation in Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVSV)

For the branch of Buddhist philosophy to which Dharmakīrti belongs, the human mind is nothing but streams, or layers, of mo-

mentary mental events (*citta*) and their associated factors (*caitta*). A momentary mental event arises out of a complex of disparate causes and is in turn, together with other momentary entities, causally responsible for the production of various other mental events.

The forms of mental events relevant in the present context are instances of sensory perception (*indriyapratyakṣa*) and instances of conceptual cognition (*vikalpajñāna*). The passages discussed below are based on the assumption that an instance of sensory perception is directly caused by a non-mental real entity, by a sense faculty, by an immediately preceding mental event, and by a host of additional factors, such as light in the case of visual perception. By contrast, conceptual cognitions have no direct causal link to reality, but depend on recollection (*smṛti*) of past experience. Moreover, while a sensory perception grasps the real entity by which it is caused by showing its image (*pratibhāsa*) or representation, a conceptual cognition operates by identifying and naming. Its content consists in the attribution of a property (*dharma*) to a property-bearer (*dharmin*), as for instance in the conceptual cognition "this is blue" the property of being blue is attributed to the bearer "this".

While non-conceptual perception is, provided that all of its causes are intact, always veridical owing to its direct link with momentary reality, conceptualisation is inherently erroneous insofar as it mistakes the general features that it abstracts from and superimposes on disparate, momentary reality for reality itself. Still, some conceptual cognitions are correct in the sense that they identify seen reality correctly and serve as a solid basis for successful action, whereas others are false because they misidentify it and lead people astray – identifying mother-of-pearl as mother-of-pearl is in this sense correct, whereas identifying it as silver is false.[1] Finding out

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[1] TILLEMANS 1995: 877f. relates that the dGe lugs pas assume such a "hierarchy of error", distinguishing between "valid thought, which is only →

how this correctness is exactly to be differentiated from falsehood, and how it is to be known whether an instance of a conceptual cognition is correct or erroneous, is a delicate matter that has generated controversies within the tradition as well as in modern scholarship. In the present context I shall take the liberty to evade this debate and simply posit working definitions for correctness and error that I assume to represent a rough understanding of the views advanced by Dharmakīrti and those of his successors that will be dealt with in this paper: a conceptual cognition is correct if its content is congruent with the nature of the seen real entity that the cognition is about and if it *therefore* enables the cognising person to successfully act upon the entity according to his/her intentions in the situation in question. By contrast, a conceptual cognition is erroneous if its content is incongruent with the seen entity's nature and if it therefore fails to enable the person to act successfully.

A correct conceptual cognition is referred to as "ascertainment/ascertaining cognition" (*niścaya*, *niścayajñāna*), in contrast to which

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erroneous in a very specific way about what appears, and utterly wrong thought, where nothing real appears at all and error occurs on the level of determination". He further argues that "this idea of a twofold hierarchy of error has only a very strained grounding in Dharmakīrti". It is true that a clear-cut terminological distinction between the fundamental error of all conceptualisation and the contingent error of some conceptualisation is wanting especially in PVSV, where the expressions *bhrānti* and *samāropa* are used for both notions. Yet, the arguments presented in the passages relevant for the present paper nevertheless evidence that a distinction between these two forms of error was maintained. How, for instance, should the claim "ascertaining cognitions exclude false superimpositions" (cf. below) be understood unless it presupposed a distinction between false superimposition performed by all conceptual cognitions, of which ascertaining cognitions constitute a subclass, and false superimposition performed only by some conceptual cognitions, namely those which are not ascertaining?

a false one is referred to as "false superimposition" (*samāropa*), or "error/erroneous cognition" (*bhrānti*, *bhrāntijñāna*). It deserves to be emphasised at this point that for Dharmakīrti, the category of error (*bhrānti*) in general comprises conceptual as well as sensory error, that is, both the conceptual misidentification of perceived reality and the erroneous perception of something as something else caused by impairment of the sense faculty, such as the visual perception of one moon as two moons on the part of a person suffering from an eye-disorder.[2] Insofar as the following discussion is concerned with conceptual error alone, the expression "error" will be used exclusively in this limited sense.

In the beginning of the *apoha*-section of PVSV, Dharmakīrti propounds as its main thesis that what is understood through words and logical marks are not real entities themselves, but "exclusions" (*vyavaccheda*). This thesis is first defended through arguments pertaining to the nature of, and relationship between, perception and other forms of cognition, as well as language (PVSV 25,26-26,1):

> *kathaṃ punar etad gamyate: vyavacchedaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ pratipādyate, vidhinā na vasturūpam eveti? pramāṇāntarasya śabdāntarasya ca pravṛtteḥ.*
>
> How is this understood: that an exclusion is made understood by words and logical marks, (and) not, in an affirmative manner

[2] For sensory error, see PV 3.297ff. and PVin 1.76,29ff. (cf. also HATTORI 1968: 97). Both forms of error are subject to the classical Indic definition of error as the "apprehension of something as that which it is not", articulated by Dharmakīrti in PVin 2.1c: *atasmiṃs tadgraho bhrāntir* ... See SCHMITHAUSEN 1965:154 for further references also from other philosophical schools.

(*vidhinā*), the nature of a real entity itself (*vasturūpam eva*)?[3] – [This is understood] on the ground that an additional [instance of a] means of valid cognition and an additional [instance of a] word occurs [with reference to a real entity already grasped by perception, or already grasped by another instance of a *pramāṇa* or a word].[4]

Perception not only grasps real entities directly, but also in their entirety, because real entities are of a uniform and indivisible nature or "own-being" (*svabhāva*), and because the partial perception of something indivisible is impossible.[5] In other words, perception

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[3] Śākyabuddhi construes *vidhinā* with *na vasturūpam eva* (*pratipādyate*), whereas Karṇakagomin construes it with *vyavacchedaḥ pratipādyate*. PVṬ D59b7-60a1 = Q70b4f.: *sgra daṅ rtags ni sgra daṅ rtags* (*rtags* D : *rtags dag* Q) *ste de dag gis rnam par bcad pa rtogs par byed kyi / rnam par bcad pa la mi ltos pa'i sgrub pas dṅos po'i raṅ gi ṅo bo kho na rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no źes bya ba 'di ji ltar śes te /* PVSVṬ 120,28-121,9: *sa* (sc. *vyavacchedaḥ*) *eva śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ vidhinā vidhirūpeṇa pratipādyate 'dhyavasīyate, na punar vastuno rūpaṃ pāramārthikadharmibhāvalakṣaṇaṃ pratipādyata iti kuto gamyate*?

I have followed Śākyabuddhi, with additional support from PVSV 27,9f. *yadā 'numānam api vastu vidhinā pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakṛt* ..., where an "affirmative" mode of knowing is also connected with knowing a real entity, and not with knowing an exclusion. Karṇakagomin's interpretation might be related to his position in the debate between *vidhivāda*- and *pratiṣedhavāda*-interpretations of the *apoha*-theory that emerged after Dharmakīrti, cf. AKAMATSU 1986.

[4] In my translations, round brackets are used for supplemented expressions of a lesser scale, whereas square brackets indicate supplementations of a larger scale and with a smaller degree of certainty. The distinction therefore shows which supplements depend on the translator's interpretation to a large extent and might perhaps be controversial.

[5] PV 1.45ab: *ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam*, PVSV 26,4: *eko hy arthātmā / sa pratyakṣaḥ* ..., PVSV 26,14: ... *dṛṣṭasarvatattvasyāpi bhāvasya* ..., PV 1.47ab: *tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ*. For the impossibility of partial perception of indivisible →

grasps all there is to be grasped of the real entity by which it was caused. That being the case, nothing remains to be known through further instances of other *pramāṇa*s – by which Dharmakīrti specifically means inference –, or for words to make known – all aspects of the entity are already established through perception (*sarvākārasiddhiḥ*, PVSV 26,6). Whatever remains to be established by inference or language cannot belong to the "own-being" of the perceived entity (*atatsvabhāvatvam*, PVSV 26,7), which was after all already grasped by perception. However, it is undeniable that several instances of inference occur with reference to one and the same real entity grasped by perception, and, by extension, that inference is a distinct *pramāṇa* in its own right. According to Dharmakīrti, this is explicable only if the object and mode of apprehension of inference and language differ from that of perception.

But even if this is granted, why should the object of logical marks and words be, of all things, an "exclusion"? Dharmakīrti's answer: because inference serves to exclude false superimpositions (*samāropavyavaccheda*).[6] Inference excludes a false superimposition by removing it, by – as Karṇakagomin clarifies – preventing that this superimposition, as a momentary event, produces a homologous successor as part of the midstream which constitutes the cognising

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(i.e., partless) entities, cf. PVSV 27,1f.: ... *anaṃśasya caikadeśena darśanāyogāt.*

[6] See PV 1.58ab: ... *bhrāntinivṛttyartha* ...; PVSV 27,13: *samāropavyavacchedaḥ* ... *kriyate*; 27,14f.: *tadartham* (sc. *samāropavyavacchedārtham*) *anyat pravartate*; 26,23f.: ... *tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni saphalāni syuḥ* ... ; 26,24: ... *teṣāṃ tu vyavacchedaphalānāṃ* ... Most of these passages expressly refer to a *pramāṇa* other than perception (cf. PV 1.45 and 47), but the focus clearly lies in inference/logical marks (cf. PV 1.48). PVSV 61,16-62,15 reiterates analogous claims for verbal expressions (see FRAUWALLNER 1933: 56f.)

person.[7] In other words, inference brings an existing series of error about a certain aspect of reality to a halt, even though this does not per se preclude that the same type of error might occur again at similar occasions in the future.

The most common examples adduced for such superimpositions in PVSV are the false identification of mother-of-pearl as silver (e.g., PVSV 26,15ff.) as well as the case of a mirage, where sun-rays, brought to vibrate by vapour rising up from the heated ground, are mistaken for water when seen from a distance.[8] Moreover, at one place in PVSV, doubt (*saṃśaya*) is indicated side by side with error, as a mental event excluded by inference (PVSV 27,15-22, see further below). Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin emphasise that logical marks also exclude doubt because doubt takes two alterna-

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[7] See PVSVṬ 128,12-15: *yatrāpi samāropaḥ pravṛtto na tatrāpi samāropaniṣedhaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām pratipādyate sambandhābhāvād. ata evāyaṃ na kriyate, ahetutvāc ca nāśasya. kevalaṃ pūrvakasya samāropasya svarasanirodhāt śabdaliṅgābhyām anityādiniścaye saty anyasya samāropasyānutpāde sati samāropaniṣedhaḥ kṛto bhavati.*

[8] This description of a mirage is borrowed from NBh 112,1: *grīṣme marīcayo bhaumenoṣmaṇā saṃsṛṣṭāḥ spandamānā dūrasthasya cakṣuṣā sannikṛṣyante...* KRASSER 1991_2: 59, n.99 asserts that Dharmakīrti attributes the erroneous character of mirages to deficient sense faculties, but passages in PVSV actually indicate that they were considered as caused by deficiencies in the cognising person's mind. In PVSV 49,19-51,16, the mirage is invoked as an analogy to the fundamental error of all conceptualisation. Since the latter is caused by ignorance (*avidyā*), this implies a mental conditioning also of the former. This is clearly stated in PVV 205,1f., 207,19ff. and 208,1-8. The passage in PPar II 20,10f., which Krasser adduces in favour of his interpretation, might also be interpreted in a different fashion – or perhaps Dharmottara developed his own distinctive theory of the causes for mirages? Cf. also below n. 43 for Śaṅkaranandana's interpretation of *asati bhrāntikāraṇe* in PVSV 32,12.

tives as its object-content, and because one of them is excluded through inference.[9] The function of inference to exclude a certain mental event can therefore be applied to error as well as doubt, the latter being in structural terms derivable from the former.[10] As a shorthand for error and doubt, I shall subsequently use the term "deficient mental event".

For any given real entity, as many deficient mental events are possible as there are other entities for which it might be mistaken, and there can consequently occur as many logical marks to exclude

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[9] PVṬ D63a4-6 = Q74b1-3: *rjes su dpag par bya ba 'ga' źig la / phyin ci log gi śes pa med du zin kyaṅ 'on kyaṅ de la the tshom yod par 'gyur la the tshom yaṅ gñi ga'i cha la brten pa yin pas / phyogs la der 'khrul pa la reg par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir the tshom bsal ba la yaṅ rtags kyis* (: *kyi* Q) *rnam par gcad* (: *bcad* Q) *par bya ba kho na yin no //* PVSVṬ 126,26-28: *yadi nāma kvacid anubhavayoge sati yadīha niścayas tathā 'pi tatra saṃśayena bhāvyam. saṃśaya cobhayāṃśāvalambī. sa ca pakṣe tadviparītaṃ saṃspṛśaty evātaḥ saṃśayavyudāse 'py anyavyavacchedaḥ kṛto* (*kṛto* conjectured on the basis of PVṬ : *kuto* PVSVṬ) *bhavaty eva liṅgena.* The underlined text (for which the manuscript folio 48b6f. is unfortunately illegible) must be corrupt. On the basis of the parallel in PVṬ, it might be reconstructed as **yadi nāma kvacid anumānayoge sati yadi na viparyāsas* ... For an argument against the inclusion of doubt in the category of mental events opposed to ascertainment that also takes the relationship between doubt and error as proposed here into account, see NSā 242,19ff.

[10] However, this structural relationship – doubt contains at least one erroneous alternative – does not necessarily entail that doubt is psychologically caused by error, in that an error-event would serve as a cause for generating a doubt-event under certain circumstances. This conclusion seems to be attributed to Dharmakīrti in the table in KATSURA 1984: 231, where a causal chain error → doubt → ascertainment (through inference/verbal knowledge) is indicated.

these events.[11] By extension, this also supports the status of inference as a distinct *pramāṇa*. The psychological function of inference to exclude error and doubt is consequently tied to its character as apprehending an "exclusion". However, inference is not the only type of ascertainment to be discussed in its relationship to false superimpositions.

The two types of ascertainment

The distinction between two types of ascertaining cognitions is based on their causation. Perceptual ascertainment, in secondary literature also termed "perceptual judgment",[12] follows instantly after and is caused by an instance of sensory perception. By contrast, inferential ascertainment is the establishment of a probandum (*sādhyadharma*) in a logical subject (*pakṣa*) subsequent and due to the ascertainment of a probans (*sādhanadharma*) with which the probandum is inseparably connected, and the recollection of this inseparable connection. In the Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti clarifies that perceptual ascertainment does not occupy the status of a *pramāṇa*

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[11] PVSV 26,22f.: *yāvanto 'sya parabhāvās tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinaḥ samāropā iti tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni saphalāni syuḥ*. See also the first of two "intermediate verses" (*antaraśloka*) PV 1.52.

[12] See PV 1.60 with PVSV 31,26-32,12, quoted and translated further below. For an outline of Dharmakīrti's theory of perceptual judgment, see KATSURA 1984: 225f., 1989 and 1993.

Note that in KATSURA 1993: 5 and p.71, a distinction is drawn between "perceptual judgment" and *adhyavasāya* ("determination"): perceptual judgment is described as producing *adhyavasāya*. However, it seems to me that *adhyavasāya* is in the pertinent passages from the Hetubindu more or less synonymous with *niścaya*, "ascertainment", to the effect that perceptual judgment does not *produce* determination or ascertainment, but in itself *is* an instance of a determinative or ascertaining cognition.

proper, as it does not provide any new information pertaining to the realisation of a human goal on the part of the perceived object (HB 2,18ff.). In a more rudimentary form, this argument is already advanced in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 (prose on k.48, D207a4-b6 = Q304b7-305b1), in connection with refuting an independent *pramāṇa* for cognising absences. The problematic status of perceptual ascertainment as a *pramāṇa* may be responsible for the lack, at least in Dharmakīrti's works, of a specific Sanskrit term for it. In PVSV, it is only indirectly referred to as that form of ascertainment which is not inferential, which arises instantly after perception, and which is characterised by its opposition to false superimpositions.[13]

Since perceptual ascertainment arises immediately after perception, it cannot, like inference, exclude a deficient mental event by removing it. But this, one might argue, entails that it does not grasp an "exclusion" and thus undermines Dharmakīrti's general claim that all instances of conceptualisation are characterised by having exclusions as their objects. Dharmakīrti clarifies this issue by specifying that perceptual ascertainment is nevertheless opposed to deficient mental events by preventing their arising in the first place.[14]

Because the function of *pramāṇa*s to exclude deficient mental states is adduced as one reason for the claim that they take an "ex-

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[13] PVSV 28,8: *yad rūpādidarśanānantaram aliṅgaṃ niścayajñānaṃ bhavati* ... In PVSV 31,12f., perceptual ascertainment is referred to simply as "the other" (*anyat*), meaning the other type of ascertainment as opposed to inference.

[14] See PV 1.50-51 with PVSV 28,8-22. Cf. KATSURA 1993: 70: "Perceptual judgment ... will lead us to a successful action by preventing erroneous superimpositions from occurring." KATSURA 1984: 227: " ... In fact, inference is meant to dispel misjudgement and suspicion just as perceptual judgment is meant to prevent them." By "suspicion", Katsura here most probably refers to doubt (*saṃśaya*).

clusion" as their object-content, it can be expected that they always function in this manner. In other words, inference will be held to remove error or doubt not only in some particular cases, but universally and intrinsically. From this it further follows that inference is necessarily preceded by doubt or error pertaining to the presence of the probandum in the logical subject. This is confirmed in the following passage which articulates Dharmakīrti's views on the psychology of inference in a most explicit fashion (PVSV 27,15-22):[15]

> *nanu nāvaśyaṃ viparyāsapūrvaka evāpratītaniścayo bhavati, yathā 'kasmād dhūmād agnipratipattiḥ. na hi tatrānagnisamāropaḥ sambhāvyate. tan na sarvatra vyavacchedaḥ kriyate. uktam atra: dharmipratipattāv abhedāt sarvapratipattiḥ. bhede vā 'sambaddhasya tatrāpratipattir iti. tasmāt tatrāpi taddarśinas tatsvabhāvāniścayaḥ. kutaḥ? viparyāsāt. sa ca taṃ pradeśaṃ tadviviktena rūpeṇa niścinvann agnisattābhāvanāvimuktayā buddhyā katham aviparyasto nāma? tadākārasamāropasaṃśayarahitaś ca tatpratipattau na liṅgam anusaret. na ca tasyānvayavyatirekayor ādriyeta.*
>
> [Objection:] An ascertaining (cognition) of something not (yet) cognised (i.e., inferential ascertainment) is not necessarily preceded by a misconception (*viparyāsa*), as for instance in (case of) the spontaneous cognition of fire from smoke. For in that (case), no false superimposition of non-fire is assumed [by the inferring person]. Therefore, an exclusion (of a false superimposition) is not carried out in every case (of an inference).

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[15] Other – and quite different – translations of this passage are given in MOOKERJEE/NAGASAKI 1964: 104f. and ZWILLING 1976: 94f. A summary is presented in FRAUWALLNER 1932: 252f.

> [Answer:] Regarding this (point), it was stated [before]:[16] when a property-bearer is cognised (by perception), all (its properties) are cognised if (they are) non-different (from the bearer). Or, if (a property is) different (from the bearer), no cognition occurs, with respect to this (bearer), concerning (a property which is then) not connected (with the bearer). Therefore, in that case (of a seemingly spontaneous inference from smoke to fire), too, an essential property (i.e., possession of fire) of this (place) is not ascertained on the part of one who sees this (place). (But) why? – Because of a misconception. Now, how (could) someone who ascertains this place as devoid of this (fire), by means of a cognition that is bereft of the presumption that fire exists,[17] not be taken (to hold) a misconception? For someone who is without false superimposition and without doubt about a certain aspect (of a perceived object) will not pursue a logical mark in order to understand this (aspect); nor will he attend to the positive and negative concomitance of this (logical mark). ...

Because it is observed that persons spontaneously realise fire from smoke, an opponent argues, not all instances of inference are preceded by false superimpositions, i.e., "misconceptions" (*viparyāsa*). Such spontaneous inferences, which apparently function like

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[16] This is most probably a reference to PVSV 26,5f., summarised above on p. 6. The part between *uktam atra* and *iti* might also be a quotation from another text (by Dharmakīrti or someone else?), but no source could be identified.

[17] Since the main focus of the rhetorical question is on *niścinvat* – "how (could) someone who ascertains ... not be taken (to hold) a misconception?" –, the nominal phrase *agnisattābhāvanāvimuktayā buddhyā* is best taken as a specification of this ascertaining cognition in that it further emphasises its being devoid of the presumption, i.e., the positive conviction, that fire exists. Based on this interpretation, *agnisattābhāvanāvimuktayā buddhyā* refers to the same state of affairs as *tatsvabhāvāniścayaḥ* from above: a cognition which does not ascertain the presence of fire.

mental reflexes, are also discussed in later Nyāya sources. Discussions of the relationship between *anumāna* and error/doubt before Dharmakīrti could not be located,[18] and it appears that Dharmakīrti can indeed be credited with introducing a peculiar conception in this regard.

Moreover, certain Nyāya texts after Dharmakīrti suggest that the reaction to Dharmakīrti's psychological views was not uniform. According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, inference generally applies to doubtful objects; error is not discussed in this connection. Even though inference is observed to occur with regard to objects for which no

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[18] Prior to Dharmakīrti, error/doubt seem to have been discussed in relation to processes of examination, reflection and judgment predominantly in the context of defining "ascertainment" (*nirṇaya*) in NSū 1.1.41: *vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ.* While ascertainment may also arise from perception alone (NBh 38,14: *bhavati khalv indriyārthasannikarṣād utpannapratyakṣe 'rhtāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇaya iti*), reasoning (*nyāya*) in general is elsewhere said to apply neither to something uncognised – that is, something unperceived? –, nor to something already ascertained, but to something doubtful (NBh 3,3f.: *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kiṃ tarhi saṃśayite 'rthe*, where the Jaisalmer ms. reads *saṃśayite pravartate* for *saṃśayite 'rthe*).

Moreover, older lists of ten members of proof contain, in addition to the five known as the *pañcāvāyavāḥ* in the Nyāya school, "doubt" (*saṃśaya*), "desire to know" (*jijñāsā*), "attainment of what is possible" (*śakyaprāpti*), "purpose" (*prayojana*) and "removal of doubt" (*saṃśayavyudāsa*), see NBh 30,8f., where a ten-membered list is said to have been propounded by *aneke naiyāyikāḥ*.

Lastly, in PDhS 37,10 (text according to NENNINGER 1992), those who are in doubt, error or without an opinion (*saṃśayitaviparyastāvyutpannānām*) are mentioned as hearers of an inference for others. This is the closest connection between deficient mental events and inference – as opposed to proof or ascertainment in general – in pre-Dharmakīrtian literature that could be identified so far.

doubt exists, like in the case of the unsought realisation of fire through the unexpected perception of smoke rising from the ridge of a mountain, those trained in reasoning (*nyāyavidaḥ*) assume that inference necessarily has a doubtful object from an objective viewpoint (*vastuyogyatāvaśena*).[19] In other words, even when subjectively no doubt is experienced during the inferential process, the object still remains doubtful objectively. Bhāsarvajña, on the other hand, expressly argues against Dharmakīrti's position after quoting PVSV 27,18-28,1, with minor variations, in NSā 249,21-242,2. In fact, his argumentation reads like a more explicit statement of the objection presented in PVSV itself: the undeniable fact that people occasionally see smoke and instantly realise the presence of fire, without experiencing error or doubt beforehand, shows that inference is not always preceded by such events, and it is not admissible to assume their existence without the inferring person being conscious of them. The occasional experience of spontaneous inferences which are, according to Bhāsarvajña, prompted by a high degree of habituation (*abhyāsātiśaya*),[20] is therefore raised against the universal presupposition of error/doubt on the part of inference.

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[19] NM_1 595,2-5 = NM_2 149,20-24: *anumānaṃ ca sandigdhe viṣaye pravartata iti prāyeṇa tadvyavahāraḥ. yady api kvacid asandigdhe 'pi viṣaye dṛṣṭaṃ pravartamānam anumānam analānarthitāyām* (*anarthitāyām* NM_2 : *arthitāyām* NM_1) *atarkitopanataparvatanitambanirgatadhūmadarśanena kṛśānukalpanam* (°*kalpanam* NM_2 : °*kalpam* NM_1) *iva, tathā 'pi vastuyogyatāvaśena sandigdhaviṣayam evānumānam icchanti nyāyavidaḥ.*

[20] See NSā 242,7-9: *na hi viparyayaḥ saṃśayo vā 'pratīyamāno 'py astīti vaktuṃ śakyate. na ca tadapratītau kvacid dhūmadarśanānantaram evāgnyanumānaṃ bhavan na dṛśyate.* ... NSā 242,17f.: *abhyāsātiśayād anicchato 'py anumānapravṛtter na samāropābhāve 'numānāpravṛttiḥ.* For a discussion of the conceptual properties of *abhyāsa* in the context of recollection, see PREISENDANZ 1994_2: 304f., n.84.

Later Navya-Naiyāyikas follow this line of reasoning and further illustrate such inferences with the instantaneous realisation of the presence of a cloud upon hearing thunder.[21]

In refuting the objection, Dharmakīrti first reiterates the theoretical conundrum, stated before in PVSV 26,5f., which arises from the assumption that inference grasps real entities immediately and in their entirety, just like perception: in that case, all properties that a property-bearer possesses would have to be known already when it is perceived, so that no occasion would be left for the application of instances of other *pramāṇa*s; by extension, inference would lose its status as a distinct *pramāṇa*. With respect to those properties that the property-bearer does not possess, a directly apprehending inference could not operate anyway, as these are not connected with the bearer in the first place. The – here only implicit – conclusion is that the mode of apprehension as well as the object of inference must be differentiated from that of perception. It is to this implicit conclusion that the description of the inferential situation which now follows is causally connected with *tasmāt*.

For understanding the description, it is worth bearing in mind that for Dharmakīrti all conceptualisation involves an intention on the part of the cognising person: provided a person intends to ascertain an aspect of reality, this aspect is posited as the property in an ascertaining cognition, and the undifferentiated remainder of the real entity is posited as its bearer.[22] If a person intends to ascertain the difference of a seen white cow from horses, the ascertaining cogni-

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[21] In Navya-Nyāya treatises, the issue is discussed under the heading of *pakṣatā*; see the summaries in BHATTACHARYA 1974 and MOHANTY 1992: 102. The two main criteria applied in the investigation of *pakṣatā* are (a) presence/absence of doubt (*saṃśaya*) and (b) presence/absence of desire to establish (*siṣādhayiṣā*).

[22] See PVSV 44,6-10, STEINKELLNER 1971: 200.

tion will be one that attributes the property "non-horse" to the seen white cow. Differences of the cow from sets of objects other than horses – such as its difference from spotted cows – are set aside in this particular ascertaining cognition, but may become attributed in others if the cognising person so intends.[23]

Accordingly, the situation invoked by the opponent is to be described as one where a person who perceives the fire-possessing place (*taddarśinaḥ*),[24] and who intends to ascertain fire, does not

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[23] Cf. also PVSV 33,9-11: *yadā 'yaṃ pratipattā tadanyavyavaccheda-bhāvānapekṣaḥ piṇḍaviśeṣe 'śvavyavacchedamātraṃ jijñāsate tathābhūtajñāpanārthaṃ tathākṛtasaṅketena śabdena prabodhyata anaśvatvam asyāstīti.* The wish on the part of a listener in a communicative situation to understand – i.e., ascertain – the difference of a cow from horses that is addressed here corresponds to a wish to ascertain a particular property on the part of the inferring person in the case of a private inference.

[24] As an aside, it deserves to be noted that this passage rests on the assumption that the inferring person perceives a place which possesses both smoke and fire. This is brought out clearly in HBṬ 20,19ff. on HB 2,13f. where Dharmakīrti claims that in smoke-fire-inferences, smoke is ascertained in the place through perception (i.e., through perceptual ascertainment).

Arcaṭa presents an objection to this statement which questions that the place can be properly assumed as *sādhyadharmin* (HBṬ 20,19ff.), attributed to Uddyotakara in HBṬĀ 265,10: the place connected with fire is not perceived by the inferring person, whereas the region in the sky which is perceived only possesses smoke, but not fire. Hence – it is implied –, the place cannot be the *sādhyadharmin* qualified by both *sādhya-* and *sādhanadharma*. Arcaṭa counters the argument mainly by pointing out that the oneness of the place as *dharmin* is assumed according to worldly judgment. The criticism as such goes back to Uddyotakara's discussion of Dignāga's *anumeya*-definition as *dharmaviṣiṣṭo dharmī* in NV 46,23-47,6. See also similar criticism of this definition in ŚVV 316,7-11, where it is also pointed out that if the fire-possessing parts of the moun- →

ascertain that the place is fire-possessing (*tatsvabhāvāniścayaḥ*), that is, determines the seen place as being without fire (*tadviviktena rūpeṇa niścinvat*). The interesting move in this argumentation lies in the shift from the proposition "N.N., who intends to ascertain fire, does not ascertain that the place is fire-possessing" to "N.N., who intends to ascertain fire, ascertains that the place is not fire-possessing". In other words, a person with an intention towards ascertainment of F ascertains non-F if he/she does not ascertain F.[25] It is this shift which renders the ascription of error to the cognising person inevitable: someone who ascertains that a place which in fact possesses fire is without fire can only be assumed to be in error, even though, one feels tempted to add, the person does not experience an erroneous cognition because the inferential process appears to occur spontaneously.

Lastly, Dharmakīrti adds that people who are without doubt and error pertaining to an aspect of reality will not perform an inference in order to ascertain it. This suggests that there is an alternative, simpler method available. Because of the arguments presented above, this cannot be an ascertainment *in* perception, because perception does not ascertain individual aspects of entities due to its holistic character. Rather, this is ascertainment immediately after perception – perceptual ascertainment. If someone who is without doubt/error regarding the property F ascertains it immediately after perceiving a real entity which is an F, and, moreover, if someone

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tain were indeed perceived, their fire-possession would already be known through perception (and inference would be unnecessary).

[25] Note that this shift becomes plausible only if an intention on the part of the cognising person is assumed, for otherwise, the non-ascertainment of F could simply be due to a lack of interest. If I see a fiery place and have absolutely no interest in fire because I am looking for a swimming-pool, I would find it rather odd if someone were to accuse me of the erroneous assumption that fire is absent there.

who entertains doubt/error about F requires inference to remove it, perceptual and inferential ascertainment end up sharing a specific relationship to each other with regard to actual situations: in any given situation where a real entity is perceived, inferential ascertainment becomes necessary when perceptual ascertainment is impossible and a deficient mental state arises instead immediately after the perception.

Naturally, this situation-specific relationship holds good only for such inferences which are occasioned by the perception of a real entity about which knowledge is to be gained. By extension, it also concerns only such deficient mental states which are "about" real entities, which have a real substrate,[26] such as the misidentification of real and perceived mother-of-pearl as silver, or the misidentification of a fire-possessing place as being a place without fire. By contrast, deficient mental states or inferences about construed property-bearers – here one might think of the Sāṅkhya's primordial matter (*prakṛti*) – are exempt from it, simply because nothing is perceived in the inference situation. Such inferences still remove a deficient mental state, because all inferences remove deficient mental states, but they do not remove one which pertains to a real entity perceived in the situation where the inference takes place.

Moreover, this account connects perceptual ascertainment with deficient mental events through their respective causes: if it is possible that immediately after an instance of perception, there arises either perceptual ascertainment or a deficient mental event, at least some of the causes for perceptual ascertainment must be such that their absence is responsible for the production of error or doubt. In order to clarify what type of factors precisely cause those deficient mental events that are to be removed through inference, it is there-

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[26] For the distinction between error with substrate and error without substrate in classical Indic theories of error, see SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 149.

fore necessary to examine further the causation of perceptual ascertainment, even if this in textual terms unfortunately turns out to be more difficult than might be expected.

The causation of perceptual ascertainment and of deficient mental events

The verse PV 1.60, together with the prose PVSV 31,26-32,12, is the sole passage in PVSV which lists factors responsible for the emergence of perceptual ascertainment. Unfortunately, it does not directly address the question which of these factors are responsible for the arising of an ascertaining cognition rather than an erroneous or doubtful one because its main explanatory interest lies elsewhere. Arriving at a plausible hypothesis about these causes is nevertheless possible, but requires some extrapolation.

The central part of the passage is PVSV 32,5-12:

> *anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati, yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ. tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo 'nubhavād bhedaniścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ. teṣām eva ca pratyāsattitāratamyādibhedāt paurvāparyam, yathā janakatvādhyāpakatvāviśeṣe 'pi pitaram āyāntam dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti. so 'pi bhavan niścayo 'sati bhrāntikāraṇe bhavat.|*
>
> [1] (Perceptual) experience produces ascertaining cognitions (*niścayapratyaya*) in accordance with (a person's) habituation to a [correct] conceptual cognition [with a certain content] (*yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ*), as for instance when (an ascetic, a lecher and a dog respectively) conceive of (a woman's corpse) as a corpse, as desirable or as something to eat, even though the perception of (its) appearance does not differ (for these three beings). In this case, acuity of (conceptual) cognition (*buddhipāṭava*), a (state of) habituation to the imprint of this (conceptual cognition) (*tadvāsanābhyāsa*), situation-context and the like cooperate [with perception] in the production, out of (an instance of perceptual) experience, of a cognition that ascertains a distinctive (property) (*bheda*). The precedence (of ascertainment) (*paurvāparya*), moreover, is due to the

difference in degree, etc. of proximity (*pratyāsatti*) of precisely these (cooperating causes), as for instance when (a person), having seen (his) father approach, (determines) "my father is coming", (and) not "my teacher (is coming)", even though (the approaching person) is likewise father and teacher.

[2] Moreover, this ascertainment (that follows immediately after a perception) arises – (if it) arises (indeed) (*bhavan*) (?)[27] – when a cause for error is absent.[28]

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[27] The function of the present participle *bhavan*, attributed to *niścayaḥ*, is not entirely clear.

Such uses of *bhavan*, in combination with an indicative main verb, but also with one in optative mood or future tense, are not uncommon in *śāstric* language, cf., e.g., TSP 475,16f.: *yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte śabdādau dharmiṇi kṛtakatvādinā 'nityatvaniścayo bhavan pramāṇaṃ bhavati, tathā samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścayo bhaviṣyati.* TSP 225,13f.: *tathā hi – padārthasyopalambho bhavan sākāreṇaiva vijñānena bhaved anākāreṇa vā.* TSP 614,22f.: *na cātra vyatiriktasya saṃvedane kaścit pratibandho 'sti. tathā hi pratibandho bhavan bhavet tādātmyaṃ tadutpattir vā.* It seems that in these instances, as well as in others, *bhavat*, when attributed to an entity, indicates that its occurrence is not necessary, or that the acceptance of the corresponding concept is not self-evident, but depends on further conditions: a *pratibandha*, for instance, if it exists – that is, if it obtains for the case under discussion, but precisely this cannot be taken for granted and remains to be examined –, will consist either in *tādātmya* or in *tadutpatti*.

In the present case, this tentative assumption yields the following interpretation: if an ascertaining cognition arises indeed – but its arising is not always the case, because it only arises when the *niścayapratyaya*s are instantiated –, it does so only with respect to those aspects of reality which are not subject to fundamental error (cf. further below for the meaning of *bhrāntikāraṇa*).

[28] For other translations of this passage, see ZWILLING 1976: 107, and KYŪMA 2002: 187f. For a summary, see FRAUWALLNER 1932: 257.

Paragraph [1] first states that an instance of perception, here referred to as *anubhava*, produces ascertaining cognitions in accordance with *vikalpābhyāsa*, that is, in accordance with the habituation of the cognising person to a conceptual cognition, resulting from its repeated experience or deliberate training in the past. We can surmise that this conceptual cognition is specified by having a particular content, for naturally, the repeated experience/training of conceptualising lemons will hardly habituate me to the conceptualisation of airplanes. Moreover, since such habituation is supposed to be responsible for the production of ascertainment, the conceptual cognitions experienced in the past must have been correct, for Dharmakīrti will hardly have believed that repeatedly mistaking mother-of-pearl for silver will result in the correct determination of mother-of-pearl as mother-of-pearl on the next occasion.

The author next adduces the rather graphic example of an ascetic, a dog and a lecher, who, when they see a woman's corpse, ascertain it respectively as a corpse, as something to eat, and as desirable, in reliance on the cooperating causes *buddhipāṭava*, *tadvāsanābhyāsa*, *prakaraṇa*, and the like (*ityādayaḥ*). These factors therefore – at least primarily – explain why, out of several equally possible interpretations of seen reality, one arises for a certain person or being rather than another. Moreover, within a smaller range of possible interpretations of perceived reality available to one and the same cognising person, such as "being a father" or "being a teacher", the degree, etc. (*-ādi*) of "proximity" (*pratyāsatti*) of these cooperating causes decides on which one dominates and therefore actually arises.[29] What is meant by "proximity", and what is indicated by

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[29] Or: the degree, etc. of proximity decide on which one arises first, in an actual situation where several ascertainments arise in succession? I do not consider this as the most plausible interpretation, but in view of the un- →

-ādi after *tāratamya* in the compound, remains obscure, also from the commentaries, but this semantic uncertainty can be left aside for the time being, since the main burden for the explanation undoubtedly lies on the "cooperating causes" themselves.

But what is actually the issue at hand? The passage is introduced with the question why, if a real entity which is different from everything else is perceived, it is not ascertained precisely in this fashion, that is, as different from everything else and therefore in its own, unique own-being with all its aspects.[30] Dharmakīrti's answer: because the causes which cooperate with the perception in bringing about an ascertainment are incomplete (*sahakārivaikalyāt*, PVSV 31,27f.). Judging from the example of the woman's corpse, the author primarily aims to explain the partial nature of ascertainment through factors which render different forms of ascertainment relevant to different cognising persons. All these possible forms are correct, in that the dead woman can indeed be correctly identified in these various ways. It may be mentioned in passing that Dharmakīrti's list, insofar as it focuses on factors which render a particular interpretation relevant in a particular situation, coincides with two lists given by Bhartṛhari, where factors such as "situation-context" (*prakaraṇa*), "sentential connection" (*vākya*) or "spatial and temporal context" (*deśakāla*) are enumerated as responsible for deciding which of several possible meanings a word/utterance actually has on specific occasions.[31]

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certainties surrounding *pratyāsatti* and *-ādi* in the compound, it cannot be entirely ruled out.

[30] PVSV 31,26-28: *kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarvato bhinne vasturūpe 'nubhavotpattāv api tathaiva na smārto niścayo bhavati?*

[31] VP 2.314-315: *vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād aucityād deśakālataḥ / śabdārthāḥ pravibhajyante na rūpād eva kevalāt / saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā / arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya san-* →

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nidhiḥ || sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādyaḥ | śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ || "From sentential connection, situation-context, meaning (of co-occurring words, i.e., textual context), propriety/suitability, spatial and temporal context, the meaning of words is differentiated, not merely from their form. Accompaniment by an entity that would serve to distinguish and absence of an entity that would serve to distinguish, mention of an entity that regularly accompanies, opposition, meaning (of co-occurring words), situation-context, indication available in a related sentence, presence of a specifying word, probability, propriety/suitability, place, time, gender, (and) accent, etc. are causes for remembering the specific (meaning) when the meaning of a word is not delimited." This paraphrasing translation closely follows the summary of the verse in AKLUJKAR 1990: 147; for other, slightly varying translations, cf. IYER 1977 and RAGHAVAN PILLAI 1971.

Already in BIARDEAU 1964: 418, it has been noted that VP 2.314 is modelled after Bṛhaddevatā 2.318: *arthāt prakaraṇāl liṅgād aucityād deśakālataḥ | mantreṣv arthavivekaḥ syād itareṣv iti ca sthitiḥ ||* "From the meaning [of other words or sentences?], from situation-context, gender/indication, appropriateness, from (considerations of) place and time, there will result the determination of meaning for *mantra*s; such is the settled rule for other (genres of speech/writing), too." (Cf. also MACDONNELL 1904.)

The partial overlap of items in both lists in VP, as well as the close resemblance of VP 2.314 to the verse from the Bṛhaddevatā, suggest that Bhartṛhari for some reason juxtaposed lists from different sources, modifying that from the Bṛhaddevatā or taking it over from another source where it had already been changed. That these are actually two lists is also confirmed by VPṬ 127,13f. on VP 2.314: *anye 'pi tanniścayāya prakārā 'nusandhātavyaḥ. ślokavaśāc codāharaṇamātram eva darśitam iti mantavyam.* (Cf. also VPVṛ 273,8f., which, however, contains lacunae.) Note that VP 2.315-316 seem to have missed from the text used by Biardeau, which is probably why this issue has not been pursued any further by her. For Kāṇḍa 2, this was the edition Benares 1887, Benares Sanskrit Series vols. 19 (?) and 24. That k.316 is missing from the Benares edition is also noted in RAGHAVAN PILLAI 1971: 108, n.263. A →

However, in Dharmakīrti's case, the incompleteness of the factors listed, which have previously been termed "causal factors for ascertainment" (*niścayapratyaya*),[32] was in a different passage also said to be responsible for error.[33] While the present passage is on the surface mainly concerned with epistemic relevance, at least some of the factors that it mentions must therefore also have been considered responsible for epistemic correctness – their absence does not result in the emergence of a different, equally relevant ascertainment, but rather results in the emergence of error instead of ascertainment. That the list itself is not complete – after all, it ends in *-ādayaḥ* – need not disturb us, for given that this is the only place where Dharmakīrti lists the *niścayapratyaya*s, we can surely

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detailed examination of the genesis of these lists has, to my knowledge, not yet been undertaken.

For a general assessment of VP 2.314-316, cf. AKLUJKAR 1990: 558, n.13: "There is some overlap in the list [i.e., in VP 2.314-316 as a whole, B.K.] that follows by the very nature of the matter involved and because the list evolved through the efforts of generations of thinkers. For the latter reason, there is also an element of variation in the understanding or definition of terms involved. For example, *prakaraṇa* and *sāmarthya* obviously had wider meanings in addition to their specific meanings determined on the basis of other factors included in the list(s)."

[32] I here assume, on the basis of Karṇakagomin's commentary, that the factors listed in PVSV 32,5-12 and referred to as *bhedaniścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ* are the same ones previously referred to as *niścayapratyaya*.

[33] See PVSV 26,19f.: ... *niścayapratyayavaikalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyaṃ paśyāmīti manyate.* The incompleteness of the causal factors for ascertainment results in a non-ascertainment, i.e., in the mistaken belief that one sees a form common to silver and mother-of-pearl, when in fact only mother-of-pearl is perceived.

expect the key factor responsible for epistemic correctness to be expressly mentioned in it.[34]

The factor "situation-context" (*prakaraṇa*) can be ruled out as a factor whose absence leads to error. First of all, it seems that a "situation-context" in general is not something that can be "absent" or "incomplete", but only something that can be different under different circumstances. Secondly, while a given situation-context such as a medical conversation may well explain why someone ascertains a fruit as medicine, and not as tasty, it hardly explains why someone ascertains it as medicine instead of mistaking it for a pot.[35]

As candidates for conditions for epistemic correctness, we are thus left with the three expressions *vikalpābhyāsa*, which occurs in the sentence that precedes the actual list, *buddhipāṭava*, and *tadvāsanābhyāsa*, both of which occur in the list itself. In later texts of the

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[34] As additional factors covered by *-ādayaḥ*, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin list *arthitva*, *sāmarthya*, and the like (!). Cf. PVṬ D70b7-71a1 = Q83a8 = PVSVṬ 142,16f.: *ādiśabdād arthitvasāmarthyādiparigrahaḥ.* The former could mean either "interest [of the cognising person in the aspect that comes to be ascertained]" or "usefulness [of the seen object, in that fashion in which it is ascertained, for the cognising person]", and the latter might mean "propriety" or "suitability". However, the actual semantics of these notions remain so far unknown and do not become any clearer from similar lists given by Kamalaśīla or Arcaṭa, cf. TSP 244,17, 478,13ff., 707,19f., HBṬ 22,11, 26,21f.

[35] A medical conversation, as situation-context for ascertaining a particular fruit as medicine, is given as an example for *prakaraṇa* by Śākyabuddhi and Śaṅkaranandana: PVṬ D70a6f. = Q83a6f.: *dper na sman pa la sogs pa'i gtam gyi skabs su bab pa na / de mthoṅ ba las skyes bu chos du ma yod du zin kyaṅ sman pa la sogs pa ñid du ṅes pa lta bu'o //* PVṬ(Ś) D191a3f. = Q221b5f.: *sman pa'i skabs su gnas par 'gyur ba'i skyes bu la sman par ṅes pa yin no //*

tradition, *abhyāsa* is in at least two different contexts assigned the function of keeping away error. First, in the discussion about intrinsic or extrinsic validity (*prāmāṇya*) of cognitions that is led in various post-Dharmakīrtian treatises, a "habituated perception" (*abhyāsavat pratyakṣam*) is said to be intrinsically valid because causes for error are removed from the mind stream of the cogniser.[36] Second, in a context that is closer to the one in PVSV, Jñānaśrīmitra in his *Anupalabdhirahasya* repeatedly states that habituated persons, or persons whose perceptions are acute, do not perform inferences for cognising certain aspects of reality, but instead determine them through perceptual ascertainment.[37] Because repeated experience or training can be assumed to produce a state where one's perceptions are acute, acuity can be considered a result of a process of habituation. The mention of either "acuity" or "habituation" by Jñānaśrīmitra can therefore be considered simply a matter of different emphasis.[38] However, while these later materials confirm that acuity and habituation are the key factors responsible for the correctness of perceptual ascertainment, they depart from the passage in PVSV

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[36] See STEINKELLNER 1992: 259, and, among others, TSP 938,19-23, PVinṬ(a) 13,5-14,6.

[37] See AR 186,16-23 where, in connection with the quotation of PV 3.107cd *vyavasyantīkṣaṇād eva sarvākārān mahādhiyaḥ*, someone whose mind is sharp (*paṭudhi*) is said to ascertain the absence of a real entity solely on the basis of perception, whereas someone whose mind is not sharp (*apaṭu*) requires inference. Cf. in particular AR 186,22: *pratyakṣāpāṭava eva hy anumānaṃ prārthyate*, "... for it is only when perception is not sharp that inference is striven for". In AR 185,10, 185,27, 186,11, 189,22, 189,27, a state of habituation (*abhyāsadaśā*) or a specific habituation (*abhyāsaviśeṣa*) is invoked as the decisive factor.

[38] On *abhyāsa*, see also the useful general observations in KYŪMA 2002, where the term is translated as "repetition" (Japanese *hanpuku*).

in one important respect, at least if Śākyabuddhi's interpretation of it is adopted.

Both Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin liken *buddhipāṭava* to a yogi's perceptual acuity which ensures direct perceptual awareness of such fundamental aspects of reality as momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*).[39] In other words, *buddhipāṭava* as mentioned in the list is *like* a yogi's perceptual acuity, which implies that the two are not fully identical. This seems reasonable, because meditative concentration on such aspects of reality as momentariness or selflessness results in a yogi's direct perceptual awareness of these aspects, whereas the *niścayapratyaya*s are considered responsible for the production of a relevant and correct conceptual cognition immediately after an instance of sensory perception. This functional difference also extends to *tadvāsanābhyāsa* when understood as "habituation to the imprints of this (*buddhi*)".

But if *buddhipāṭava* is only *like* yogic perceptual acuity, how is it to be understood in its function to ensure the correctness of perceptual ascertainment on the part of ordinary persons? Not surprisingly, Śākyabuddhi interprets *tadvāsanābhyāsa* as habituation to imprints of ascertaining cognitions, which implies that *buddhi* was understood as equivalent to *vikalpa* in *vikalpābhyāsa*. This turns *tadvāsanābhyāsa*, "habituation to imprints of this (ascertaining cognition)" into an explication, or specification, of *vikalpābhyāsa*, "habituation to a conceptual cognition". Indeed, Śākyabuddhi indicates a conceptual connection between these two items to the effect that the initial mention of *vikalpābhyāsa* as an ex-

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[39] PVSVṬ 142,15f.: *buddheḥ pāṭavaṃ tīkṣṇatā. yathā yogināṃ buddhipāṭavād darśanamātreṇa kṣaṇikatvādiniścayaḥ* = PVṬ D70b4f. = Q83a4f. Other translations of *buddhipāṭava* in the present context are "Frische des Geistes" (FRAUWALLNER 1932: 257) and "[the degree of] sagacity" (ZWILLING 1976: 107).

planatory factor had "to be completed" (*bskaṅ bar bya ba*, **pūrya*?) by the subsequent indication of *tadvāsanābhyāsa*.[40] It is possible that the additional information conveyed by *buddhipāṭava* and *tadvāsanābhyāsa* is precisely that the conceptual cognition to which the person must be habituated is ascertaining, if we assume that only ascertaining cognitions can be "acute" (*paṭu*) and that the notion of an "acuteness of error" is self-contradictory for Dharmakīrti and his commentators.

Secondly, the "completion" of *vikalpābhyāsa* by *tadvāsanābhyāsa* may also have had a further dimension, even though this is by no means certain. From a theoretical viewpoint, a mere habituation to concepts, which are after all viewed as context-insensitive labels abstracted from disparate and momentary reality, would hardly be able to ensure the arising of ascertainment immediately after per-

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[40] PVṬ D70b5f. = Q83a5f.: *de'i bag chags goms pa ni* (*tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ*) *ṅes pa'i śes pa de'i bag chags de goms śiṅ rgyun chags su 'jug pa ste, dper na skyes bu 'ga' źig la yon tan du ma yod du* (*ma yod du* om. Q) *zin kyaṅ ji ltar goms pa bźin du yon tan ṅes pa la* (*la* om. Q) *lta bu'o || 'dis ni rnam par rtog pa la ji ltar goms pa bźin* (*yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ*) *źes bśad pa gaṅ yin pa de kho na'i gtan tshigs bskaṅ bar bya ba'i phyir yaṅ bzlas pa yin no ||* The syntax of the final sentence is not entirely clear; I tentatively translate as follows: "with this [immediately preceding explanation of *tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ*], the reason/cause (*gtan tshigs*, **hetu*) (indicated) in the solitary/in this very explanation (given with) *yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ* is also (*yaṅ*?) discussed (*bzlas pa*, **jalpita*?), because (this reason/cause) is to be completed (*bskaṅ bar bya ba*, **pūrya*?)." In other words, the mention of *yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ* alone as a reason/cause asks for "completion", i.e., additional explanation or specification, and this completion is provided with *tadvāsanābhyāsa* when interpreted as a habituation to the imprints of an ascertaining cognition.

Even if this last sentence were to be read differently, the preceding interpretation of *tadvāsanābhyāsa* clearly evidences an attempt to interpret it as an equivalent to or specification of *vikalpābhyāsa*.

ception *in similar contexts* in the future. What is required is not only knowledge of situation-independent semantics, but rather knowledge, by experience, of the use of concepts *in* specific situations. It is not certain whether Buddhist epistemologists in general reflected upon this pragmatic aspect of habituation, or whether it was at all relevant as background for Śākyabuddhi's interpretation of the relationship between *vikalpābhyāsa* and *tadvāsanābhyāsa*. But it is at least possible that the occurrence of *vikalpa* in *vikalpābhyāsa* is significant in this respect, namely if *vikalpa* is interpreted as a mental event with conceptual content, referred to under the aspect of its occurrence in a certain situation, and not merely as a type of cognition. The term *vikalpābhyāsa* would then refer to a habituation to a content-specific conceptual cognition as it occurs in a specific situational context, and the "imprint" (*vāsanā*) of this *vikalpa* is not a mere concept such as "corpse" or "desirable", but an impression left behind by the correct application of this concept in a certain situation. In other words, the imprint can be expected to, as it were, store and preserve situation-specific information and not merely information about the general semantics of concepts. As the texts are transmitted, it is not possible to determine whether such considerations informed either Dharmakīrti's conception of the *niścayapratyaya*s or Śākyabuddhi's interpretation of PVSV 32,5-12, but it may be useful to bear these considerations in mind when examining further and related occurrences of *abhyāsa*.

In the context of explaining the relevance/correctness of perceptual ascertainment, Śākyabuddhi's interpretation of a habituation to conceptual imprints and an acuity of conceptual cognitions seems better suited than the accounts of perceptual acuity and, by exten-

sion, a habituation to perceptions that were mentioned above,[41] simply because perceptual imprints alone are inadequate for ensuring the production of perceptual ascertainment in the future – after all, repeatedly seeing a woman's corpse will hardly make me ascertain it as a corpse, and not as something else, when I perceive it next time; surely, what is called for is a habituation to conceptualisation, to ascertainment.[42] For this reason, I have decided to follow Śākyabuddhi in the interpretation of PVSV 32,5-12, even though it may turn out that this view proved to be controversial or problematic in the tradition itself – after all, there may have been a reason why precisely this passage from his commentary was not taken over by Karṇakagomin who otherwise closely follows his predecessor.

In spite of the apparent concern of PVSV 32,5-12 with epistemic relevance and not with epistemic correctness, we can thus extrapolate that the crucial presupposition for perceptual ascertainment as opposed to error consists in a mental state where, as a result of repeated experience or training of certain correct conceptual cognitions in the past, an instance of perception instantly triggers an association with a correct and relevant feature that can be attributed to the perceived entity. For the sake of terminological convenience, this particular state of mind will from now on be referred to as a *state of habituation*, whereas its absence will be referred to as *lack of habituation*, or *insufficient habituation*. If the view that this is a

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[41] An interesting critique of *abhyāsa* which focuses precisely on this question can be found in PKM 33,17f.: *atha ko 'yam abhyāso nāma, bhūyodarśanaṃ bahuśo vikalpotpattir vā?*

[42] The description of *abhyāsa* in KATSURA 1984: 225 as "repeated experience of a given object" may therefore be misleading because the repetition implied in *vikalpābhyāsa* applies to a content-specific conceptual cognition, and not to a direct perceptual experience of an object.

habituation to conceptual cognitions should turn out as problematic, the fact still remains that some form of habituation serves as the key factor responsible for the correctness of perceptual ascertainment, and that insufficient habituation is the key factor responsible for the production of error or doubt.

Lastly, in paragraph [2] of PVSV 32,5-12, it is added that ascertainment arises instantly after perception only if "a cause/causes for error" (*bhrāntikāraṇa*) is/are absent. Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin interpret this as a reference to a scope-restriction of perceptual ascertainment: perceptual ascertainment arises when the causal factors for ascertainment are present, but solely with regard to those aspects of reality for which ordinary beings are properly predisposed.[43] For ordinary persons whose cognitive faculties are not as highly developed as those of yogis or Buddhas can in principle

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[43] In other words, *asati bhrāntikāraṇe* is held to answer the following objection: "Even though they are habituated to a conceptual cognition of momentariness and selflessness, which is a contributing cause [for perceptual ascertainment], those who do not see the truth (*tattvādarśin*) do not ascertain momentariness, etc. on account of perception [alone]." PVṬ D71a4f.-Q83b5f. = PVSVṬ 142,25f.: *nanu saty api kṣaṇikatvanairātmyavikalpābhyāse sahakāriṇi* (*sahakāriṇi* ms 54a1-2 : *sahakāriṇī* PVSVṬ) *tattvādarśināṃ na pratyakṣāt kṣaṇikatvādiniścayo bhavatīty ata āha ...*

By contrast, Śaṅkaranandana interprets *asati bhrāntikāraṇe* to exclude cases such as a mirage, i.e., to refute the following objection: "[Objection:] Even if [all] cooperating causes exist, [it may be the case that] there is no ascertainment of a distinctive quality, as for instance in cases like a mirage (**marīcikā*)." PVṬ(Ś) D191b4f. = Q222a6f.: *gal te lhan cig byed pa rnams yod kyaṅ khyad par ṅes pa yod pa ma yin te / dper na smig rgyu dag la bźin no /* Since it is not certain whether Śaṅkaranandana proposed his own distinctive theory of errors of the type of mirages (in this context, cf. also a possibly related passage in Dharmottara's PPar II referred to above in n.8), or whether the text is corrupt, it is not possible to tell exactly what sort of *bhrāntikāraṇa* the author aims at.

not ascertain fundamental aspects of reality such as momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) or selflessness (*nairātmya*) immediately after a perception.[44] Being afflicted with ignorance (*avidyā*), they will inevitably identify real entities as permanent or endowed with a self after perceiving them. The resultant error may be temporarily removed through a subsequent inference, like, for instance, the inference from existence to momentariness (*sattvānumāna*), but it will occur again the next time a real entity is perceived and the intention to determine its momentariness exists.

Two descriptions of inferential processes according to post-Dharmakīrtian treatises

The peculiar relationship between perceptual and inferential ascertainment within a certain domain of aspects of seen reality, namely those which are not subject to the power of ignorance, is also assumed as part of one particular description of inferential processes. This is the description given by Dharmottara of the *śiṃśapā*-inference, one of the most common illustrations of inferences based on a reason of essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).[45] Dharmottara's is the

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[44] See PVSV 21,6-9: *tāṃ punar asya kṣaṇasthitidharmatāṃ svabhāvaṃ svahetor eva tathotpatteḥ paśyann api mandabuddhiḥ sattopalambhena sarvadā tathābhāvaśaṅkāvipralabdho na vyavasyati sadṛśāparotpattivipralabdho vā.*/ See also PV 3.106cd-107, where it is emphasised that beings with sublime cognitions – i.e., yogis or Buddhas – determine all aspects of reality solely by perception: ... *moho viniścetur apāṭavāt* ... / *tasyaiva* (sc. *moha*, k.106d) *vinivṛttyartham anumānopavarṇanam* / *vyavasyantīkṣaṇād eva sarvākārān mahādhiyaḥ.*

[45] The main passage used for the following description is NBṬ 106,11-107,2: *yatra pracuraśiṃśape deśe 'viditaśiṃśapāvyavahāro jaḍo yadā kenacid uccāṃ śiṃśapām upadārśyocyate 'yaṃ vṛkṣa iti tadā 'sau jāḍyāṃś śiṃśapāyā uccatvam api vṛkṣavyavahārasya nimittam avasyati tadā yām evānuccāṃ paśyati śiṃśapāṃ tām evāvṛkṣam avasyati. sa mūḍhaḥ* →

most explicit and articulate description located so far, but passages in the works of other Buddhist epistemologists contain descriptions with the same main structural features, sometimes applying to *svabhāvahetu-*, sometimes to *anupalabdhihetu-*inferences.

The inference "this is a tree, because it is a *śiṃśapā*" is understood to establish that a seen *śiṃśapā* can be referred to with the expression "tree" due to its possession of branches and other distinguishing characteristics of trees. The inferential process is described in reliance on two temporally distinct situations. In the first situation, a dull (*jaḍa*) person who is faced with a place full of *śiṃśapā*-trees is shown a tall *śiṃśapā* and told that it is a tree. When faced with a small *śiṃśapā* in the second, later situation, the same person fails to call it a tree and is thus perhaps rightly termed a "dimwit" (*mūḍha*).[46] This failure to ascertain a *śiṃśapā* as a tree, which is said to amount to a false superimposition of "non-tree" on the tree, is rooted in an incorrect understanding of the "cause" (*nimitta*), that is, of the cause for the correct application of the designation "tree". The understanding is incorrect in the specific sense that the cause is

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śiṃśapātvamātranimitte vṛkṣavyavahāre pravartyate. noccatvādi nimittāntaram iha vṛkṣavyavahārasya, api tu śiṃśapātvamātraṃ nimittaṃ śiṃśapāgataśākhādimattvaṃ nimittam ity arthaḥ (translated in STEINKELLNER 1991: 321, n.58) See also PVSVṬ 33,17-21: *yadā 'yaṃ mūḍhamatiḥ śābaleye pravartitagovyavahāro bāhuleye śābaleyarūpaśūnyatvād govyavahāraṃ na pravartayati sa nimittapradarśanena govyavahāre pravartyate. sāsnādisamudāyanimittako hi govyavahāro na śābaleyarūpanimittikaḥ. bāhuleye 'pi tannimittam astīti katham asau na pravartyate.* Analogous descriptions with slightly varying examples are given in PVinṬ 2 D202a5-b2 = Q240a3-b1 and PVinṬ 1 D26a1-b5 = Q29a5-30a4.

[46] STEINKELLNER 1967: 184, n.97 describes such a "dimwit" as "clumsy" ("schwerfällig") in cognition and action, whereas cognisers who are *amūḍha* are people with "normal reactions" (" ... der ... normal reagiert ... "). See also TORELLA 1994: 140, n.12, where the dimwit features as a "a torpid intellect", as opposed to a "normal person".

assumed to be overly narrow: the dimwit considers tallness as a part of the cause of the designation "tree", whereas the correct cause is nothing but the possession of branches and certain other features that distinguish trees from other plants or objects. This erroneous assumption of an overly narrow cause is attributed to forgetfulness,[47] since the dimwit had not only correctly determined the *śiṃśapā* as a tree in the first situation, but had also properly understood possession of branches, etc. as the correct cause, as the proper logical reason that is inseparably connected with the property of being a tree.

The actual inference takes place in the second, later situation, assisted by instruction on the part of another person in the form of an utterance like "you have used this expression before because of this cause",[48] serving to remind the dimwit of his own previous correct

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[47] See DhP 107,23f.: ... *paścāj jāḍyavaśāt tanmātraṃ nimittaṃ vismṛtya* ..., PVinṬ 1 D24b2f. = Q27b1: *tha sñad du źugs pa las blun pas phyis brjed* (: *brjod* D) *pa*, also D24b4 = Q27b3.

[48] For such "instructions" (in the case of inferences based on a *svabhāvānupalabdhi*-reason, where the non-perception of a perceptible is considered the cause of the designation "absent"), see PVinṬ 1 D23a5f. = Q25b6f.: *yul daṅ rgyu 'dis tha sñad 'di la khyod kyis sṅon źugs pa yin no źes rgyu daṅ bcas pa'i yul bstan pas pha rol po rmoṅs pa la rgyu mtshan daṅ bcas pa'i med pa'i tha sñad dran par byed do* // PVV 507,14-16: *pūrvam api tvayā dṛśyādarśanamātrako 'sadvyavahāraḥ pravartitaḥ. tatsadbhāvād ihāpi pravartayeti paraḥ pratipādyate.* Corresponding "instructions" for *svabhāvahetu*-based inferences are given in PVinṬ 3 D86a4 = Q102a4f., D86b3-5 = Q102b4-7, as well as PVinṬ 2 D198a7-b2 = Q235a3-5.

In some of these passages, the expression "object" (*viṣaya*) is used side by side with or instead of "cause" (*nimitta*), based on a conceptualisation of the relationship between probans and probandum as one between object and object-bearer (*viṣayin*) as evidenced in PVSV 5,1: ... *viṣayapratipattāv apy apratipannaviṣayīṇāṃ darśanāt*, cf. also PVin 1 34,5-14. →

ascertainment of both probans and probandum. Enabled to recall the inseparable connection, the dimwit then performs the inference "this is a tree, because it is a *śiṃśapā*." Durvekamiśra adds that people of even dimmer wit, who have not even ascertained the inseparable connection at a previous point in time, cannot carry out such inferences and need to be taught about the inseparable connection first.[49] By contrast, people who are not dimwits with respect to the said property ascertain it solely on the basis of perception, that is, through perceptual ascertainment.[50]

Dharmottara notes that Dharmakīrti's uses of *viṣaya* and *nimitta* always imply each other, see PVinṬ 1 D23a5 = Q25b5f.: *de bźin du gźan dag tu yaṅ yul gyi* (: *gyis* Q) *sgras rgyu 'phen* (: *phel* Q) *la rgyu'i sgras kyaṅ yul 'phen pa yin te / thams cad du slob dpon gyi tha sñad ni 'di lta bu yin no //*

[49] DhP 107,20: *ādita eva tena śākhādimattvamātraṃ nimittaṃ na gṛhītam* (statement of opponent which is endorsed), and DhP 107,22-25: *yaḥ prathamaṃ tāvat śiṃśapāgataṃ śākhādimattvamātram eva nimittam avasāya vṛkṣavyavahāraṃ pravartayat paścāj jāḍyavaśāt tanmātraṃ nimittaṃ vismṛtyānyad eva vṛkṣavyavahārakāle uccatvam api nimittam āsīd iti vyāmuhya tadoccatvam api vṛkṣavyavahāranimittam avakalpayatīti.* Insofar as the instruction on the part of a second person is accorded the function of reminding the dimwit of the previously ascertained inseparable relation in the relevant passages from PVinṬ (see the previous note for references), the assumption that such inferences can only be undertaken by dimwits who have in fact ascertained the relation before can also be attributed to Dharmottara.

[50] See PVinṬ 1 D26b1-5 = Q29b7-30a4: ... *rmoṅs pa ma yin pa ni mṅon sum ñid las so // ... rgyu mtshan ṅes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mṅon sum kho nas 'gyur ro //* PVinṬ 2 D202b2-4 = Q240b1-3: *'di lta bu la sogs pa mṅon sum sṅon du 'gro ba'i tha sñad ni thams cad du rjes su dpag pa kho nas rtogs par byed pa ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ gaṅ gi tshe rgyu mtshan la rmoṅs pa de'i tshe rjes dpag pas rtogs par byed do // rgyu mtshan la* (: *las* Q) *<ma> rmoṅs na ni mṅon sum ñid las don rtogs par 'gyur ro //* Note that, for Dharmottara, such perceptual ascertainment applies to af- →

It is not difficult to see how this description accords with the above extrapolations from PVSV: a real entity is perceived, and a property S that the perceiving person intends to ascertain is not ascertained immediately after perception. The person's forgetfulness, adduced in Dharmottara's description as the cause for this failure, can be interpreted as a result of insufficient habituation, which we have identified as the key cause for deficient mental events. It is this failure to ascertain S, tantamount to the erroneous assumption that the object is non-S, which necessitates ascertainment of S through inference. The deficient event which necessitates the inference is caused solely by the mental predisposition of the cognising person. If this predisposition changes through subsequent habituation, the person will in the future ascertain *śiṃśapā*s as trees immediately after perceiving them – experience and training remove the necessity of reasoning.

There is, however, a significant type of description of inferential processes in which no such relationship between perceptual and inferential ascertainment is involved, and most probably for good reasons. This description is useful because it permits us to reconstruct limitations to the scope of perceptual ascertainment. In explaining one by one the various sub-types of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), which vary in complexity depending on the degree of knowledge about the conceptual relationships causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), pervasion (*vyāpti*) and incompatibility (*virodha*) re-

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firmative ascertainment, and to negative ascertainment only when the negated entity is an instance of a cognition or mental image. Negative ascertainment with an external object such as a pot is categorically exempt from this rule and can only be established through inference. No other Buddhist epistemologist is known to draw such a distinction, and Jñānaśrīmitra expressly opposes it. See KELLNER 1997a for a (preliminary) treatment of this controversy.

quired for their application,[51] Dharmottara repeatedly adduces a principle that is to decide which type of reason is to be applied in a particular situation: if, due to certain features of the situation, it cannot be guaranteed that an object would be necessarily perceived if it existed,[52] then knowledge about conceptual relationships pertaining to this object must be introduced as the situation demands. More complex reasons which involve a higher degree of knowledge are to be applied in situations whose features render the application of simpler reasons impossible.

These features, as they are described in Dharmottara's works, comprise a host of factors: (a) excessive spatial distance, either because the object is too far away to be seen distinctly, or because it can only be perceived through a type of perception (e.g. tactile perception) that cannot operate from a certain distance, or because of both these reasons (five out of the ten complex types of non-cognition enumerated in NB according to PVinṬ, four according to NBṬ); (b) a part of the property-bearer in regard to which the object to be negated is not visible to the cognising subject (two types); (c) a combination of both these factors (one type); dim light (d) (one

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[51] See KELLNER 1997b: 497, n.8 and 501, n.22, for the various classifications of *anupalabdhi*-types in Indic and Tibetan Buddhist texts.

[52] This hypothetical conditional constitutes an "assumption of necessary perceivedness" (*dṛśyatvasambhavanā*, *dṛśyatvasamāropa*) and is central to the notion of situational perceptibility that restricts the logical reason of non-cognition, see KELLNER 1997c and 1999. Statements that emphasise the role of this conditional in the application of *anupalabdhi*-types are stereotypically repeated in NBṬ on each of NB 2.32-41 (with the exception of NB 2.36), e. g. NBṬ 126,3f.: *kāryānupalabdhiś ca yatra kāraṇam adṛśyaṃ tatra prayujyate. dṛśye tu kāraṇe dṛśyānupalabdhir eva gamikā.* See KELLNER 1999: n.30 for a list of corresponding passages in PVinṬ 2, and, further, PVṬ D17a3ff. = Q20b7ff, PVSVṬ 39,13ff., TBh 64,6-8, TSop 289,25-27, and PVA k.584cd with PVA 639,5f.

type according to NBṬ). In detail: (a) comprises *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*, *kāryaviruddhopalabdhi*, *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*, *kāraṇānupalabdhi* as explained in PVinṬ, *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*, (b) comprises *kāryānupalabdhi* and *viruddhakāryopalabdhi*, (c) is given with the *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi*, and (d) with the *kāraṇānupalabdhi* as explained in NBṬ. The description of the *vyāpakānupalabdhi*-example deserves special mention: There are two mountain tops next to each other, one so densely forested that it is not possible to discern individual tree species such as *śiṃśapā*s, the other with a *stūpa* but without any trees. It is not possible to directly ascertain the absence of a *śiṃśapā* on the treeless mountain top, for it cannot be guaranteed that a *śiṃśapā* would necessarily be seen if it existed. Dharmottara does not clearly state why this is the case, but merely claims that being a tree is perceptible (in the situation in question), whereas being a *śiṃśapā* is not. But even if the analysis is not clear, the following train of thought seems to be a fair reconstruction of the argument: The information in the situation renders it questionable whether a *śiṃśapā* would be clearly seen or identified, and permits an unequivocal visual perception and ascertainment only of a tree. It is the discernable absence of a tree on the mountain top with the stūpa which then allows one to indirectly infer the absence of *śiṃśapā*s.[53] Or, consider for instance the description of a *kāraṇānupalabdhi*-inference: a person sees some sort of vapour rising up from a lake in the near darkness of a winter dawn. He intends to ascertain that smoke is absent, but distance and dim light make it possible that, even if smoke existed, it might not be seen, that is, it might not be

[53] Cf. PVSVṬ 39,13-17, and also, though not as detailed, PVṬ D17a3f. = Q20b7-21a1. The *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* occupies an exceptional status, inasmuch as it represents a hypothetical inference (*prasaṅga*) and is perhaps for this reason the only type without an explanation of this type.

seen as smoke. Hence doubt persists as to what the seen substance actually is. He then looks at the dark lake and determines that fire is absent there – fire, whose bright colour would be necessarily seen if it existed. Recalling that smoke is an effect of fire, he reasons from the absence of fire as a cause to the absence of smoke as an effect and thus establishes the non-instantiation of smoke.[54]

In all cases there is either directly mentioned or at least implied a deficient mental event prior to the inference, namely that of doubt. This deficient event is, however, here mainly caused by unfavourable environmental circumstances, such as excessive distance, dim light, an object being partly hidden behind another, and so forth. It is because of such unfavourable circumstances that the perception in question does not trigger a mental association of the correct and appropriate imprints that may be present in the cogniser's mind stream. No indication is made that the acquisition of habituation would enable the person to ascertain the property in question immediately after perception. This suggests that perceptual ascertainment was considered impossible not only in cases where the cognising person lacks habituation, but also in cases where the perceptual image is, owing to unfavourable conditions in the environment, not clear or complete enough to trigger an association with

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[54] This is the description of the *kāraṇānupalabdhi*-situation according to NBṬ 136,2-7: *niṣkampāyatasalilapūrite hrade hemantocitavāṣpa<s>yodgame virale sandhyātamasi sati sann api tatra dhūmo na dṛśyata iti kāraṇānupalabdhyā pratiṣedhyate. vahnis tu yadi tasyāmbhasa upari plavamāno bhavet prajvalito rūpaviśeṣād evopalabdho bhavet. ajvalitas tu indhanamadhyaniviṣṭo bhavet. tatrāpi dahanādhikaraṇam indhanaṃ pratyakṣam iti svarūpeṇa ādhārarūpeṇa vā dṛśya eva vahnir iti tatrāsya prayoga iti.* See also PVinṬ 2 D210b1f. = Q251a4f. (where the relevant external parameter is said to be spatial distance, not dim light), PVṬ D17b4f. = Q21b1f., and PVSVṬ 40,11-15.

the properly habituated imprints, where it is in some sense below the required threshold for awakening the proper *vāsanā*s.

That such a type of limitation to the powers of habituation was indeed taken into account is further confirmed by a passage in Dharmottara's PVinṬ, where it is stated that habituation removes suspicion of error only when a perception does not occur under the influence of sleep, when its object is in spatial proximity, and when the conditions for manifestation are not unfavourable (*gsal byed mi mthun pa ma yin pas*, PVinṬ(a) 13,3f., *anāśaṅkyavyañjaka* DhP 19,9). This account deserves special notice in that environmental conditions such as spatial distance are here not connected with the occurrence of perception, but with the emergence of conceptualising cognitions subsequent to a perception. Thus, within the range of objects that I can see and that are therefore close enough to produce a perception, it is possible that the perceptual image of a vapour-like substance is because of too great a distance, or too little light, so unclear that it does not trigger an association with the imprint of smoke that I am actually interested in, and that I could ascertain immediately after seeing smoke if there was more light, or if I moved a little closer.

The reconstruction of these limitations is tentative to the degree that it relies on descriptions of inferential processes from later literature which are not contained in Dharmakīrti's works. However, at least at the present stage, these descriptions are not known to contain features which are connected specifically with views that developed only after Dharmakīrti, that conflict with tenets attested in his own writings, or that exhibit an entirely different philosophical perspective which might invest individual claims and views expressed by Dharmakīrti with a new function. These descriptions present more detail, but they do not, it seems, introduce new theoretical notions that would render their use in interpreting Dharmakīrti problematic.

Conclusions

In the *apoha*-section of the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti, Dharmakīrti not only develops his distinctive theory of conceptualisation and language, but also advances a psychological theory of inference: as one type of ascertaining cognition, inference serves to exclude, that is, remove, error and doubt. It is – amongst other things – for this reason that it has an "exclusion" (*vyavaccheda*) as its object. The other main form of ascertainment that is dealt with in PVSV, ascertainment which follows immediately after perception, serves to keep error and doubt away and for this reason also has an "exclusion" as its object. In both cases, the opposition between ascertainment and deficient mental states is used as argumentative support for claims about the nature of ascertainment itself: it is because of the function of ascertainment to remove or prevent error and doubt that it does not grasp real entities in the same direct fashion as non-conceptual perception, but rather grasps "exclusions". This connection between the character of ascertainment and its psychological function is worth noting because it invests the psychological function of inference with a theoretical significance that one would not readily expect it to have, and that at least some philosophers from other schools were not prepared to endorse. Bhāsarvajña, for instance, rejects the universal presupposition of deficient mental events on the part of inference by pointing to inferential processes which apparently happen spontaneously, as, in a manner of speaking, mental reflexes. Dharmakīrti's insistence that even in such cases a deficient mental event exists points to a divergence of opinions about what precisely is required to subsume a certain cognitive process under the heading of *anumāna*. It remains to be seen whether these divergences and the different psychological analyses involved in them were further addressed, or developed, in a later period.

Furthermore, with respect to a certain situation where a real entity is perceived, there exists according to our reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's position a specific relationship between perceptual and inferential ascertainment: provided that the cognising person intends to ascertain a certain aspect of the perceived entity, this aspect is either ascertained immediately after perception, or a deficient mental event – error or doubt – with respect to it arises instead. The former occurs provided that (a) the perception takes place in a favourable environment, meaning, e.g., that the spatial distance between the cogniser and the seen object is not too great, and provided that (b) the cogniser is habituated to the ascertainment in question because of repeated experience of it, in significantly similar situations, in the past. It is only if both conditions are fulfilled that perceptual ascertainment arises; if either of them is not fulfilled, a deficient mental event arises instead. This perhaps curious view, namely that when seeing an object I can only determine it correctly or be in error/doubt about it, is rendered somewhat more plausible by the added assumption that this process takes place in a situation where the cogniser's mind is, through a certain intention or wish, focused on ascertaining a particular aspect of seen reality. Perception is thus assumed to take place in a context – a situational context which comprises both a certain mental focus of the cognising person and certain environmental features of the situation itself, such as the spatial distance between cogniser and object, or lighting conditions.

Deficient mental events which arise after sensory perception can subsequently be removed through inference, provided, of course, that the cognising person is capable of properly identifying correct evidence for arriving at the desired item of knowledge, and of remembering the inseparable connection required to obtain between evidence and probandum. Such is, in short, the conception of the relationship between sense perception, perceptual and inferential ascertainment, and error or doubt as reconstructed on the basis of

Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti and two different descriptions of inferential processes provided in later texts of the Buddhist epistemological tradition.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

English titles of Japanese publications which are my own making are marked with an asterisk.

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VKSKS(O)	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd(- und Ost)asiens

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TSP *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): Dvarikadas Shastri (ed.), *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalshīla*. 2 vols. (Bauddha Bharati Series 1, 2) Varanasi 1968, reprint 1981, 1982.

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TSop *Tarkasopāna* (Vidyākaraśānti): Giuseppe Tucci, *Mi-*

nor Buddhist Texts, part I. Roma 1956, 275-310.

DhP — Dharmottarapradīpa (Durvekamiśra): Dalsukhbai Malvania (ed.), Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]. Patna ²1971.

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NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Pakṣilasvāmin): Anantalal Thakur (ed.), *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* (Nyāyacaturgranthikā 1) New Delhi 1997.

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NSū — *Nyāyasūtra*: See NBh.

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VPṬ — *Vākyapadīyaṭīkā* (Puṇyarāja): See VP 2.

VPVṛ — Vākyapadīyavṛtti: See VP 2.

ŚVV — *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā* (Umbeka): S.K. Ramanatha Sastri (ed.), *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa*. Revised by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangasvamy. Madras 1971 [1st edition 1940].

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gTsaṅ nag pa on Similar/Dissimilar Instances and Examples

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When explaining the *trairūpya*, that is the three characteristics presented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as a definition of a valid logical reason, Buddhist logicians in the Tibetan tradition usually proceed by first defining three "bases of dependence" (*ltos gźi*)[1] on which the three characteristics are grounded. These three bases of dependence are respectively: the subject (*phyogs*, *pakṣa*), which is the basis for the establishment of the first characteristic, i.e., the fact that the logical reason is a property of the subject (*phyogs chos*, *pakṣadharma*[*tā*]), similar instances (*mthun phyogs*, *sapakṣa*), which constitute the basis for the establishment of the pervasion of the logical reason by the property to be proved (*rjes su 'gro ba'i khyab*, *anvayavyāpti*), worded in terms of the reason's presence only in similar instances, and dissimilar instances (*mi mthun phyogs*, *vipakṣa*), on the basis of which one establishes the negative pervasion (*ldog pa'i khyab*, *vyatirekavyāpti*) or the reason's complete absence from dissimilar instances.

A divergence of opinion arose among Tibetan interpreters of Dharmakīrti's texts with regard to the definition of similar and dis-

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[1] This term can be found already in rṄog lo tsā ba's *Tshad ma rnam ṅes kyi dka' gnas rnam bśad* (rNam bśad) and is used systematically by gTsaṅ nag pa, Sa skya Paṇḍita and his commentators, as well as in the later *bsdus grwa* tradition. I have not found any correspondence for this term in Indian texts.

similar instances, leading to numerous controversies. As a consequence of these different definitions, their classification of knowables in the context of a particular inference also differed. One can distinguish two opposing positions that I will term "the three-*pakṣa* view" and the "two-*pakṣa* view". The three-*pakṣa* view is supported mainly by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) and followers of the *Tshad ma Rigs pa'i gter* (Rigs gter). As a quick outline: followers of the three-*pakṣa* view hold that knowables are to be divided into three distinct *pakṣa*: similar instances (*sapakṣa*), dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), and a third *pakṣa* consisting of instances for which the possession of the property to be proved is not determined. The subject is to be found in this third *pakṣa*, because its qualification by the property to be proved is questioned; if it is to remain an object of doubt, it cannot be classified as either a similar or a dissimilar instance. On the contrary, for subscribers to the two-*pakṣa* view, all knowables are classifiable in exactly two directly contradictory *pakṣa*: instances possessing the property to be proved on the one hand, and instances that do not possess it on the other. The subject, although constituting a distinct basis of dependence (*ltos gźi*), does not constitute a distinct *pakṣa*, but must be classified in either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*.

The difference between these two views might appear as a minor one, but it actually reveals much about the understanding of the inferential process by the respective proponents. In particular, because *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are used as bases of dependence for the second and third characteristics, the way they are defined influences the whole account of the ascertainment of these two characteristics, including the question of their logical equivalence. It also has an impact on technical points such as the interpretation of the fallacy arising in the case of "uncertain not-common logical reasons" (*asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*), as was already shown by Til-

lemans in his article titled "On *Sapakṣa*"[2], which contrasts Sa skya Paṇḍita's three-*pakṣa* view with the two-*pakṣa* view of post-Sa paṇ dGe lugs pa scholars. This article also shows how the latter's view, albeit considered by modern scholars as "unorthodox", actually finds support in Dharmakīrti's writings.

In the tenth chapter of the Rigs gter, which deals with inference for oneself (*raṅ don rjes dpag*, *svārthānumāna*), Sa skya Paṇḍita devotes long sections to the presentation and refutation of the opposing two-*pakṣa* view. Sa skya Paṇḍita himself does not identify his opponent(s) by name, and commentators merely state that the opposing view is that of most Tibetan logicians[3]. His account of the opponent's position is based on the presentation found in gTsaṅ nag pa's *Tshad ma rnam par ṅes pa'i ṭi ka legs bśad bsdus pa* (bsDus pa) and mTshur ston's *Tshad ma śes rab sgron ma* (sGron ma)[4]. As such, the gTsaṅ nag pa-mTshur ston view appears to be

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[2] TILLEMANS 1990.

[3] Only Glo bo mkhan chen identifies the opponent as gTsaṅ nag pa (Ñi ma 216: *slob dpon gTsaṅ nag pa la sogs pa'i bod dag*). Go rams pa says: "most Tibetans" (gSal byed 93a3: *bod phal cher*), Śākya mchog ldan: "Tibetan logicians" (Rol mtsho 104a4: *bod kyi rtog ge pa rnams*). In Pham byed, he never makes reference to gTsaṅ nag pa, but quotes several passages showing that Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge also subscribed to a two-*pakṣa* view.

[4] On gTsaṅ nag pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge (12th century) – one of the eight great disciples of Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) – and mTshur ston gŹon nu seṅ ge (1150-1210), who was one of Sa skya Paṇḍita's first teachers on *pramāṇa*, see JACKSON 1987: 104-107 and VAN DER KUIJP 1983 and 1989. On sGron ma, see VAN DER KUIJP 1993: 287-289. I am very thankful to Prof. van der Kuijp who made a copy of mTshur ston's text available to me. As far as the passages taken into consideration below are concerned, mTshur ston's text appears to be mainly a reformulation of gTsaṅ nag pa's tenets. sGron ma's formulation is usually clearer →

especially representative of the Tibetan two-*pakṣa* view before and during Sa skya Paṇḍita's time, and since both bsDus pa and sGron ma are extant, we can have a detailed account of this theory that does not rely exclusively on Rigs gter's presentation. The views of pre-Sa paṇ logicians such as gTsaṅ nag pa and mTshur ston must have played an important role in the early phase of the development of Tibetan epistemology. Also, their texts contain original interpretations of Dharmakīrti as well as innovative ideas that cannot be traced back to Indian texts. The question of their influence on the later Tibetan tradition, in particular on the authors of post-Sa paṇ *bsdus grwa* – who are generally considered to follow Phya pa's ideas – remains yet to be answered.

My goal here is to present some material that should contribute to a better understanding of the place of gTsaṅ nag pa among Dharmakīrti's interpreters on questions linked with inference, and in particular with the *trairūpya*. As background information, I will start with a presentation of gTsaṅ nag pa's definition of similar and dissimilar instances, and of the way knowables are to be classified as one or the other, leading to a clarification of notions such as "being a *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*" and "being present in *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*". Then, turning to the question of the ascertainment of the second and third characteristics, I present gTsaṅ nag pa's ideas on the nature and function of similar (*mthun dpe*, *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) and dissimilar examples (*mi mthun dpe*, *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*). In particular, I show their importance in the context of "uncertain not-common" (*thun moṅ ma yin pa ma ṅes pa*, *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) logical reasons and examine why, in this context, gTsaṅ nag pa in

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and more detailed than bsDus pa. Nevertheless, some parts of gTsaṅ nag pa's text do not find an equivalent in sGron ma. As far as the content is concerned, Rigs gter presents a view common to both gTsaṅ nag pa and mTshur ston, but from the specific choice of arguments or examples, it appears that Sa skya Paṇḍita's account in Rigs gter is closer to sGron ma.

point of fact resorts to using *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* not including the subject. I then argue that the two-*pakṣa* and the three-*pakṣa* views, although they appear, and intend to be, irreconcilable, actually have to deal with the same problem, namely the question of avoiding the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* (i.e., proving something that is already established) while ascertaining a universally valid necessary connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, and that they solve it using similar means, in particular resorting to examples.

gTsaṅ nag pa's definition of similar and dissimilar instances

Dharmakīrti's definition of similar and dissimilar instances as found in PVin or NB[5] – namely what is similar/dissimilar to the subject (*pakṣa*) on account of possessing the universal which is the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) – that Sa skya Paṇḍita will use to support his own definition – is accepted by gTsaṅ nag pa only as a definition of similar and dissimilar instances in an "etymological sense" (*sgra'i don*)[6]. As for "real" *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, they are defined using the following verse:

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[5] PVin 3 D4211 [Ce 202a2], cited in DhPr 98,9: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadabhāvo 'sapakṣaḥ*. NB 2.7-8=NP 2.2: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno 'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ / na sapakṣo 'sapakṣaḥ* / See TILLEMANS 1990: 58-59 for the diverse interpretations of this definition.

[6] The "etymological definitions" accounted for in bsDus pa 92a3-5 are: *mthun phyogs ni sa pha kṣa ces pa phyogs btags pa ba rtsod gźi daṅ bsgrub bya'i chos kyis 'dra ba* and *mi mthun phyogs ni a sa pha kṣa ces pa rtsod gźi daṅ bsgrub bya'i chos kyis 'dra ba myed pa* (sGron ma 37b2-4: *phyogs btags pa ba rtsod gźi' chos can daṅ bsgrub bya'i chos yod du mthun pa* and *phyogs daṅ bsgrub bya'i chos yod du mi mthun pa*).

sapakṣa/vipakṣa etymologically speaking and real *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* are then explained to stand in a *mu gsum* relation (although mTshur ston ar- →

> *bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las / mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs su brjod* [sGron ma: *'dod*]
>
> [An instance] is said to be a similar instance (*sapakṣa*) or a dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) on account of possessing or not possessing the property to be proved.

Although its author is not identified by name in the text, this verse can be recognized as Ratnākaraśānti's definition as termed in the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*[7].

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gues that *vipakṣa* stand in a *mu bźi* relation). The following examples are given: For *sapakṣa*: both "etymological" and real: a similar example; neither: a dissimilar example; real but not etymological: the subject (because it is not similar to itself). For *vipakṣa*: both "etymological" and real: dissimilar example; neither: similar example; etymological but not real: the subject.

Note that this distinction is already made by Phya pa in terms of *sgra bśad pa* and *mtshan ñid yod pa* (cf. Pham byed 27a1-4: *Rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug phya pa ni 'di ltar bźed de* [...] *mthun phyogs kyi mtshan ñid kyaṅ yod la sgra bśad pa'aṅ yod pa ni / sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na bum pa lta bu'o // mtshan ñid yod kyaṅ sgra bśad pa med pa sgra rtag par sgrub pa na nam mkha' la sogs pa lta bu'o // gñis ka med pa sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na nam mkha' lta bu'o // sgra bśad yod la mtshan ñid med pa ni mi srid pa ñid do // mi mthun pa'i phyogs la'aṅ de ltar bźed do //*)

This distinction is made by later dGe lugs pa authors such as 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa and Yoṅ 'dzin in their *rTags rigs* using the term *sgra bśad du 'jug gi mthun phyogs* for "*sapakṣa* etymologically speaking". See TILLEMANS 1990: 56.

7 AVS 100,4-5,101,4-7: *matau sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau / bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las / mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs su 'dod.* Translated in KAJIYAMA 1999: 127: "What is possessed of a probandum is regarded to be a similar case, and what is not possessed of it a dissimilar case."

This citation is identified as such in Raṅ 'grel 272: *kha cig slob dpon śānti pa'i rjes su 'braṅs nas bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ ldan pa mthun phyogs / mi ldan pa mi mthun phyogs źes zer la /*. Śākya mchog ldan →

As a consequence of this definition, knowables will be divided into two *pakṣa*, according to whether they are *bsgrub bya'i chos ldan* (possessing the property to be proved) or *bsgrub bya'i chos mi ldan* (not possessing the property to be proved). When explaining the meaning of *ldan*, gTsaṅ nag pa introduces an original feature that is already found in Phya pa's texts, but does not seem to have a source in Indian texts: gTsaṅ nag pa distinguishes two types of properties to be proved, namely properties of a substance (*rdzas pa'i chos*) – also termed properties based on a substance (*rdzas la rten pa'i chos*) – and properties of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*) – also termed properties based on a distinguisher (*ldog la rten pa'i chos*).[8] In doing so, he distinguishes three ways in which an in-

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mentions that this definition was already used by Phya pa (Pham byed 25b3: *Rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug phya pa ni / bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ ldan pa daṅ / mi ldan pa źes gsuṅ la/*). As will be shown below, gTsaṅ nag pa is not really a "follower of Ratnākaraśānti", for he does not agree with Ratnākaraśānti on the major question of *antarvyāpti*, nor on the explanation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. One can wonder why he would be quoting Ratnākaraśānti's definition if he disagreed with the main tenets of his view. One answer could be that gTsaṅ nag pa felt that quoting an Indian author instead of introducing a personal definition would bring a note of authenticity to his position.

[8] The notions of *rdzas* and *ldog pa* are first introduced by gTsaṅ nag pa in the section dealing with definitions (i.e., *mtshan gźi – mtshon bya – mtshan ñid*). gTsaṅ nag pa's definitions of these notions are the following:

bsDus pa 15a7: *ldog pa'i chos rnams 'bral mi śes par 'dus pa'i don ni de dag gi rdzas su brjod ciṅ 'dus ba can gyi chos rnams ldog par brjod pa yin te khrab daṅ byaṅ bu bźin no /* (sGron ma 14a6: *'dir rdzas daṅ ldog pa chos* [read: *ces*] *bya ba'i don gźi' cig gi steṅ du chos du ma 'bral mi śes par 'dus pa 'am tshogs pa ni rdzas yin la / 'dus pa can gi chos kha yar ba ni ldog pa yin te dper na khrab daṅ khrab kyi byaṅ bu bźin no /*)

→

stance can be said to "possess" (*ldan*) a property, that I will call modes of proof[9]:

If the property to be proved is a property of a substance (*rdzas chos*), there are two modes of proof. In the first one, the property is distinct (*tha dad*) from the subject. One proves the presence of the property to be proved on the locus of the subject (thus using the Tibetan verb *yod*), and subject and property stand in a relation described as "[constituting] a unique substantial aggregate"(*rdzas tshogs pa gcig*). A typical example of this is the proof of fire on the mountain by means of the logical reason "smoke". Mountain and

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rdzas must be seen as a kind of aggregate formed of different parts that would be the *ldog pa*, just as, in the example, a coat of mail (*khrab*) is formed by the juxtaposition of iron rings (*byaṅ bu*). This seems to amount to a distinction between the concrete and the abstract, but gTsaṅ nag pa's description of these two notions remains unclear and displays notable differences with the account of *rdzas* and *ldog pa* found in later *bsdus grwa* manuals, that identify *rdzas* with *dṅos po* (entity) and *don byed nus pa* (causally efficient), and *ldog pa* with ultimately unreal, mind-created concepts. Indeed, in bsDus pa, *rdzas* is said to be different from *dṅos po* (entity) and *raṅ dbaṅ du grub pa* (self-established). While keeping in mind these differences, I will translate *rdzas* by "substance", and *ldog pa* by "distinguisher". (Note also that in later *bsdus grwa* manuals the distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* is not used in the context of inference. For an account of these notions in later Tibetan textbooks, see ONODA 1980 and 1992: 54, 140-141, and DREYFUS 1997.)

[9] Cf. Raṅ 'grel p. 273 that introduces gTsaṅ nag pa's distinction in terms of *bsgrub pa'i tshul*. The formulation of the different modes of proof as well as examples found in bsDus pa 88b6 and 89a2 (sGron ma 35a5-7) are parallel to the presentation of three "modes of definition" (*mtshon pa'i tshul*) in bsDus pa 15b3-4 (sGron ma 14a9-b3). In that earlier passage the notions of *mtshan gźi, mtshon bya, mtshan ñid* in the process of defining (*mtshon pa*) play a role completely parallel to those of *rtsod gźi, sgrub bya'i chos, rtags* in the process of a proof (*bsgrub pa*) by inference.

fire are two distinct substances forming a unique aggregate. Accordingly, all the bases forming a unique aggregate with fire – as for instance a kitchen – are said to possess the property to be proved and are therefore similar instances, and those which do not – such as lakes – are dissimilar instances.

The second mode of proof is the case where the property is identical (*gcig*) with the subject. One proves that the subject has a certain nature (thus using the Tibetan verb *yin*), for instance when one proves that sound is impermanent. There, subject and property to be proved stand in a relation of substantial identity (*rdzas cig*).

The third mode of proof takes place when the property to be proved is a property of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*). The predicative relation explained in terms of "being based on the own distinguisher (*raṅ ldog*)" is also presented, by analogy with the case of distinct substances, in terms of the distinguishers constituting a unique aggregate (*ldog pa tshogs pa cig*)[10]. This technical formulation is usually replaced in the examples by the idea of the "own distinguisher" of the subject being suitable for the conventional designation expressed by the property to be proved. So for example when proving that "emptiness is a simple negation", what is aimed at is to prove that emptiness can have the designation "simple negation" (*stoṅ pa ñid med dgag gi tha sñad du ruṅ*).

Accordingly, the general interpretation of *ldan* (alternatively *rten*) is that an instance possesses the property to be proved if "the prop-

[10] What one is proving is literally that the subject "is that distinguisher" (*ldog pa der bsgrub*), or that the property is based on the subject as "own distinguisher" (*raṅ ldog*). Cf. DREYFUS 1997: 182, and p.501, n. 39: "The own distinguisher (also called the general distinguisher, *spyi ldog*) is the conceptual identity of the thing and equivalent to the distinguisher of that thing."

erty to be proved is based on [this] base like it is based on the subject".[11]

The classification of knowables

The basic tenet of the two-*pakṣa* view held by gTsaṅ nag pa is that there are only two *pakṣa*, meaning that all knowables are either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, which is expressed by saying that all knowables can be classified in the two *pakṣa*[12]. By showing that *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are directly contradictory (*dṅos 'gal*), one guarantees that what does not belong to one of them belongs to the other, and vice-versa. There is, therefore, no possibility of having instances which constitute a third *pakṣa* (or *phuṅ gsum*), be it a "positive *pakṣa*" (*bsgrub phyogs*, something that is both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*) or a

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[11] bsDus pa 88b6: *gźi gaṅ la rtsod gźi' la ji ltar bsgrub par bya ba'i chos de ltar rten pa* (sGron ma 35a5: *rtsod gźi' la bsgrub bya'i chos ji ltar bsgrub lugs ltar ldan pa yin*). The expressions *bsgrub tshul daṅ mthun par* "in keeping with the mode of proof" or *'god tshul daṅ mthun par* "in keeping with the mode of presentation" are often found in definitions in later Tibetan manuals (for example Yoṅ 'dzins's rTags rigs, respectively p.19 and p.23). No specific explanation is ever offered in those texts on what these modes of proof are. I think that gTsaṅ nag pa's distinction of the three modes of proof arising from his general interpretation of *ldan* could be the source of this formulation. Since later Tibetan scholars do not retain the distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* in this context, the issue of "keeping with the mode of proof" comes down to distinguishing cases where the property to be proved is identical with the subject (verb *yin*) and where it is distinct from the subject (verb *yod*) (cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 69, n. 21).

[12] I use the expression "classification of knowables into two *pakṣa*" to translate *phyogs gñis su śes bya kha tshon chod pa*. In fact *kha tshon chod pa* conveys the meaning of "determining", but it will be shown later that it does not have the same import as *ṅes pa* or *grub* as far as the idea of establishment is concerned.

"negative *pakṣa*" (*dgag phyogs*, something that is neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*).

gTsaṅ nag pa uses the above-mentioned distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* to overcome difficulties caused by the classification of problematic instances.[13] Indeed, the main characteristic of substances (*rdzas*) and distinguishers (*ldog pa*) is that a singular substance cannot be qualified by both a "property of a substance" (*rdzas chos*) and its opposite, and that a singular distinguisher cannot be qualified by both a property of a distinguisher and its opposite.[14] It follows that, when proving a property of a substance, all substances will necessarily belong to one or the other *pakṣa*, for with regard to a singular substance, only one of two opposite prop-

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[13] gTsaṅ nag pa's opponent presents cases that cannot be classified in exclusively one *pakṣa*. For example "pot" in the proof that smoke is a valid logical reason, or "simple knowable" in the proof that sound is impermanent. Cf. bsDus pa 90a3 (sGron ma 36a7).

[14] The clearest account of these characteristics is found in sGron ma 14a7: *rdzas chos daṅ ldog chos ces bya ba'i don yaṅ de daṅ de min gñis gźi' rdzas cig la 'gal na ni rdzas la rten pa'i chos yin te / dper na sṅo mi sṅo daṅ rtag mi rtag la sogs pa'o // de daṅ de min gñis ldog pa cig la 'gal na ni ldog pa la rten pa'i chos yin te / dper na gtan tshigs daṅ mtshan ñid daṅ med dgag daṅ ma yin dgag la sogs pa'o /* (bsDus pa 15a7: *de lta yin daṅ skye 'jig la sogs pa'i ldog pa 'ga' źig ni rdzas la rten pa'i chos yin te de daṅ de ma yin rdzas cig la mi ruṅ pa'i phyir ro // sgrub bya daṅ gtan tshigs la sogs pa 'ga' źig ni ldog pa la rten pa'i chos yin te ldog pa tha dad na rdzas gcig la'aṅ ruṅ pa'i phyir ro /*)

"And also the meaning of *rdzas chos* and *ldog chos* is the following: if being [x] and not being [x] are contradictory for a unique substantial basis, [x] is a property based on a substance, like for instance blue and not blue, permanent and impermanent, etc. If being [x] and not being [x] are contradictory for a singular distinguisher, [x] is a property based on a distinguisher, for instance 'logical reason', 'defining characteristic', 'simple negation', 'negation with positive implication', etc.".

erties can qualify the substance. The same reasoning is applied in parallel to the case of properties of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*). In doing so, gTsaṅ nag pa finds a firm grounding for his claim that the two *pakṣa* are directly contradictory. On the other hand, he is bound to make a concession on the basic proposition that **all** knowables are classifiable into two *pakṣa*, in order to disclaim the opponent's objection that since there is no contradiction in having two opposite properties of a distinguisher (*ldog chos*) qualifying one substance, when one proves the property of a distinguisher, some substances could constitute a "positive *pakṣa*" (*bsgrub phyogs*), and that inversely, when proving the property of a substance (*rdzas chos*), some distinguishers could constitute a "negative *pakṣa*" (*dgag phyogs*). gTsaṅ nag pa overcomes this objection by saying that when proving a property of a substance, only substances have to be classified, while distinguishers do not have to be classified since one is not affirming or negating a distinguisher. Correspondingly, in the case of the proof of a property of a distinguisher, only distinguishers have to be classified.[15] The instances that are not of the same type as the subject (i.e., *rdzas* or *ldog pa*) will then be considered to be outside the scope of the classification without ac-

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[15] bsDus pa 90a5: *de la 'dir me daṅ mi rtag pa la sogs pa rdzas la rten pa'i chos bsgrub pa'i tshe raṅ gi rten rdzas la kha tshon gcod pa na dṅos po daṅ śes bya rten pa'i rdzas gsum pa myed la / ldog pa gñi gar 'du ba mi 'gal te ldog pa dgag sgrub mi byed pa'i phyir ro //* [...] *gtan tshigs la sogs pa ldog pa la rten pa'i chos sgrub pa'i tshe rten ldog pa kha tshon gcod pa na ldog pa gsum pa med la rdzas gñi gar 'du ba mi 'gal te rdzas dgag sgrub mi byed pa'i phyir ro //* (Parallel passage in sGron ma 36a7-36b2)

Śākya mchog ldan (Pham byed 31a3) shows that this solution was already proposed by Phya pa, but while in gTsaṅ nag pa's text, emphasis is put on the fact that instances with a different nature from the property to be proved do not **have to** be classified, Phya pa points out that the main reason is that there are problematic cases that **cannot** be classified.

quiring the status of distinct *pakṣa*. This concession has the consequence that the notions of pervasion and contradiction also will have to be interpreted in relation to a referential (the domain of substances or distinguishers) instead of universally.

Within each type of proof (i.e., *rdzas* or *ldog pa*), the subject and the property to be proved as well as the logical reason also have to be classified.[16] As far as the subject is concerned, it is always a similar instance; this is easy to understand, for the possession of the property to be proved by the subject is a necessary condition for the thesis to be established. In the proof of the property of a substance, the property to be proved must be a similar instance. This is because properties of a substance are always homological, that is always qualify themselves.[17] As a consequence, a valid logical reason

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[16] Properties of a substance are themselves substances and properties of a distinguisher are themselves distinguishers.

[17] On the question of heterological/homological properties, note the parallel with the definitions of *rdzas chos* and *ldog chos* given in Yoṅs 'dzin bsdus grwa: *rdzas chos: khyod khyod raṅ yin, khyod ma yin pa khyod ma yin. ldog chos: khyod khyod raṅ ma yin pa 'am khyod ma yin de khyod yin pa gaṅ ruṅ yin pa.* See ONODA 1992: 54.

To account for the fact that something, although not literally speaking "based on itself", can be said to possess the property it itself is, gTsaṅ nag pa introduces a new interpretation of *ldan*, namely that when two terms are in a relation of predication, both the basis that possesses the property (*ldan gži*) and the property possessed (*ldan chos*) can be said to be *ldan*. bsDus pa 89a2 (sGron ma 35a7): *ldan pa'i brjod byar yaṅ rten pa rten chos gñi ga yaṅ 'dus pa yin te / gži 'am chos rkyaṅ pa la ldan pa'i sgra mi 'jug pa'i phyir ro // des na bsgrub bya'i chos raṅ la raṅ ldog gñis pa mi rten yaṅ raṅ ñid ldan chos yin pas ldan pa'i brjod bya las ma 'das pa ñid do //*

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in the proof of the property of a substance will also always be a similar instance. Indeed, if it were a dissimilar instance, the fact that it qualifies itself would lead to the fallacy that the logical reason qualifies a dissimilar instance, in other words is present in *vipakṣa*, which would contradict the third characteristic.

On the other hand, properties of distinguishers can be either homological or heterological. Accordingly, the property to be proved, as well as the logical reason can be either a *sapakṣa* or a *vipakṣa*. There are thus four possible configurations.[18] There, many controversies arise because the opponent wrongly identifies the logical reason "being a *sapakṣa* (or *vipakṣa*)" and "being present in *sapakṣa* (or *vipakṣa*)". [19] The pointed fallacies can be avoided by

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bsDus pa 90a3 (sGron ma 35b9): *bsgrub bya'i chos ni sbyor ba thams cad la mthun pa'i phyogs kho na ste ldan chos ldan par 'du ba'i phyir ro* //

[18] For instance if one proves that something is a simple negation (*med dgag*), the property to be proved, *med dgag*, is heterological and hence a *vipakṣa*. If one proves that something is a negation with a positive implication (*ma yin dgag*), the property to be proved, *ma yin dgag*, is homological and hence a *sapakṣa*. As for the logical reason, for instance the logical reason *sgrub chos dor ba* that proves *med dgag*, it is itself a simple negation and hence a *sapakṣa*, but the logical reason *med dgag gi tha sñad kyi stoṅ pa* proving *ma yin dgag* is a *vipakṣa*, because it is not itself *ma yin dgag*.

[19] One finds numerous examples of such controversies. For instance in bsDus pa 91a, an opponent argues that in the case of the property to be proved *med dgag* (simple negation), which is heterological and therefore a *vipakṣa*, there can be no *anvaya* since the logical reason must be excluded from *vipakṣa*. gTsaṅ nag pa's answer is that although the logical reason does not qualify *med dgag* – which is a *vipakṣa* – it qualifies that which possesses the property *med dgag* (i.e., what is a *sapakṣa*) in the same way that it qualifies the subject and therefore there is *anvaya*. Also, →

remembering that, for the logical reason, "being present in *sapakṣa*" really means "to qualify a similar instance like it qualifies the subject". Thus for instance the so-called "uncertain common logical reasons" (*sādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*) do not constitute, as the opponent maintains, a "positive *pakṣa*" (*bsgrub phyogs*), because although they do qualify similar as well as dissimilar instances, and are therefore "present in *sapakṣa* and in *vipakṣa*", they are themselves either similar or dissimilar instances. If this is clear in the case of the proof of the property of a distinguisher, it remains problematic when proving the property of a substance, for we have seen that since properties of substances are homological, "being a *sapakṣa*/*vipakṣa*" is linked with "being present in *sapakṣa*/*vipakṣa*". The impossibility of a "positive *pakṣa*" (*bsgrub phyogs*) is guaranteed theoretically by the characteristic of *rdzas* mentioned above; still, uncertain subjects and logical reasons are said to be *ci rigs pa* (either), i.e., they are not exclusively *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*. gTsaṅ nag pa adopts two strategies to bypass the rule that a unique substance cannot be qualified by opposite properties. The first one is to deny the status of unique substance to the problematic instance, the second is to consider distinct aspects of a unique sub-

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for instance, logical reasons can be *vipakṣa* without being necessarily present in *vipakṣa*.

The idea of conformity with the mode of proof is important, for a logical reason can occur in *vipakṣa* although not in the way it is presented with regard to the subject. For instance when proving that "produced" is a logical reason to prove sound's impermanence because it fulfils three characteristics, the logical reason "three characteristics" is included in "knowable" (*śes bya*), which is a *vipakṣa*. As such, it does occur in *vipakṣa*, but since it does not qualify *vipakṣa* in the way it qualifies the subject, there is no fault in the establishment of *vyatireka*.

stance so that each of the opposite properties will apply to a different "ground" (*ltos sa/yul*).[20]

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[20] The first strategy is applied to "knowable" (*śes bya*) in the proof that sound is impermanent. *śes bya* (alternatively *gźal bya*) cannot be considered to be a unique substance, because it is only a similar concept (*ldog mtshuṅs*) superimposed on a plurality of substances. So *śes bya* does not have to be exclusively *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* and still constitutes a case of *sādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* in the proof that sound is impermanent because it qualifies both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in the way it qualifies the subject. (bsDus pa 90a2: *ma grub pa daṅ ma ṅes pa'i gźi rtags ni ci rigs par 'du ste / de yaṅ chos la khyab ches pa'i spyi ldog gźi rtags su 'god pa'i chos ni rdzas la rten pa'i ldog mtshuṅs rnams mthun pa daṅ mi mthun pa'i phyogs gñis su 'gyur bar blta'o //* [...] 90a5: *de la 'dir me daṅ mi rtag pa la sogs pa rdzas la rten pa'i chos bsgrub pa'i tshe raṅ gi rten rdzas la kha tshon gcod pa na dṅos po daṅ śes bya rten pa'i rdzas gsum pa myed la /* [...] *śes bya tsam gyi rdzas ni du ma ñid yin te ldog mtshuṅs sgro btags pa'i gcig la rdzas kyi spyi med pa'i phyir ro //*)

The second strategy is applied with regard to an uncertain subject. The example given in bsDus pa 90b3 is far from clear: inference (*rjes dpag*) is said to be a substance that cannot be classified when proving "is a direct perception", because it is both *mṅon sum* and *mṅon sum ma yin*. The opponent's objection (using "a cognition consisting of the appearance of two moons" (*zla ba gñis snaṅ gi śes pa*) as the subject) is dealt with more clearly in sGron ma: "'Being a direct perception' (*mṅon sum yin*) and 'not being a direct perception' (*mṅon sum ma yin*) are absolutely not contradictory when considering two distinct 'spheres' (*yul tha dad*). When considering a unique 'sphere' (*yul cig*) in the case of a singular substance, there is a contradiction. Nevertheless even when considering a unique sphere, we can determine it [as *sapakṣa* and/or *vipakṣa*] because it is a substance that is not a direct perception – i.e., a *vipakṣa* – when considering the two moons (*zla ba gñis la ltos nas*) which are seized in that way, but it is a substance that is a direct perception – i.e., a *sapakṣa* – when considering the nature of cognition (*śes pa'i ṅo bo la ltos nas*). Similarly, 'being a cause' and 'not being a cause' and 'being an effect' and 'not being an effect' are contradictory with regard to a unique →

Efforts aiming at the classification of the subject, the logical reason and the property to be proved, as well as problematical instances, are made in order to guarantee the elimination of doubt when it comes to the ascertainment of *anvaya-* and *vyatirekavyāpti*. This is the reason why gTsaṅ nag pa's primary claim is that **all** knowables must be classified. As we have seen above, the initial distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* turns out to be of major importance, because it divides the universe of discourse into two distinct levels that do not intermix as far as inference is concerned. When proving the property of a substance, one will deal only with substances and their properties, and when proving the property of a distinguisher, one will deal only with distinguishers and their properties. One will thus always consider a domain where the law of excluded middle applies, allowing a strict bipartition of its members that guarantees that no case will be left out when *anvaya-* and *vyatirekavyāpti* are ascertained, and that these two are logically equivalent.

Having clarified the nature and definition of similar and dissimilar instances, which were presented as the bases of dependence (*ltos gźi*) of the positive and negative pervasion, I now turn to questions related to the ascertainment of the second and third characteristics, introducing the notion of examples.

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substance, but it must be understood that, although they are contradictory when considering a unique 'ground of reference' (*ltos sa cig la ltos nas*), they are not contradictory with regard to a unique substance when considering distinct 'grounds of reference' (*ltos sa tha dad la ltos nas*)." (sGron ma 36b3: *mṅon sum yin ma yin gñis yul tha dad la ltos nas ni 'gal ba tsam yaṅ med la / yul cig la ltos nas rdzas gcig la 'gal mod kyi yul cig la ltos nas ni de'i tshe yaṅ kha tshon chod te 'di ltar gzuṅ pa zla ba gñis la ltos nas mi mthun phyogs mṅon sum ma yin pa'i rdzas yin la / śes pa'i ṅo bo la ltos nas mthun phyogs mṅon sum gyi rdzas yin pa'i phyir ro // de bźin du rgyu yin ma yin daṅ 'bras bu yin ma yin rdzas cig la 'gal ba yaṅ ltos sa cig la ltos nas 'gal ba yin gyi ltos sa tha dad la ltos nas rdzas cig la mi 'gal bar rig par bya'o //*)

Nature and function of examples

Although gTsaṅ nag pa borrows his definition of similar and dissimilar instances from Ratnākaraśānti, he does not subscribe to the theory of intrinsic entailment (*antarvyāpti*). On the contrary, examples are necessary, endowed with a specific function that goes beyond helping "less intelligent people" (*rmoṅs pa*, *mūḍha*), as conceded by the *antarvyāptivādin*. Indeed, we will see how the absence of examples is linked to the logical reason being uncertain/inconclusive. The notion of examples is introduced by gTsaṅ nag pa when he classifies into two categories logical reasons whose first characteristic is established: logical reasons that occur only in the *pakṣa* (subject), termed "not-common" (*thun moṅ ma yin pa*, *asādhāraṇa*), and logical reasons that occur also in instances other than the subject (*rtsod gźi las gźan la'aṅ 'jug pa*), termed "common" (*thun moṅ pa*, *sādhāraṇa*).[21] This "other" (*gźan*) is defined as a base – substance (*rdzas*) or distinguisher (*ldog pa*) – that does not have the defining characteristic (*mtshan ñid*, *lakṣaṇa*) of the subject.[22] Such instances will be similar examples (*mthun dpe*, *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) if the property to be proved is established (*grub*), and dissimilar examples (*mi mthun dpe*, *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*) if it is negated (*bsal*).[23] gTsaṅ nag pa then enumerates five cases illustrat-

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[21] bsDus pa 94b8 (sGron ma 40b2).

[22] bsDus pa 95a4: *rdzas sam ldog pa yaṅ ruṅ gźi gaṅ la ji skad bśad pa'i rtsod gźi'i mtshan ñid myed pa'o* (sGron ma 40b5: *raṅ ldog la ji skad bśad pa'i rtsod gźi'i mtshan ñid med pa ni rtsod gźi las gźan yin*).

[23] bsDus pa 95a5 (sGron ma 40b3) : *de la rtsod gźi'i mtshan ñid myed pa ni* (sGron ma *bsgrub bya*) *grub pa daṅ bsal pa yin pas mthun pa daṅ mi mthun pa'i dpe' gñis su 'gyur la* /

In the following passages, the emphasis is put exclusively on similar examples (*mthun dpe*).

ing similar examples by contrasting the status of similar examples to that of the subject:

1. The subject and the example constitute two distinct substances (bsDus pa: *ṅo bo tha dad*; sGron ma: *rdzas tha dad*). For example: a mountain and a kitchen are respectively subject and example in the proof, by means of the logical reason "smoke", that there is fire on the mountain.
2. The subject and the example share an identical nature (*ṅo bo gcig ñid*), but the first is hidden (*lkog gyur*), while the second is perceptible (*mṅon gyur*). For example: "what has the designation 'cow'" and a white-haired [ox] (*kar zal*)[24] in the proof that what has the designation "cow" is impermanent because it has a hump and a dewlap.
3. Both the subject and the example are hidden (*lkog gyur*), but the subject is subtle (*phra ba*) while the example is evident (*gsal ba*, *vyakta*). Thus "what is impermanent" (*mi rtag pa*) is an example in the proof that "acoustic illusion" (*sgra'i sgyu ma lta bu*) can have the designation "conditioned (thing)" (*'dus byas kyi tha sñad du ruṅ*) because it is generated by causes (*rgyus bskyed*).[25]

[24] *kar zal*: bsDus pa and sGron ma's spelling for *dkar zal*. The expression originally designates the white colour of an animal's hair (cf. *ba glaṅ dmar zal*: the red colour of a cow); it is used here to designate an animal whose hair is white (or white with black spots cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, p.2454: *gźi dkar por nag thig yod pa la dkar zal*). Jäschke also gives the meaning "heifer" for *zal mo*, so that *kar zal* can be understood as "white calf" (*kar zal pho*) or "white heifer" (*kar zal mo*), but according to *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, zal pho* and *zal mo* simply designate white male bovines and white female bovines respectively.

[25] This case is not mentioned in sGron ma.

4. Both the subject and the example being perceptible (*mṅon gyur*), one can be a particular case of the other. For instance, the particular case (*bye brag*) "knowable non-entity" (*dṅos med kyi śes bya*) is an example in the proof that "knowable in general" (*śes bya tsam*) is empty (*stoṅ pa*) because it is neither one nor many (*cig daṅ du ma daṅ bral ba*). Or, inversely, the general case (*spyi*) can be used as an example: for instance "sound in general" can be an example to prove that a particular sound is empty because it is neither existent, non-existent nor being generated (*yod med skye ba daṅ bral ba*).[26]
5. In the proof of the property of a distinguisher, subject and example can be coextensive (*khyab mñam pa*) distinct concepts (*ldog pa tha dad*). For instance sound's audibility (*sgra la mñan bya*) can be an example in the following proof: sound's existence (*sgra 'i yod pa*) can have the designation "property of the subject" (*pakṣadharma*) with regard to sound because the logical reason is established with regard to the subject.

What distinguishes the example from the subject is that, whereas the possession of the property to be proved remains doubtful for the subject, it is already established in the example, in most cases because it is "easier" to establish it. As illustrated above, the feasibility of establishment of the property to be proved is conditioned first by the facility of comprehension of the property-possessor, which in turn depends on the nature of the property-possessor – as in 3 (subtle/evident) – and on the disputant's intellectual dispositions – as in 2, where a stupid or uneducated disputant simply does not know the meaning of "cow" – or depends on the disputant's previous knowledge. It is equally conditioned by the possibility of establishment of the property. If the property cannot be established in

[26] The second possibility is not given in sGron ma

any case, there can be no example. Illustration of this point can be found in the case of the following proof: "This man is the reincarnation of a god because he has eyes" (*skyes bu 'di ni lha las 'phos pa yin te mig daṅ ldan pa'i phyir*).[27] The logical reason "having eyes", although "common" in that it occurs in instances other than the subject, will be termed "not-common" because the instances in which it occurs cannot be determined as possessing or not possessing the property to be proved, and hence cannot be examples. In example 4 above, the property "empty" is "easier" to establish for the example, because it can be established by reflexive cognition (*raṅ rig*, *svasaṃvedana*) with regard to "non-entity", but its establishment remains doubtful for all the other instances. This example deserves further attention: First it is a case where the subject includes everything, since everything is knowable. Here, although there is no instance substantially different from the subject in which the logical reason occurs, there is a possibility to find an example because gTsaṅ nag pa's definition of "other than the subject" does not restrict the meaning of "other" to "substantially different". Second, in this proof, a particular case has to be taken as an example because the logical reason is a specific property of the subject. There could be a risk that, if this particular case is a valid example merely because it illustrates the co-presence of the logical reason and the property to be proved, fallacies would arise in the cases where the property to be proved is a specific property of the example but not a property of the subject. Taking as an example a particular case of the subject also raises the question whether a particular sound – for instance "sound of a drum" – can serve as an example in the proof that sound in general is impermanent because

[27] Another example is the property "omniscient"; in this case, the property cannot be established, but it can be negated. Thus, in the case of the proof "this man is not omniscient because he speaks", similar examples can be presented, but not dissimilar examples.

it is audible, a possibility mentioned in Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana*.[28] Accepting this possibility would lead gTsaṅ nag pa to consider "audibility" as a "common", and furthermore valid logical reason. But gTsaṅ nag pa explicitly rejects this possibility, showing that the case is not parallel to the preceding proof of emptiness. His main argument is that in the case of the logical reason "audibility", the instance "sound of a drum" does not have a status different from that of the subject in that the property to be proved, "impermanence", is hidden in both the subject and the example. This amounts to saying that there is no difference between sound in general and a particular sound in terms of feasibility of ascertainment of the property to be proved: if impermanence is not perceptible in the subject "sound", it cannot be any more perceptible in a particular sound, and if it were perceptible in the subject, there would be no need for an example. On the contrary, in the case of the proof of emptiness, the property to be proved, "empty", is

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28 ASV 110,4-5: *sarvaśabdeṣu vimatau bādhakam pramāṇam pravartamānam / adṛṣṭāntam api tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭāntayati.* Translated in KAJIYAMA 1999: 129: "When opinions are divided with regard to all sounds, the annulling cognition which is taking place, though having no example, adduces one of [all sounds] as an example."

Note that in this formulation Ratnākaraśānti uses "all sounds" as the subject, while gTsaṅ nag pa uses "sound" (*sgra*) or "mere sound" (*sgra tsam*), which I take to be equivalent to "sound in general" (*sgra spyi*), in parallel to the formulation "general knowable"/"knowable in general" (*śes bya'i spyi*) in the above example (this is at least the case in sGron ma, which uses in the parallel passages the expressions *sgra tsam* and *śes bya tsam*). gTsaṅ nag pa obviously considers that the problem is the same whether one speaks of *A kyi spyi*, or *A tsam* but most probably considers that this formulation is not equivalent to *A thams cad* (all As), that is never used in this context. On the Tibetan problematic of A (for instance, "sound in general") versus A's (the particular sounds), see TILLEMANS 1995, especially pp. 866-871.

perceptible in the example, but hidden in the subject.[29] Thus "non-entity" can be an example because it is indeed an instance different from the subject in which the logical reason occurs. But since "sound of a drum" is not different from the subject in that the establishment of the property to be proved goes together for them, gTsaṅ nag pa rejects the possibility for a particular sound to be an example, and confines "audibility" to the status of "not-common" logical reason.

The following considerations about the characteristics of the examples can be made from this analysis of the different types of examples:

The idea of analogical inference (i.e., properties established for the example are established for a particular subject on the ground of a similarity between the two, for instance sharing the same nature) and that of inductive generalisation (i.e., properties established for the example are established for the general case) are subordinated

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[29] bsDus pa 95b3: *de rgyu mtshan gaṅ las / 'dir śes bya daṅ dṅos myed kyi śes bya ni gcig daṅ du bral gyis stoṅ ñid sgrub na dpe' daṅ rtsod gźir ruṅ pa yin te rtags daṅ bsgrub bya gñis ka dpe' la mṅon du gyur źiṅ rtsod gźi' la lkog du gyur pa'i phyir ro //*

der yaṅ de skad brjod na gtan tshigs ma grub ste sgrub bya mi rtag pa gñi ga la lkog du gyur źiṅ rtags mñan bya gñi ga la mṅon du gyur pa'i phyir ro //

'dir de skad brjod par ni mi nus ste stoṅ ñid dpe' la lkog gyur yin na dṅos med 'dzin pa'i raṅ rig gis dṅos po'i spyi khegs kyaṅ bye brag mi khegs par 'gyur la / rtags rtsod gźi' la lkog gyur yin na sgra 'dzin pa'i mṅon sum gyis mñan bya ma yin pa'i dogs pa mi chod par thal ba'i phyir ro // des na rtags rtsod gźi la lkog gyur yin pa daṅ bsgrub byas khyab par bsgrub pa la tshul 'di ruṅ gi gźan du ma yin pas / der yaṅ don byed nus pa'i mñan bya źes daṅ / byas pa'i sgra yin pa'i phyir źes bkod na ruṅ pa yaṅ yin no //

to the idea of ascertainment of an invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved. The function of the example is not only to illustrate the co-presence of two properties but to be a pertinent instance that will allow the disputant to whom the example is presented to ascertain the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, which will in turn allow him to ascertain the second and third characteristics of the logical reason. A necessary condition for this is that the property to be proved must be established for the example while remaining doubtful for the subject. On this matter we have seen how, in differentiating subject from example, gTsaṅ nag pa uses mainly a difference in terms of feasibility of establishment (perceptible/hidden, evident/subtle), and possibility of establishment. Because possession of the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos ldan*) does not necessarily imply establishment of the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos grub*), a distinction has to be made between properties things really have, and properties established by the disputant. One point needs to be made here: we have seen before that in valid cases the subject is a *sapakṣa*, i.e., possesses the property to be proved. Still, for gTsaṅ nag pa, the subject can never be an example because, in addition to not being different from itself, the property to be proved is neither established nor negated with regard to the subject before completion of the proof. This point is important, because from the point of view of later opponents against the two-*pakṣa* view, if the subject is a *sapakṣa*, the possession of the property to be proved will be established and it will cease to be an object of doubt, thus leading to the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* (proving something that has already been proven).[30] It is clear however, from the above presentation, that

[30] Sa skya Paṇḍita does not state explicitly that a fallacy of *siddhasādhana* occurs in this case, but points to the fact that here there would be no →

gTsaṅ nag pa never intended to imply that for similar instances the possession of the property to be proved is established, and that he subscribes to the view that the subject must be a doubtful instance to the same extent as do holders of the three-*pakṣa* view.

Hence, for gTsaṅ nag pa, a similar example is not a similar instance in which the logical reason occurs; rather, it is a similar instance that is acknowledged to be a similar instance (i.e., for which the property to be proved is established) in which the logical reason is known to occur. I will now consider how these epistemic requirements intervene in the definition of uncertain logical reasons, considering in particular the problematic case of not-common logical reasons, and examine on what ground these reasons are classified as "uncertain" by gTsaṅ nag pa. I will inquire to what extent gTsaṅ nag pa's interpretation can be traced back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and compare it with the dGe lugs pa view.

Uncertain not-common logical reasons

gTsaṅ nag pa's classification of logical reasons whose first characteristic (i.e., *pakṣadharma*) is established uses the idea of mental ascertainment (*blo'i dbaṅ gis dbye ba/blos ji ltar mthoṅ pa'i sgo nas dbye ba*) in that it considers not only the factual presence/absence of the logical reason in similar and dissimilar instances, but whether presence and absence are acknowledged by the disputant. gTsaṅ nag pa thus makes a first quadripartition according to whether the logical reason can be perceived (*mthoṅ*) in both *pakṣa*, in neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*, in *sapakṣa* only, or in

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pakṣa to serve as a basis of dependance for *pakṣadharma*. The first characteristic would have to be reformulated as "being a property of the similar instance which is a subject of enquiry". Cf. Rigs gter 275,21: *śes 'dod phyogs su mi 'dod phyir || ltos gźi daṅ po med par 'gyur || ltos gźi daṅ po mi 'dod na || 'di la phyogs chos mtshan ñid dka' ||*

vipakṣa only. Each case is further divided into four according to whether the logical reason, if not perceived, is present or absent, and if perceived is partially or completely present, thus obtaining a total of sixteen sorts.[31] Out of these sixteen, only one is a valid logical reason: the logical reason is perceived only in *sapakṣa*, it is factually absent in *vipakṣa* and is determined as contradictory to the opposite of the property to be proved. One case is that of a contradictory logical reason, and the twelve others are uncertain logical reasons. When gTsaṅ nag pa talks of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* here, he is actually considering similar and dissimilar instances that do not include the subject.[32] Indeed, since the subject has been proven to be a *sapakṣa* if correct and a *vipakṣa* if contradictory, were *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* to be taken in their "real" sense (therefore including the subject), it would be impossible to have a case where the logical reason is absent in both, because it would be present at least in the *pakṣa* where the subject belongs (remember we are dealing with cases for which the *pakṣadharma* has been established).[33]

I will restrict my analysis to the four cases where the logical reason is perceived neither in similar instances nor in dissimilar instances:

1. The logical reason is in fact present in both *pakṣa*. For example: "having eyes" in the proof that this man is the reincarnation of a god.

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[31] See bsDus pa 96a4ff. and sGron ma 41a8ff. bsDus pa only lists the different categories without giving any example.

[32] This fact is mentioned explicitly only in sGron ma 41a8.

[33] Note that this last argument is precisely the one presented by the dGe lugs pa to argue for a metaphorical interpretation of "absence in both *pakṣa*" (see TILLEMANS 1990: 61).

2. The logical reason is absent in both *pakṣa*. For example: "audibility" in the proof of sound's impermanence.[34]
3. The logical reason is present in *sapakṣa* only. For example: "produced" in the proof of sound's impermanence, given that the disputant believes that only sound is produced.
4. The logical reason is present in *vipakṣa* only. For example: "produced" in the proof of sound's permanence, given that the disputant believes that only sound is produced.

These four types are grouped by gTsaṅ nag pa under the heading "uncertain not-common [logical reasons]" (*thun moṅ ma yin pa ma ṅes pa*, *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*). The first two cases have already been shown above to be cases where no examples can be adduced. The same is true for the third and fourth cases, due to the disputant's failure to acknowledge that there are instances that can be examples.

So each of these four cases exemplifies the failure of one of the factual or epistemic requirements necessary for the existence of a positive example: in the case of "having eyes", there is failure to acknowledge the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as being respectively similar and dissimilar instances because the property to be proved cannot be either established or negated. In the case of "audibility", there simply do not exist instances other than the subject where the logical reason occurs, and the subject cannot be an example. In the third and fourth cases, there is failure to acknowledge the presence of the logical reason in something other than the subject because the disputant considers the logical reason as a property specific to the subject.

[34] This case matches the case of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* given by Dignāga in his *Hetucakra*, with the only difference that sGron ma has *mi rtag pa* instead of *rtag pa*.

Now why are these not-common logical reasons necessarily uncertain (*ma ṅes pa*)? gTsaṅ nag pa's general definition of uncertain reasons is that the *pakṣadharma* is established, and that neither exclusion from *sapakṣa* or from *vipakṣa* is established.[35] And his definition of uncertain not-common logical reasons is: [*pakṣadharma* is established, and] even though the logical reason is not perceived (*ma mthoṅ*) in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, [its] exclusion from either is not established.[36] By saying that the logical reason's exclusion from *vipakṣa* (or *sapakṣa*) is not established, what is meant is that the third characteristic is not fulfilled, so that the reason is uncertain because *vyatireka* is not ascertained (or alternatively, reverse-*vyatireka*, i.e., exclusion from *sapakṣa* is not ascertained). Absence of an example is thus linked with incertitude because it is the example that enables the disputant to ascertain the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, and therefore to guarantee the logical reason's exclusion from *vipakṣa* (or to ascertain a counter-connection that guarantees the logical reason's exclusion from *sapakṣa*).

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[35] bsDus pa 96b1: *ma ṅes pa'i spyi'i mtshan ñid ni phyogs chos grub ciṅ rtags mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs gñis ka la* [sGron ma 41b7: *las*] *ldog pa ma grub pa*. Establishment of the exclusion from dissimilar instances would make it a valid reason, while establishment of the exclusion from similar instances would make it a contradictory reason. See bsDus pa 96b5: *'gal ba ni phyogs chos grub ciṅ rtags mthun phyogs la* [sGron ma 42a2: *las*] *ldog pa grub pa* and *yaṅ dag ni phyogs chos grub ciṅ rtags mi mthun phyogs la ldog pa grub pa*.

[36] bsDus pa 96b2: *thun moṅ ma yin pa ma ṅes pa ni* [sGron ma 41b8: *phyogs chos grub ciṅ*] *rtags mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs la ma mthoṅ yaṅ gñis ka las ldog pa ma grub pa*.

Let us consider how this relates to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's respective positions.[37] For Dignāga, what causes a not-common reason to be uncertain is that *anvaya* is not established because there is no concrete example for the positive concomitance. As a consequence, the opponent cannot ascertain the second characteristic, because this requires the statement of an example showing him the inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) between the logical reason and the property to be proved. Dignāga also states that in the case of "audibility" to prove sound's impermanence, the third characteristic – *vyatireka* – is established. Dharmakīrti's point, on the other hand, is that these not-common logical reasons are uncertain because *vyatireka* cannot be ascertained. Indeed, the exclusion from *vipakṣa* remains doubtful because mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) of the logical reason does not confirm its absence.

Further, in Dharmakīrti's analysis of the logical reason "possessing breathing, etc. (*prāṇādimat*)" to prove that a living body possesses a self (*sātmaka*), one finds the idea that this "non-perception" can also be due to the fact that the locus where the logical reason is to be perceived – i.e., what possesses or does not possess a self – is not established for the disputant, because the self is a notion that is epistemically remote.[38] This same idea is present in gTsaṅ nag pa's example of proving the property "being the reincarnation of a god". It seems then reasonable to say that gTsaṅ nag pa's exposition of

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[37] These questions have already been analyzed in detail in TILLEMANS 1990: Appendix 76-79, ONO 1999, as well as by Prof. Katsura and Iwata in the present volume. I borrow from their conclusions the elements relevant to the interpretation of gTsaṅ nag pa's theory.

[38] See the following passages (quoted and translated by Iwata): PVin 3 Q321b: *'di gñis las gcig la gnas par ṅes pa med de / de'i bdag ñid du 'grub pa la ma grub pa'i phyir ro //* and PVin 3 Q322a3-4: *bdag (b)skal bas 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir srog la sogs pa yaṅ de la 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro //*

the epistemic requirements for the possibility of an example displays ideas already present in Dharmakīrti's texts, although they cannot be said to be directly based on them since gTsaṅ nag pa does not refer to these key passages. The same is true about the question of gTsaṅ nag pa's adoption of a two-*pakṣa* view.[39]

The dGe lugs pa position that is analyzed in TILLEMANS (1990) comes down to the same conclusion, namely that absence of an example makes it impossible for the opponent to ascertain *vyāpti*, and that a distinction has to be made between the factual presence of a property and its mental ascertainment.[40] Nevertheless, gTsaṅ nag pa cannot be proved to be the source for the dGe lugs pa's position, because the following difference must be accounted for: the dGe lugs pa want to take Dignāga's definition of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* – i.e., the logical reason is absent in *sapakṣa* and absent in *vipakṣa* – as a general definition, and insist on considering *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in their "real" sense, that is including the subject. Consequently, they are bound to adopt a metaphorical interpretation of "absence": in the case of "audibility", the logical reason is in reality

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[39] Several passages in Dharmakīrti's texts tend to show that he himself supported a two-*pakṣa* view. See for instance Dharmakīrti's claim that "audibility" cannot be present in things other than the two alternatives eternity and non-eternity, and that "breathing, etc." should be present either in things which possess the self or in things that do not possess it (see PVin 3 Q229b8: *thun moṅ ma yin pa yaṅ gñi ga las phyi rol du gyur pa mi srid pas* [...] and PVin 3 Q321b: [...] *gñis kyi bdag ñid las phyi rol du gyur pa med pa'i phyir* [...]).

[40] Cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 63-64: "Instead of asking factual questions as to whether or not the reason is present in *sapakṣa*, one inquires about what the opponent can or cannot reasonably know or think – in effect, the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* has been transformed into a problem of epistemic or belief logic."

present in *sapakṣa* only, because it is only present in the subject, but the debater cannot know it without an example, hence "absence" must be taken as "unascertained presence".[41] But gTsaṅ nag pa does not follow the same line of reasoning because his presentation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* relies on his previous definition of *asādhāraṇa*, which included the idea of absence of the logical reason in instances other than the subject where the property to be proved is established. Therefore *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in this context are considered not to include the subject. Consequently, in the case of audibility "absence in *sapakṣa*" does not have to be interpreted metaphorically. But, for gTsaṅ nag pa, "absence in *sapakṣa* and absence in *vipakṣa*" occurs only in a particular case of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. So gTsaṅ nag pa, instead of reinterpreting Dignāga's definition, completes it by adding the question of the debater's mental ascertainment, thus raising it to a so-called epistemic level, so that the general criterion of the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* becomes "non-perception in *sapakṣa* and non-perception in *vipakṣa*" (*sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* not including the subject). However, gTsaṅ nag pa does not depart from his idea that *vyāpti* is based on the real *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* including the subject. Indeed, although the ascertainment of *vyāpti* necessitates the use of instances for which the property to be proved is established, *vyāpti* itself is purely a matter of factual possession of the property to be proved regardless of its establishment, therefore it also applies – and it is necessary that it will apply – in the case of the subject. Accordingly, the definition of *anvaya* is: the logical reason occurs only in *sapakṣa* in the same way it is presented with regard to the subject, and that of *vyatireka*:

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[41] Cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 62-63, where it is shown that this interpretation of Dignāga finds support in Dharmakīrti's writings.

the logical reason does not occur in *vipakṣa* in the same way it is presented with regard to the subject.[42]

Concluding remarks

In the introduction, I started by stating how numerous controversies arose between partisans of the two-*pakṣa* view and those of the three-*pakṣa* view. Indeed, presentations of the two-*pakṣa* and three-*pakṣa* views, especially those made by their respective supporters, tend to emphasize differences in such a way that the two views appear irreconcilable, while both claim to be the correct interpretation of Dharmakīrti's thought. Thus, in Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*, gTsaṅ nag pa is pictured as holding a completely heterodox view because he introduces a distinction in terms of *rdzas* (whose definition Sa skya Paṇḍita does not agree with) and *ldog pa* (Sa skya Paṇḍita rejects the interpretation of *ldan* proposed by gTsaṅ nag pa in this case), but mainly because by including the subject in similar instances he deprives the logical reason of a basis for its first characteristic. An implicit corollary is that in such a case, when the presence of the logical reason in only *sapakṣa* is established, there is no more doubt with regard to the subject, thus constituting a fault of *siddhasādhana*.[43] In response, the main reproach made against

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[42] bsDus pa 100a2: *rjes 'gro'i mtshan ñid ni rtags rtsod gźi la dgod par bya ba ltar mthun phyogs ñid la 'jug pa'o* / [...] *ldog pa'i tshul ni rtags rtsod gźi la dgod par bya ba ltar mi mthun phyogs la 'jug mi srid pa'o* /

The two are logically equivalent as long as one stays on one of the levels of proof (*rdzas* or *ldog pa*) introduced by gTsaṅ nag pa in the classification of all knowables into two *pakṣa* exclusively.

[43] Note that the three-*pakṣa* view also is accused of the fault of *siddhasādhana*, because when using the notion of *sapakṣa* to establish *vyāpti*, the idea of "being similar to the subject on account of possessing the property to be proved" implies that one should know that the subject possesses the →

the three-*pakṣa* view is that if the subject is left out, doubt will always remain in the ascertainment of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. So both views actually have to face a similar dilemma: keeping the subject doubtful, but ascertaining an invariable connection that holds in all cases, including the subject. While being conscious of other discrepancies that remain between the two views, it is important to note that both views will address this problem by explaining the actual process taking place in the ascertainment of *vyāpti* in the same way: the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved is ascertained on the basis of a similar example. The idea of "similarity" of the example is induced in both cases by the definition of *sapakṣa*: For the two-*pakṣa* view, subject and example are similar because the subject also is a *sapakṣa*. Therefore, both possess the property to be proved. For the three-*pakṣa* view, *sapakṣa* are by definition similar to the subject. In a proof the proponent can use this similarity to show the opponent that, reciprocally, the subject is similar to the *sapakṣa*, in particular to one of them: the example. This enables the opponent to understand that the subject also possesses the property to be proved, although the subject is not itself a *sapakṣa*. So whereas gTsaṅ nag pa introduces the epistemic criterion that the possession of the property to be proved is established by the disputant only when he presents similar examples, keeping the criterion for being a *sapakṣa* on a factual level, the three-*pakṣa* view includes the epistemic criterion implicitly in the definition of *sapakṣa* already. Thus, both will agree that the subject is a doubtful instance, the example a determinate one, and that once an invariable connection is ascertained it is universally valid. The difference between the two views comes down to the question of at which point to account for mental ascertainment, and the fact that they accept respectively two

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property to be proved in order to know what is similar to it on this account.

pakṣa or three *pakṣa* is a consequence of this. So while both positions diverge theoretically as to their interpretation of Dharmakīrti with regard to the interpretation of notions such as *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* and presence/absence in *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, practically, when it comes to the question of ascertainment of the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, both actually use the same method, thus, in point of fact, finding some common ground on a matter constantly presented as a major point of contention between them.

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The Negative Concomitance (*vyatireka*) in the Case of Inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) Reasons

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According to Dignāga's logic, the reason (*hetu*) in an inference must possess three characteristics (*trairūpya*), that is, it must satisfy three conditions, in order to be valid: the reason must be a property of the subject (*dharmin*) of inference; it must be present in at least some of the similar instances (*sapakṣa*); and it must be absent from all dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*).[1]

The second and third conditions are indicated respectively in the similar example (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*), defined as the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and its concrete example (*dṛṣṭānta*), and the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*), defined as the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) and its concrete example.[2] Viewed from the angle of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, they are established by means of an inductive process where the presence of the reason in at least some of the similar instances and its absence from all dissimilar in-

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[1] Cf. PSV^{K} 111a6-b1 (ad PS 2.5cd); KITAGAWA 1965: 94ff. With his insertion of the restrictive particle *eva* in the formulation of the second condition, Dignāga proposes another interpretation of the second condition, namely, the condition that the reason is present only in the similar instances (cf. PSV^{K} 111a7f.; see also PV 2.21ab). On account of the inserted restriction "only" the second condition is logically the same as the positive concomitance. On this interpretation see KATSURA 1983: 15-17, HAYES 1988: 148-150.

[2] Cf. PS 4.1-2 and PSV^{K} 148a7f. (= PSV^{V} 63b8-a2), translated into Japanese in KITAGAWA 1965: 239-241.

stances are observed in examples. As the examples are things which are similar or dissimilar to the subject of inference, the subject itself cannot be an example; in other words, examples are drawn only from *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Therefore, it should be noted that the domain in which both concomitances are induced excludes the subject of inference.

Because of the dependence of the inference on concrete examples one encounters the following problems. As will be shown later, in the case of inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reasons,[3] with the exception of one specific case, the judgement whether they are inconclusive or not is based on the third condition. For if the reason is seen even in a single example that does not possess the property to be proved, even though the reason is present in similar instances, it is immediately determined that the reason is inconclusive.[4] Therefore, the criterion by which the reason is judged to be inconclusive or to be valid is the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances, i.e., the negative concomitance. The negative concomitance is shown by

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[3] According to Dignāga's logic, reasons are classified into two large groups: those which do not satisfy the first condition, i.e., unestablished (*asiddha*) reasons, and those which satisfy it. The latter are divided into three types in Dignāga's theory of the nine types of reason (cf. PS 3.21-22, PSV^{K} 131a5ff.; KITAGAWA 1965: 185ff.). This division is based on an examination of whether these reasons satisfy the second and third conditions, i.e., the presence of the reason in at least similar instances and the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances. (1) Those which satisfy both the second and third conditions are valid. (2) Those which do not satisfy either condition are contradictory (*viruddha*); they derive the opposite of the consequence to be proved (*sādhya*). (3) The others are inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) with respect to the derivation of their consequences (cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 38f.).

[4] Cf. PVin 3.69ab (= 313a6): *ekāprasiddhisaṃdehe 'prasiddhavyabhicārabhāk* / (cited in VNṬ 135,27, cf. FRAUWALLNER 1954: 149), ONO 1987: 4; PVin 3.318a5f.; NB 3.66.

means of a concrete example. When giving examples, however, the proponent encounters the problem of how to deal with the example when it is not existent, namely, when no dissimilar instances exist or when their existence is doubtful for the proponent.

Further, there arises the question of whether the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances is sufficient to rule out all inconclusive reasons. One expects that the reason cannot be inconclusive as long as it is absent from all dissimilar instances which do not possess the property to be proved. However, Dignāga argues that in some cases even if the reason is absent from all dissimilar instances, it remains inconclusive. Take the reason "audibility" (*śrāvaṇatva*) for the thesis "sound is non-eternal" (*anitya*). "Audibility" belongs only to the subject of the thesis "sound" and hence is absent from both the similar and the dissimilar instances; the reason's absence from all dissimilar instances is satisfied but its presence in similar instances is not. Since there is no concrete example which shows the presence of the reason in similar instances, this reason is inconclusive (cf. § IV). This kind of reason is grouped under the fifth (uncommon inconclusive) reason in the "Wheel of Reasons" (*hetucakra*). However, can the reason be absent from all dissimilar instances and still be inconclusive?

Such problems arose mainly from the inductive aspect of Dignāga's logic. Dharmakīrti takes them up for discussion and in some cases improves on Dignāga's solutions. In the present paper I shall analyze Dharmakīrti's method for solving these problems in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and examine the possibility of determining the logical relation between the reason and the consequence without depending on examples.

I. The reason's absence from all dissimilar instances as the criterion for its non-inconclusiveness

While Dignāga notices that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are contrapositive and hence logically equivalent, he insists that both the similar example (*sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*) and the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*) must be adduced in a syllogism;[5] nevertheless, on the ground of the logical equivalence of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, one of the two could suffice for the derivation of the consequence. Then the question arises: "Which is the main basis for deriving the consequence without any inconclusiveness?"

Dignāga gives the answer indirectly in his examination of what determines the difference between a valid and an inconclusive reason. The main factor for deriving a consequence is not the positive cognition that the reason is present in the possessor of the property to be proved. It is rather the negative cognition that the reason is excluded from the loci that do not possess the property to be proved.

> [The reason present in the subject is determined as valid] on the ground [that the proponent] excludes other things (i.e., dissimilar instances) [from the domain of the reason], but not on the ground [that he] grasps those particular [instances] (i.e., things in which the property to be proved and the reason are present). ... When [the reason which] depends on the two (relations – the relation that the reason is present in some instances and the relation that the reason is absent from the others –) is present either in all [of the instances, which are of the same] sort as [the subject] to be proved, or in not all [similar instances] (i.e., in one part of the similar instances), on the ground that [the reason] excludes the [dissimilar instances] from which [the property to be proved] is absent, then [it] is called

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5 Cf. PS 4.5, PSV^{K} 150a8-b2; KITAGAWA 1965: 262.

> the reason which makes known the correct [consequence]. (PSV^K 135a1-3)[6]

In Dignāga's account, when, on the ground of the negative relation that the reason is excluded from the dissimilar instances, the positive relation that the reason is present in at least some of the similar instances is established, then the reason is determined as valid. Therefore, the main factor which determines that the reason is not inconclusive but valid consists in the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), i.e., the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances.

Following Dignāga, Dharmakīrti discusses the inconclusive reasons in the Wheel of Reasons (*hetucakra*). As the ground for determining that the third, seventh and ninth reasons, as well as the first, are inconclusive, he points out that they do not satisfy the criterion of absence in all dissimilar instances. According to his interpretation the third, seventh and ninth reasons are enumerated in the Wheel of Reasons merely to show that the reason's absence from all dissimilar instances is the main condition for the derivation of consequence:

> Three kinds of [the reason which is] a property of the subject (namely, the third, seventh and ninth reasons in the Wheel of Reasons) are mentioned to establish that the exclusion (**vyāvṛtti*) of the reason [from dissimilar instances] is the principal [factor for the

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[6] PSV^K 135a1-3 (= PSV^V 51b8-52a2, ad PS 3.30cd-31a): *don gźan rnam par gcod pa'i sgo nas yin gyi de'i khyad par 'dzin pa'i sgo nas ni ma yin te / ... gñi ga la brten pa ni gaṅ la med pa de rnam par gcod pa'i sgo nas bsgrub par bya ba'i rigs mtha' dag gam mtha' dag ma yin pa la 'jug pa na ji lta ba bźin śes par byed pa'i gtan tshigs su brjod pa yin te /* (KITAGAWA 1965: 504,7-16), translated into Japanese in KITAGAWA 1965: 222.

> derivation of consequence],[7] for it is not [the case that only] by means of the positive concomitance (*anvaya*) (namely, the presence of the reason in some similar instances) the reason is [the factor which] makes [its consequence] known (*gamaka*), since [for example, the consequence to be proved] "[sound] is not caused by effort" (**aprayatnānantarīyaka*) [can]not be cognized by [the seventh reason in the Wheel of Reasons] "non-eternity" [of sound]. (PVin 3.310a6f.)[8]

In the case of the inference "sound is not caused by effort (thesis), because it is non-eternal",

sound: (non-eternity → being not caused by effort)

the property to be proved "being not caused by effort" cannot be derived from the reason "non-eternity", because the reason "non-eternity" is present in all dissimilar instances which are caused by effort, even though this reason is present in some of the similar instances which are not caused by effort, for example in lightning (*vidyut*).

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[7] Cf. PVin 3.34d (301a5) = PV 4.195d: *śeṣo vyāvṛttisādhanaḥ* // ("The rest (i.e., the third, seventh and ninth reasons) are [shown in the Wheel of Reasons with a view] to establishing that [the valid reason is] excluded [from all dissimilar instances]"), ONO 1999: 306; PVin 3.310b3-5: *de'i phyir gaṅ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba de ni mi rtag pa ñid do źes de ltar rtag pa rnam par bcad pa* (*vyavaccheda*) *ñid kyis gtan tshigs go bar byed pa yin te / sgra daṅ sa phyogs la sogs par rtag* (Q; *rtags* D213a1) *pa daṅ me med pa* (Q; om D) *la sogs pa rnam par bcad pas ldog pa rtogs na ṅag 'di'i nus pa yoṅs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro* //; PVA 589,27: *śeṣāṇāṃ tu trayāṇāṃ nirdeśo vyāvṛttiprādhānyapradarśanārthaṃ* (*vyāvṛttidvāreṇa hetur gamakaḥ*).

[8] PVin 3.310a6f.: *gtan tshigs kyi* (Q; *kyis* D212b3) *ldog pa gtsor sgrub* (Q; *bsgrub* D) *pa'i phyir phyogs kyi chos rnam pa gsum bśad do* // *'di ltar rjes su 'gro ba'i sgo nas ni gtan tshigs go bar byed pa ma yin te / mi rtag pa ñid las rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ma yin pa ñid mi rtogs pa'i phyir ro* //.

As shown in this example, as long as the reason does not satisfy the condition that it is excluded from all of the dissimilar instances, it remains inconclusive, even if it is present in some of the similar instances. Thus, the exclusion of the reason from the dissimilar instances is the decisive factor in verifying whether the reason is inconclusive or not.

This exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) means that the reason is excluded from all of the dissimilar instances. It is equivalent to the third condition for the valid reason – that the reason is not present in all dissimilar instances – and to the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) that wherever the property to be proved is not present the reason is not present.

II. *vyatireka* in the case of the non-existence of the dissimilar instances

As stated above, the third condition for the valid reason, i.e., the negative concomitance, is the predominant factor in determining the non-inconclusiveness of the reason. With respect to the establishment of this condition one encounters the following problem. When the instance possessing the property to be proved is regarded as existent according to the doctrinal system of the proponent, the dissimilar instances which do not possess the property to be proved may be non-existent for him. For example, when the Buddhist proponent (the Sautrāntika), who does not accept the existence of eternal things, proves the thesis "sound is non-eternal" by means of the reason "because it is caused by effort", the similar instances, i.e., non-eternal things, are regarded as existent by him, whereas the dissimilar instances, i.e., eternal things, are not. Thus, the establishment of the third condition of the reason is called into question: if the dissimilar instances do not exist how is it possible to establish that the reason is not present in these non-existent dissimilar instances? Dignāga answers this question:

> Even in this case there is no doubt. Because [the reason] is not present (*avṛtti*) in these (i.e., dissimilar instances) on the ground that these (dissimilar instances) do not exist (*abhāva*), this fallacy [that the reason cannot be excluded from the dissimilar instances] is not [incurred by the proponent]. (PSV^K 131a8-b1)[9]

Dignāga's answer, that the non-presence of the reason in the dissimilar instances can be established even if these instances do not exist for the proponent, is grounded on the view that no property can be present in what is not existent. Since the substratum in which the reason is to be present does not exist, he considers that the reason's non-presence in this non-existent substratum is self-evident.

However, this leaves unsolved the question of how the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*), i.e., the negative concomitance and its concrete example, can be established when the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) themselves do not exist for the proponent. Dignāga takes up this problem in PS 4. Through the introduction of two kinds of negation he argues that the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* is established even in the case of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*. In the Buddhist inference of the non-eternity of sound from the reason "being caused by effort", the similar example (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) consists of the positive concomitance "whatever is caused by effort is non-eternal" and a concrete example "pot", which is caused by effort and is non-eternal. The negation used in "non-eternal" is an

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9 PSV^K 131a8-b1 (= PSV^V 48b8, ad PS 3.21f.): *de'i tshe the tshom ñid yod pa ma yin te de med pa'i phyir de la mi 'jug pas ñes pa 'di med do* || (KITAGAWA 1965: 492,15f.), translated into Japanese in KITAGAWA 1965: 187. PSV^K 131a8-b1 = PVSVṬ 78,24: *tadā saṃdeha eva nāsti tadabhāvāt tatrāvṛtteḥ*, cf. S. KATSURA, "New Sanskrit Fragments of the Pramāṇasamuccaya", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3, 1975: 75. Cf. NMu 2a18f. For the same idea in Dignāga's work, see also PSV^K 150a4f. = PSV^V 65a3f.; KITAGAWA 1965: 261.

affirming negation (*paryudāsa*) which has the function of affirming real things that are not eternal. The *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* consists of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) and its concrete example. The negative concomitance indicates that wherever the property to be proved is not present the reason is not present, namely, wherever non-eternity is not present the reason "being caused by effort" is not present. The negation of the "presence of non-eternity" is a non-affirming negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) which has the function only of denying non-eternity; it does not affirm anything that is eternal. Thus, the negations used in the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* are different,

> namely, it is mentioned that in the former case (i.e., *sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) [the negation of "eternity"] is an affirming negation (*paryudāsa*), in the latter case (i.e., *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*) [however, the negation of the "presence of non-eternity"] is a non-affirming negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). Thus (i.e., when the negation of the presence of non-eternity is a non-affirming negation), the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*) is established, even though [the proponent] does not accept eternal things [as existent]. (PSV^K 148b2f.)[10]

The negative concomitance in the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* indicates the logical relation that wherever non-eternity is not present the property "being caused by effort" is not present. Here the negation of the "presence of non-eternity" is a non-affirming negation. In other words, the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) do not consist of concrete things that are eternal, but of the mere negation of what is non-eternal. Therefore, the *vipakṣa* is the mere non-existence of non-

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[10] PSV^K 148b2f. (= PSV^V 64a3f., ad PS 4.3): *de lta na sṅa ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no żes smras pa yin no // de ltar na rtag pa khas ma blaṅs kyaṅ chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no //* (KITAGAWA 1965: 514,7-9, Japanese translation in KITAGAWA 1965: 242). Cf. NMu 2c8-11; KATSURA 1981: 63-65.

eternal things. For the proponent (for example the Sautrāntika) who does not accept the eternal entity as real existence, the eternal "ether" is also mere non-existence, and hence can be regarded as being a part of the *vipakṣa*. Further, ether possesses the property of not being caused by effort. Accordingly, this proponent can point to ether as one of the *vyatireka*'s examples which are the mere non-existence of non-eternal things and are not caused by effort. Since the *vyatireka* can be exemplified even in the case in which the *vipakṣa* does not exist for the proponent, the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* is established.

According to the view expounded above, the establishment of the *vyatireka* in the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* is based on the premise that in the non-existent *vipakṣa* no reason is present. Against this premise an opponent may bring forth a counterargument: the exclusion of the reason from non-existent dissimilar instances is impossible, because non-existence cannot be the locus from which the reason could be excluded.[11] The answer is given by Dharmakīrti, who rejects this objection.[12]

His main argument for the refutation is the same as that which he uses for the refutation of the Naiyāyikas' objection that the reason satisfying only the negative concomitance (*kevalavyatirekin*) is a valid reason: with a view to showing that a particular reason is excluded merely from dissimilar instances, they claim that this reason cannot be excluded from the non-existent similar instances. In this case they admit the negation of the exclusion of the reason from non-existent things, but this negation itself is also an exclusion; therefore, it entails that against their claim they themselves admit

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[11] Cf. NV 166,2f.: *na hy asad ādhāro bhavati, yatas tatpratiṣedhaḥ syāt*; PVin 2.8,1f.; PVSVṬ 78,11f. (objection on the part of Uddyotakara); STEINKELLNER 1979: 39 & note 93.

[12] Cf. PVin 2.8,3ff.

the exclusion (i.e., exclusion of the exclusion of the reason) from the non-existent similar instances.[13]

Thus, rejecting the objection that the reason cannot be excluded from non-existent things, Dharmakīrti supports Dignāga's view that the reason can be excluded from the dissimilar instances, even if these are non-existent.

An example that shows the negative concomitance is extracted from the dissimilar instances; however, there are some cases where no example is existent, such as when the dissimilar instances themselves are not existent for the proponent. Dharmakīrti, therefore, concedes that the example for the negative concomitance need not be a concrete existent: According to his logic, the negative concomitance – wherever the consequence is not present the reason is also not present – is established as long as it is established that the reason is essentially the consequence or the reason is the effect caused by the consequence.

> When, namely, the (property to be proved) is the essence of the (proving reason) or the (property to be proved) is the cause of the (proving reason [= effect]), how could [the reason] be present without its own essence, or how could [the effect as reason] be present without its cause? In consequence, in the case of the dissimilar example the negative concomitance is established even under the condition of the non-existence of the locus [to which the reason and the property to be proved belong]. (PVin 2.47, 3-5)[14]

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[13] Cf. PVin 2.8,13f., PV 4.222cd: *neti saiva nivṛttiḥ kiṃ nivṛtter asato matā* //, STEINKELLNER 1979: 40, note 99; PVin 3.323b8-324a1 = MATSUDA/STEINKELLNER 1991: 145,3f.

[14] PVin 2.47,3-5 = PVSV 18,6-9: *tathā hi sa tasya svabhāvo hetur vā. kathaṃ svaṃ svabhāvaṃ hetuṃ vāntareṇa bhaved ity āśrayam antareṇāpi vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte prasidhyati vyatirekaḥ*. Cf. PVin 2.74ab (= 71cd) = PV 1.26ab; STEINKELLNER 1979: 135f. In the passage (PSV^{K} 148b2f.) cited above it is implied that Dignāga is of the same opinion, namely that →

Since Dharmakīrti concedes that even if no concrete example of the negative concomitance exists in reality the negative concomitance can be established, he admits a break in ontological symmetry between the similar example (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) and the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*), because in the case of the similar example he presupposes the existence of a concrete example.

Thus, according to his view, the negative concomitance, i.e., the non-presence of the reason in all dissimilar instances, is the main condition for determining that the reason is not inconclusive, but the example of the negative concomitance need not be existent. The latter implies that the concrete example does not play an important role in the establishment of the negative concomitance. As shown in the passage cited above, the decisive factor for the establishment of the negative concomitance is not the concrete example, but the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), i.e., the identical relation consisting in the fact that the reason is essentially the consequence to be proved, or the causal relation that consists in the fact that the consequence to be proved is the cause for the reason.

III. Dharmakīrti's criticism of the reason which satisfies only the positive concomitance (*kevalānvayin*)

The proposition that in the non-existent thing no property (e.g., notably the reason) is present is introduced by Dignāga in order to establish the negative concomitance in the case of the non-existence of the dissimilar instances. However, this view is by no means unproblematic. It leads the Naiyāyikas to insist on cases

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the example of the negative concomitance need not be a concrete existent. Further, Dignāga conceives the view that the formulation of the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* is not necessary when a pervasion of the reason by the property to be proved is stated (cf. PSV^K 149b3-5 [ad PS 4.4], KATSURA 1983, note 19, KITAGAWA 1965: 255f.).

where the reason satisfies only the positive concomitance (*kevalānvayin*). That is to say, when the dissimilar instances do not exist for the proponent, then this view that the reason is not present in non-existent dissimilar instances entails that the reason is present only in similar instances and hence satisfies only the positive concomitance.

According to the Naiyāyikas, for example, when the proponent derives the thesis "sound is non-eternal" from the reason "because sound is an object of correct cognition (*prameya*)",

sound: (*prameyatva* → *anityatva*)

prameyatva is a valid reason which satisfies only the positive concomitance.[15] However, for Dharmakīrti this reason is of the same

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[15] Dharmakīrti introduces the Naiyāyikas' claim as follows: "They assert: Although [the reason] 'being an object of correct cognition' (*prameyatva*) is common (*sādhāraṇa*) [to similar and dissimilar instances], according to [the proponent who] rejects [the existence of eternal things which are] the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), [dissimilar instances, i.e., eternal things, do not exist; therefore,] it is impossible that [the reason *prameyatva*] occurs in non-existent [dissimilar instances]. Accordingly, the non-deviating occurrence [of the reason can] be present only in similar instances. In consequence, the reason is endowed with the positive concomitance." (PVin 3.324b7f.: *gźal bya ñid thun moṅ ba yaṅ 'dus ma byas* (D226a1; *las* Q) *la skur pa'i med pa la rjes su 'gro ba mi ruṅ ba'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba 'khrul pa med pa mthun pa'i phyogs ñid la yod pa yin pas rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldan pa ñid kyis gtan tshigs su smra'o //*). As an example of the inference from the reason which satisfies only the *anvaya*, Uddyotakara points to the following inference: For the proponent who claims the non-eternity of all things, sound is non-eternal because it is produced, cf. NV 144,5-145,2: *anvayī vivakṣitatajjātīyavṛttitve sati vipakṣahīnaḥ, yathā sarvānityatvavādinām anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. asya hi vipakṣo nāsti.* (English translation in PRETS 1999: 333f.). As for Dharmakīrti's refutation of *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin* reasons see PRETS 1999: 337ff.

type as the first reason in the Wheel of Reasons and hence is inconclusive, since the reason "being an object of correct cognition" is present commonly both in similar instances (non-eternal things) and dissimilar instances (eternal things), as both non-eternal and eternal things are objects of correct cognition.

Against the Naiyāyikas' assertion that this reason satisfies only the positive concomitance, Dharmakīrti negates the possibility of establishing the mere positive concomitance, on the ground that the reason's presence only in similar instances, i.e., the positive concomitance, implies the reason's non-presence in all dissimilar instances, i.e., the negative concomitance, and vice versa.[16]

Dharmakīrti also refutes the possible objection that the reason is certainly present in the existent similar instances, but can be neither absent from nor present in the non-existent dissimilar instances.[17] Dharmakīrti points out that in some cases the reason could be excluded from non-existent things and in other cases it could be present in non-existent things.

In order to confirm his first statement that the reason could be excluded from non-existent things, he makes use of the argument by way of which he refutes the objection that the reason satisfies only the negative concomitance,[18] and further presents the following argument:

> Although [the affirming negation (*paryudāsa*), i.e.] the negation which implies a property of an [existent] thing cannot be [present] in non-existent (things), not [only] the affirming negation alone [which implies something existent] is an object of the negation

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[16] Cf. PVin 3.324b8-325a2.

[17] Cf. PVin 3.325a2: *rjes su 'gro ba yaṅ ma yin la ldog pa yaṅ ma yin no źes bya ba ('di ni 'gal ba yaṅ yin te / ...).*

[18] Cf. PVin 3.325a3f.

(i.e., a matter indicated by the word "negation"), but the non-affirming negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), too, is [an object of the negation]. It is not contradictory that the latter (non-affirming negation) [is established] also in the non-existent (dissimilar instances) (PVin 3.325a4f.).[19]

According to this argument, whether the reason is excluded from the non-existent dissimilar instances or not is determined in conformity with the interpretation of the exclusion. When the exclusion of the reason is an affirming negation, namely, a negation that implies a positive property which is different from the reason, then the exclusion of the reason cannot be present in non-existent dissimilar instances. But when the exclusion of the reason is a non-affirming negation which merely denies the reason and does not imply any other positive property, the exclusion of the reason can be present even in non-existent dissimilar instances. In short, Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that only non-existence which is a non-affirming negation of a property can be present in non-existent things, not existence.[20]

As for Dharmakīrti's second statement, namely, that the reason could be present even in non-existent things, put forward in response to the Naiyāyikas' claim that the reason "being an object of

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[19] PVin 3.325a4f. (= PSṬ 195a4f.): *dṅos po'i raṅ bźin 'phen pa'i dgag pa med pa la mi srid kyaṅ ma yin par dgag pa gcig pu ni dgag pa'i yul ma yin no // 'o na ci źe na / med par dgag pa yaṅ yin la de ni med pa la'aṅ mi 'gal lo //.*

[20] While Dignāga applies the non-affirming negation to non-existent dissimilar instances, namely, to the negation of the property to be proved in order to establish the negative concomitance that the reason is not present in non-existent dissimilar instances, Dharmakīrti makes use of the non-affirming negation in the negation of the reason in order to establish that the non-affirming negation of the reason could occur in non-existent dissimilar instances.

correct cognition" (*prameyatva*) for the thesis "sound is non-eternal" satisfies only the positive concomitance, namely, that the reason is not present in non-existent dissimilar instances (i.e., eternal things), and hence is only present in similar instances, the point he is treating is as follows: According to his theory of inference, the subject of inference, *sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa* and so on are not the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), i.e., the objects of direct perception, but are objects of words. Since the objects of words are grasped by conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), they are conceptualized objects, namely, forms (*ākāra*) which appear (*pratibhāsin*) in conceptual construction. These forms are subsequently determined (*adhyavasāya*) as existent, non-existent and both (i.e., existent in some place and non-existent in another place).[21] Accordingly, even though non-existent dissimilar instances are not existent as particulars for the proponent, insofar as they are objects of words, they are not absolutely non-existent,[22] and are the forms that appear commonly to the conceptual construction of the proponent and opponent. It is possible with regard to these forms to examine whether the reason is present in them or not.

In consequence, the above-mentioned objection that the reason can be neither absent from nor present in non-existent dissimilar instances does not hold: namely, the objection that the reason "being an object of cognition" for the non-eternity of sound cannot be ex-

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[21] Cf. PVin 3.306b3f. (ad vv. 53-54) = PVSV 106,2-4: *sa tu vikalpaḥ sadasadubhayapratyayāhitavāsanāprabhava iti tatpratibhāsyākārādhyavasāyavaśena ca bhāvābhāvobhayadharma ity ucyate*; PVin 3.306b1 = PVSV 105,24-26: *naite śabdāḥ svalakṣaṇaviṣayāḥ, anādivāsanāprabhavavikalpapratibhāsinam arthaṃ viṣayatvenātmasāt kurvanti.*

[22] Cf. PVin 3.54cd (= 306a8-b1) = PV 1.206cd: *na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ* // ("These [objects of words, i.e., forms appearing in conceptual construction,] themselves are not non-existent, because words [denoting their objects] are used").

cluded from non-existent dissimilar instances (i.e., eternal things), does not hold. In addition:

> [The other objection] – that [the reason,] *prameyatva*, [can]<not> occur in [non-existent] dissimilar instances – does not [hold] either. I have mentioned that [objects of words are] properties of three kinds, which [arise respectively] on the basis of [the conceptual construction of] existence, non-existence and both. (PVin 3.325a6f.)[23]

With reference to the possibility of the presence of a property in non-existent things Dharmakīrti points out more generally:

> Isn't the absence of properties [in non-existent things] itself a property of these (things)? (PVin 3.325a7)[24]

Thus, on the one hand Dharmakīrti follows Dignāga's view that the reason is not present in non-existent dissimilar instances. On the other, in countering the objection that the reason satisfies only the positive concomitance because it does not occur in non-existent dissimilar instances, he insists that the absence of the reason in non-existent things is not always the case. This implies that in the case of the non-existence of dissimilar instances the absence of the reason in them cannot be a criterion for determining the establishment of the negative concomitance.

What, then, can be the basis for the determination? In Dharmakīrti's system of logic it is the essential connection on which the

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[23] PVin 3.325a6f.: *gźal bya ñid ni mi mthun pa'i phyogs la rjes su 'gro ba daṅ* <*mi*> (PVinṬ 193b5) *ldan pa yaṅ ma yin te / dṅos po daṅ dṅos po med pa daṅ* (D226a6; om. Q) *gñi ga la brten pa'i chos rnam pa gsum źes bśad zin to //*. Cf. PVin 3.53cd (= 306a8) = PV 1.205: *śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ //*.

[24] PVin 3.325a7: *chos daṅ bral ba de ñid de'i chos ma yin na*<*m*> (PVinṬ 194a2) /.

establishment of the concomitance is based (cf. pp. 124ff. below, § IV.2.3).

IV. Interpretation of the uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*) reason

As mentioned above, Dignāga asserts that for the determination of the reason's being valid, and not inconclusive, the negative concomitance, not the positive concomitance, is the predominant, decisive factor. Now the question arises whether it is possible to subject all inconclusive reasons to the criterion of the negative concomitance. Dignāga thinks that it is not possible, because there is a case where, even though the exclusion of the reason from all dissimilar instances is exemplified by an example, the presence of the reason in at least some of the similar instances cannot be established. He illustrates it with the inference "sound is non-eternal, because it is audible (*śrāvaṇa*)".

sound: (*śrāvaṇatva* → *anityatva*)

As the reason "audibility" belongs only to the subject of inference "sound", it is not present in any loci other than sound, namely, it is absent not only from the dissimilar instances but also from the similar instances. Because the reason is absent from all dissimilar instances it satisfies the third condition for the valid reason, i.e., the negative concomitance. However, as the reason is also absent from the similar instances, it does not satisfy the second condition for a valid reason. Consequently, this reason "audibility" is inconclusive in spite of the establishment of the negative concomitance.[25]

The inconclusiveness of the reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal" is explained in the same way as that of the reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is non-eternal": Regardless of

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[25] Cf. PS 2.6cd-7, PSV^K 111b3-8; KITAGAWA 1965: 102f., ONO 1999: 303, note 8.

the consequence, the inconclusiveness of "audibility" is determined solely on the ground that "audibility" belongs only to the subject "sound". Since the reason belongs to the subject alone, – since it is absent from both the similar and dissimilar instances –, it is an example of the uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*) reason, the fifth reason in the Wheel of Reasons.

Thus, in Dignāga's logic the uncommon reason (the fifth reason) is inconclusive even if it satisfies non-presence in all dissimilar instances. However, this shows that there is an exception to his view that the reason's non-presence in all dissimilar instances is the main point for the determination of the reason's non-inconclusiveness.

Now, let us see how he sets forth his argument for the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason. The basis for the argument is his view that both the similar example (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) and the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*) should be adduced in the formulation of a syllogism.

> [If similar and dissimilar examples were not stated jointly, and] only the dissimilar [example, which shows the reason's absence in all dissimilar instances,] were stated, then, because of this (mere statement of the reason's absence from all dissimilar instances), [it would be possible that the reason is] also absent from [the similar instances, namely, from the instances which are of the same] sort with [the subject] to be proved. Accordingly, it would entail that the uncommon [inconclusive reason is a valid reason]. (PSV^K 150b3)[26]

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[26] PSV^K 150b3 (= PSV^V 65a8-b1, ad PS 4.5): *ci ste chos mi mthun pa ñid kyis brjod na de'i phyir bsgrub bya'i rigs la yaṅ med pa'i phyir thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid 'gyur ro //* (KITAGAWA 1965: 520,16-18). Instead of PSV^K (: *mi mthun pa ñid kyis brjod na*) I have followed PSV^V 65a8: *mi mthun pa ñid rjod par byed na ni.* This passage is translated into Japanese in KITAGAWA 1965: 263. With respect to the same argument see PSV^K 149a7 (KITAGAWA 1965: 252f.).

Here, by means of a *prasaṅga* argument Dignāga demonstrates the necessity for the joint statement of the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* in the formulation of a syllogism: if both were not stated, namely, if the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* were not stated and the reason would be valid, then the uncommon reason which satisfies the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* and yet is inconclusive would be a valid reason. For Dignāga, the establishment of the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* is necessary in order to avoid the absurd consequence that the uncommon inconclusive reason is a valid reason. Seen from the aspect of the uncommon reason, it is inconclusive and hence not valid since it is lacking in the establishment of the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*, i.e., there is no concrete example for the positive concomitance.

Dharmakīrti differs from Dignāga in the interpretation of the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason. He does not base his argument on the non-existence of a concrete example for the positive concomitance, but on the point that the uncommon reason is indeterminate with respect to the negative concomitance. In his opinion, the establishment of the reason's absence from all dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) and the inconclusiveness of the reason are incompatible. That is, against Dignāga's view that the uncommon reason satisfies the negative concomitance, Dharmakīrti proposes that the uncommon reason is inconclusive precisely because it does not satisfy the negative concomitance.[27]

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[27] For Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the uncommon reason in PV, see ONO 1999 (304ff.), in which the hypothesis is proposed that the treatment of the uncommon reason in PV(SV) leads Dharmakīrti to develop his new proof of momentariness, namely, the inference of momentariness on the ground of existence (*sattvānumāna*). The passages in PVin 3 (321b2-324b7) which treat the uncommon inconclusive reason are translated into Japanese and the Tibetan text is critically edited with Sanskrit parallels in ONO 2000: 291ff.

IV.1. The uncommon reason in PVin 2

IV.1.1. Doubt regarding the establishment of the exclusion of the uncommon reason from all dissimilar instances

In PVin 2 Dharmakīrti introduces the objection that the uncommon reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal" is inconclusive, even though it satisfies the criterion of being absent from all dissimilar instances. He criticizes this objection on the ground that the absence of "audibility" in all dissimilar instances, i.e., non-eternal things, is doubtful.[28] In what sense is the exclusion of audibility from all instances doubtful? Dharmakīrti answers:

> [There is no ascertainment for the exclusion of audibility from the eternal and non-eternal things,] because [the fact that audibility is] a property of a thing and [the fact that audibility is] excluded from all things are contradictory. Accordingly, a doubt will arise precisely because one suspects [that it might be] present [in some instances]. (PVin 2.7, 19-21)[29]

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[28] Cf. PVin 2.7,13-17: *gal te mñan par bya ba* (Q267a8; *byed pa* D169b7) *ñid ldog pa yin yaṅ go bar byed pa ñid ma yin no że na / ma yin te / ldog pa med pa'i phyir ro // mñan par bya ba ñid ni 'ga'* (D; *'gal* Q) *las kyaṅ* (D; om Q) *ldog pa ma yin* te */ the tshom sgrub par byed pa'i phyir ro //* ("[Objection: The reason] 'audibility' is not [a valid reason which] makes known (**gamaka*) [the consequence], even though it is excluded [from all dissimilar instances]. [Answer: This] is not [correct], because the exclusion [of audibility from all dissimilar instances, i.e., non-eternal things] is not [established]. Audibility [can]not be excluded from any [instance, namely, the exclusion of audibility is not ascertained], because [it] produces a doubt [that it might be present in some non-eternal instances which are different from what is to be proved]"); German translation in STEINKELLNER 1979: 37f.

[29] PVin 2.7,19-21: *dṅos po'i chos daṅ dṅos po thams cad las ldog pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir ro // des na yod par dogs pa ñid kyis the tshom du 'gyur ro //* (translated in STEINKELLNER 1979: 38).

Audibility is a property that belongs to a certain thing. This thing is a member of all things. In consequence, inasmuch as audibility is a property, it is impossible for it not to belong to any of them, i.e., it must be present in at least one of them. However, its presence is not ascertained. Therefore, doubt arises with regard to whether audibility is present in eternal or non-eternal things. Because of this doubt the negative concomitance with respect to audibility and its consequence is not ascertained.

IV.1.2. The mere non-perception of the uncommon reason is not sufficient for establishing its exclusion from all dissimilar instances.

Against the view that the uncommon reason is absent not only from similar but also from dissimilar instances, Dharmakīrti points out that the reason's absence is still not ascertained by correct cognition, since its absence is maintained merely on the basis of non-perception.

> One says that [the reason "audibility"] possesses exclusion [from all dissimilar instances], because [its] occurrence [in the dissimilar instances] is not perceived (**adarśana*); however, exclusion of this kind does not make known [its consequence]. (PVin 2.7, 21-23)[30]

Even though the absence of audibility in dissimilar instances is maintained on the ground that audibility is not perceived in dissimilar instances since it belongs only to the subject "sound", the absence of audibility is not yet ascertained,[31] as it is not the case

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[30] PVin 2.7,21-23: *rjes su 'gro ba ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir ldog pa daṅ ldan par bśad pa yin no || ldog pa'i rnam pa 'di lta bu ni go bar byed pa ma yin te* / (translated in STEINKELLNER 1979: 38).

[31] For the same idea see PVin 3.322b3: *ma mthoṅ ba tsam la brten nas slob dpon* (Dignāga) *gyis mñan par bya ba ñid ldog pa can du bśad do || de tsam gyis med par rtogs pa ni ma yin no źes bśad zin to* || (ONO 2000: 292,28-30, Japanese translation in ibid., p. 301). Cf. PV 4.207abc; ONO 1999: 309 & note 24. For Dignāga's view that the absence of the reason →

that the mere non-perception of a thing necessarily establishes its absence, since the fact that a thing is not seen could mean that the thing's state is unclear or unknown, and hence it is not determinable whether the thing is existent or not. Therefore, there still remains the possibility that the mere non-perception of audibility in dissimilar instances does not exclude its presence in them.[32] Just as the absence of audibility in dissimilar instances is not ascertained, its presence in them is also not ascertained. Therefore, although the absence of audibility in dissimilar instances is mentioned, it is to be interpreted that this absence is merely due to a lack of ascertainment where audibility is present.[33]

Thus, the absence of audibility in dissimilar instances (non-eternal things) cannot be ascertained merely by non-perception; therefore, with respect to the uncommon reason "audibility" the negative concomitance "the absence of audibility in all non-eternal things" is doubtful. On account of this doubt Dharmakīrti avoids the contradiction that the uncommon reason is inconclusive and yet satisfies the criterion of the negative concomitance.

The reason why he thinks that the establishment of the negative concomitance and the inconclusiveness are contradictory can be traced back to his fundamental idea that the negative concomitance

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in the dissimilar instances can be confirmed by mere non-perception and Dharmakīrti's implicit criticism of Dignāga's view through the refutation of Īśvarasena's view on mere non-perception as a third type of a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), see SHORYU KATSURA, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*", *Asiatische Studien* 46/1, 1992: 225ff.

[32] Cf. PVin 2.66 (= 65) = PV 1.13: *na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā / saṃbhāvyavyabhicāratvāt, sthālītaṇḍulapākavat //*; see STEINKELLNER 1979: 113f. & notes 433f.

[33] Cf. PVSV 19,16: *kevalaṃ tu bhāvaniścayābhāvān nāstīty ucyate.*

is inevitably connected with the positive concomitance which eliminates the inconclusiveness with respect to the reason's presence only in the similar instances. From this point of view he criticizes the objection that the uncommon reason satisfies only the negative concomitance.

IV.1.3. The essential connection as the basis for the refutation of the mere negative concomitance

Why is the negative concomitance invariably connected with the positive concomitance? According to Dharmakīrti's system of logic, the establishment of both concomitances is based on a factual relation between the reason and the property to be proved, namely, the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*), a concept not found in Dignāga's logic. It consists of two relations: the one is identity (*tādātmya*), namely that the object indicated by the reason is the same as the object indicated by the property to be proved; the other consists of the relation between different things, i.e., causality (*tadutpatti*), namely that the object indicated by the reason is caused by the object indicated by the property to be proved.

Dharmakīrti rejects the objection that only the negative concomitance can be established, because the establishment of the negative concomitance is based on the essential connection and the latter establishes the positive concomitance, too.

> This (negative concomitance which makes the consequence known), in its turn, cannot be demonstrated when the positive concomitance is not [established], because the cognition [of the essential connection] that [the consequence to be proved] is the (reason) (*_tadbhāva_) or [the consequence to be proved] is the cause

(**hetubhāva*) [of the reason] establishes [the positive concomitance]. (PVin 2.7,24-26)[34]

For Dharmakīrti, the establishment of the mere negative concomitance is absolutely impossible because of his fundamental view that the essential connection is the ground for both the positive and negative concomitances. For Dignāga, who does not know this relation, a break in the symmetry of the two concomitances, i.e., the establishment of the negative concomitance alone, is possible.

Dharmakīrti's above-mentioned view on the uncommon reason "audibility" may be summarized as follows.

a) Dignāga asserts that audibility is excluded from both similar and dissimilar instances, but this exclusion is doubtful, because, inasmuch as audibility is a property of a thing, which is a member of all things, it is impossible that audibility does not belong anywhere; however, it is not determined where it is present. Therefore, this reason is inconclusive.

b) The argument for the exclusion of the uncommon reason "audibility" from all dissimilar instances, namely that it is not perceived in them, does not hold, because the mere non-perception of audibility does not prove its absence.

c) The establishment of the mere negative concomitance is impossible, because the negative concomitance and the positive concomitance imply each other on the ground that both concomitances are based on the essential connection.

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[34] PVin 2.7,24-26: *de yaṅ rjes su 'gro ba med par* (Q267b2; *pa* D170a2) *bstan par mi nus te / de'i ṅo bo daṅ rgyu'i dṅos po mthoṅ ba sgrub par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro //* (translated in STEINKELLNER 1979: 38).

IV.2. The uncommon reason in PVin 3

Dharmakīrti describes the uncommon reason in detail in PVin 3. Let us analyze his view on the aforesaid three points.

IV.2.1. Doubt regarding the exclusion of the uncommon reason from the dissimilar instances

According to Dharmakīrti's presentation of the argument for doubting the establishment of the negative concomitance of the reason "audibility" for the thesis "sound is eternal", this reason is inconclusive on the following grounds.[35] Firstly, the contrary alternatives, eternity and non-eternity, pervade all things. Audibility is a property of a thing; in other words, it is present somewhere, and therefore cannot be excluded from these alternatives. Secondly, there is no definite cognition with respect to which of the alternatives audibility is present in. Dharmakīrti ascribes this argument,

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[35] Cf. PVin 3.299b8-300a2: *mthun moṅ ma yin pa yaṅ gñi ga las phyi rol tu* (Q; *du* D202b1) *gyur pa* (Q; *pa'i* D) *mi srid pas gñi ga las ldog pa* **ṅes pa** (Q; * **des* D) *mi 'thad pa'i phyir daṅ / gñis las gcig la yaṅ yod par rtogs pa'i* (D; *par* Q) *sgrub par byed pa med pa'i phyir na 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa dag la the tshom* **za ba ñid kyi phyir the tshom** (Q; * * om D) *gyi rgyu ñid de /* ("The uncommon [reason], too, is exactly the cause of doubt [regarding the derivation of the consequence], because one has doubt both as to [the reason's] presence (**vṛtti*) [in similar instances] and as to [the reason's] exclusion [from dissimilar instances]. [The doubt arises] because it is impossible to determine that [the uncommon reason is] excluded from the two [contrary alternatives] since [things which are] other than both [of the alternatives] cannot [exist], and because there is no proof of the cognition as to [the reason's] presence even in one of the two").

which is the same as that presented in PVin 2 (cf. pp. 111ff. above, § IV.1.1), to Dignāga.[36]

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[36] Cf. PSV^{K} 133a3 (= PSV^{V} 50a6f.) = PVA 629,13f.: *yo hy asādhāraṇaḥ sādhyadharmaḥ* (in text: *sādhanadharmaḥ*) *sa yāvatā bhedena sarvasaṃgrahas tatra saṃśayahetuḥ, tadvatā<ṃ> tatsaṃgrahād ekāntavyāvṛtteś ca* (cf. KATSURA 1979: 74) = PVin 3.300a2f.: *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos thun moṅ ma yin pa gaṅ yin pa de ni khyad par ji sñed kyis thams cad bsdus pa de la the tshom za ba'i rgyu yin te / de daṅ ldan pa des bsdus pa'i phyir daṅ / gcig tu ṅes pa* (D202b3; *par* Q) *ldog pa'i phyir ro* (*źes bśad pa lta bu'o //*), NMu 2b15-17; KITAGAWA 1965: 202, note 382.

Dharmakīrti's first ground for the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason, namely, that this reason is not excluded from the contrary alternatives, corresponds to Dignāga's first ground, namely, that things possessing the uncommon property are comprehended by all sorts of contrary alternatives (*tadvatāṃ tatsaṃgrahāt*); Dignāga's second ground, *ekāntavyāvṛtti* (*mtha' gcig tu ldog pa* PSV^{K}), however, does not seem to correspond to Dharmakīrti's second ground, since, in the context of PSV, it means that the uncommon reason is excluded absolutely from contrary alternatives, i.e., *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, cf. NP 3,22-4,2: *tad* (= *śrāvaṇatvam*) *hi nityānityapakṣābhyāṃ vyāvṛttatvān* (*nityānityavinirmuktasya cānyasyāsaṃbhavāt saṃśayahetuḥ*); Dharmakīrti's second reason means that there is no determination with respect to which of the alternatives the reason is present in. Dharmakīrti's second reason is based on the interpretation that *ekāntavyāvṛtti* means the negation of the determination as to which of the alternatives is the locus of the reason, in other words, the impossibility of determining the reason's presence in either of the alternatives (cf. PVin 3.300a4f.: ***gcig tu ṅes pa ldog pas*** (*ekāntavyāvṛtti*) *ni gcig gi dṅos por rtogs pa'i* (D202b4; *par* Q) *sgrub par byed pa med* (D; *yin* Q) *par bśad pa yin no //*; PVinṬ 83b5: *'dis ni rtag pa'am mi rtag pa'i phuṅ po gcig la* (D71a2; om Q) *rtogs* (D; rtog Q) *pa'i tshad ma med par bśad pa yin no //*). Probably Dharmakīrti changed his interpretation of *ekāntavyāvṛtti* intentionally so that it would correspond to his second ground for the inconclusiveness of the reason. According to Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation too, *ekāntavyāvṛtti* means absence (**abhāva*) of determination (**nirṇaya*) (cf. PSṬ 194b6: ***mtha' gcig pa*** *ni gtan la phebs* →

Further, Dharmakīrti makes use of the law of the excluded middle when he divides the domain into the alternatives. This is seen in his interpretation of the fifth reason in the Wheel of Reasons. As an example of an inference from the fifth reason he gives the following inference, which is different from Dignāga's.

A living body (*jīvaccharīra*) possesses a self (*sātmaka*), because it possesses breathing (*prāṇa*), etc.[37]

jīvaccharīra: (*prāṇādimattva* → *sātmakatva*)

According to the orthodox interpretation of the uncommon reason, the reason "breathing, etc." is not observed in loci other than the living body; therefore, it is regarded as absent from both similar and dissimilar instances.

[38]For Dharmakīrti, the purpose of dealing with the fifth reason is to refute the objection of the Naiyāyikas,[39] to wit, that this reason

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pa yin źiṅ / de ***ldog pa*** *ni med pa'o //*; JAMBŪVIJAYA 1966-88: 663). Therefore, his interpretation corresponds to Dharmakīrti's second ground which states that there is no determination as to the reason's presence (cf. PSṬ 194b6: *'dis gcig la yod pa la sgrub byed med pa gsuṅs so //*). That Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is influenced by Dharmakīrti's view is also confirmed by the fact that, in order to explain the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason, Jinendrabuddhi adduces a quotation from PVin 3 in which Dharmakīrti explains his two grounds for the inconclusiveness by way of an example (cf. PVin 3.300a2 = PSṬ 194b7f.).

[37] Cf. PVin 3.300b4f.; PVin 3.321b3, NB 3.97: *yathā sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādimattvād iti.*

[38] Cf. PVin 3.34c = PV 4.195c, ONO 1999: 306; PVin 3.322a5ff.

[39] Cf. PVin 3.322a5-7, 323a1f. (for a Japanese translation see ONO 2000: 300, 302); PVSV 13,1-4 = PVin 2.42,20-26, STEINKELLNER 1979: 124f., note 479. For the Naiyāyikas' claim of the mere negative concomitance see NV 145,2-4: *vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpakatve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ, yathā nedaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ nirātmakam aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti*; KYŌ KANŌ, "Shusaishin no Sonzai-ronshō to →

satisfies merely the negative concomitance (*kevalavyatirekin*) and hence is a valid reason. The Naiyāyikas assert that since the self is not existent for the Buddhists, similar instances which possess a self are not existent, and thus "[the reason 'breathing, etc.' can]not be absent from non-existent similar instances; therefore, [it is] absent merely from [those which are] not similar instances".[40]

Dharmakīrti provides the full details of the refutation of their objection within his interpretation of fallacious reasons, where he gives his argument that the reason "breathing, etc." for the thesis "a living body possesses a self" does not satisfy the negative concomitance. The negative and positive concomitances are rather doubtful for the above-mentioned two grounds:

> [Firstly] other than [the set which] possesses a self and [the set which] does not possess a self there is no [third] set where breathing, etc. [as the reason] would occur,[41] because all [things] are comprehended by the occurrence (**vṛtti*) of a self and the exclusion (**vyavaccheda*) [of a self].[42] [Secondly] there is no determination as to the occurrence [of breathing, etc.] in either of these two (alternatives, i.e., things possessing a self or things not possessing a self),[43] because it is not proved [that breathing, etc., is present exclusively] in [things that are] established as having it (i.e., possession of a self or non-possession of a self) as essence [, namely,

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kevalavyatirekihetu" [The Proof of the Existence of God and *kevalavyatirekihetu*], *Indo Shisōshi Kenkyū* 5, 1987: 10ff.

[40] PVin 3.323b8 = MATSUDA/STEINKELLNER 1991: 145,3: *asataḥ sapakṣān na nivṛttir ity asapakṣa eva nāsti*, cf. PVin 3.322a5f.

[41] Cf. NB 3.98: *na hi sātmakanirātmakābhyām anyo rāśir asti yatrāyaṃ prāṇādir vartate.* The Sanskrit parallels (NB 3.98-101) are pointed out in ONO 2000, notes 2-6 to the Tibetan text.

[42] Cf. NB 3.99: *ātmano vṛttivyavacchedābhyāṃ sarvasaṃgrahāt*; ONO 1987: 11.

[43] Cf. NB 3.100: *nāpy anayor ekatra vṛttiniścayaḥ.*

> because it is not proved that breathing, etc., is present exclusively in some things that possess a self or exclusively in others that do not possess a self].[44] (PVin 3.321b3-5)[45]

In the first ground Dharmakīrti points out that the reason "breathing, etc." should necessarily be present either in some things that possess a self or in others that do not possess a self and that there is no third thing beside these two. The negation of the third thing indicates that the alternatives are exactly contradictory. In the second ground he states that it is impossible to determine in which of the two alternatives "breathing, etc." resides. From these two grounds he derives the conclusion that both the positive concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc." is present only in things that possess a self, and the negative concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc." is never present in things that do not possess a self, are doubtful.

> Consequently, since there is no [thing] other than [the alternative things which] have as their essence two (properties, i.e., the possession of a self and non-possession of a self), [the reason] "breathing, etc.", which is connected with [the subject of inference] "living body", is not excluded from these two (alternatives).[46] [Further, breathing, etc.] does not [necessarily] occur in those (i.e., things that possess a self), because [the inevitable presence of breathing,

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[44] Cf. NB 3.101: *sātmakatvenānātmakatvena vā prasiddhe prāṇāder asiddheḥ*. For the same argument for the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason, see PVin 3.299b8-300a2 (note 35 above).

[45] PVin 3.321b3-5: *gaṅ la srog la sogs pa gnas par 'gyur ba bdag daṅ bcas pa daṅ bdag med pa las phuṅ po *gźan ni** (* * *gźan* Q; *bźin ni* D223a2) *med de / bdag gnas* (Q; *rnam par gnas* D) *pa daṅ rnam par gcod pa dag gis thams cad bsdus pa'i phyir ro // 'di gñis las gcig la gnas* (Q; *rnam par gnas* D) *par* (Q; *pa* D) *ṅes pa med de / de'i bdag ñid *du grub pa la** (Q; * * *las* D) *ma grub pa'i phyir ro //* (ONO 2000: 291,6-11, translated into Japanese in ibid., p. 299).

[46] Cf. NB 3.102: *tasmāj jīvaccharīrasaṃbandhī prāṇādiḥ sātmakād anātmakāc ca sarvasmād vyāvṛttatvenāsiddhes tābhyāṃ na vyatiricyate.*

> etc.] even in one [of the two alternatives] is not established.[47] Exactly from this (uncertainty), both the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance are doubtful. Therefore, [this reason "breathing, etc."] is inconclusive [with respect to its derivation of consequence], since by means of this (reason) the determination [to derive] what is to be proved or the opposite is not [attained].[48] (PVin 3.321b5-7)[49]

Dharmakīrti interprets the inconclusiveness of the fifth reason "breathing, etc." as follows: the reason should be present in one of the alternatives, i.e., in what possesses a self or in what does not possess a self; however, it is not determined in which of the two the reason is present. In his argument, the domain to be examined in regard to whether the reason is present or absent consists not of the similar instances and dissimilar instances, but of the exactly contradictory alternatives, namely, things that possess a self (i.e., what is to be proved) and things that do not possess a self (i.e., contrary to what is to be proved). These alternatives comprehend all things. Accordingly, the domain to be examined in regard to the presence or absence of the reason consists of all things. In other words, one may not *a priori* presuppose the presence of the uncommon reason

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[47] Cf. NB 3.103: *na tatrānveti*, 104: *ekātmany apy asiddheḥ*, NBṬ: 219,6-8.

[48] Cf. NB 3.107: ... *tata evānvayavyatirekayoḥ saṃdehād anaikāntikaḥ*, ibid. 108: *sādhyetarayor ato niścayābhāvāt.*

[49] PVin 3.321b5-7: *de bas na gson po'i lus daṅ 'brel pa can gyi srog la sogs pa ni gñis kyi bdag ñid las phyi rol du gyur pa med pa'i phyir de dag las ldog pa ma yin no // de la *rjes su 'gro ba ma yin te / gcig la yaṅ ma grub pa'i phyir ro // de ñid kyi phyir** (Q; *...* om D223a4) *rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa dag la* (Q; *las* D) *the tshom za ba'i phyir ma ṅes pa yin te / de las bsgrub par bya ba daṅ cig śos dag tu ṅes pa med pa'i phyir ro //* (ONO 2000: 291,11-17; Japanese translation, p. 299). The Sanskrit parallels (NB 3.102-104,107) are pointed out by Ono in ibid., p. 297, notes 4-6.

only in the subject of inference or its exclusion from both similar and dissimilar instances.[50] This is inferred as follows: if it were presupposed, then the absence of the reason from loci other than the subject of inference would be determined, and hence one could not emphasize the doubt regarding both the presence of the reason in what is to be proved and the absence of the reason in what is not to be proved. His emphasis on doubt with regard to them may imply that he does not presuppose the reason's presence only in the subject of inference.

The idea that the domain to be examined for the presence or absence of the reason consists of all things suggests that this domain also includes the subject of inference. The excepting of the subject of inference from the domain to be examined for the reason's presence or absence is to make use of the concrete example for the confirmation of the logical relation between the reason and the property to be proved. When, on the contrary, the domain includes the subject of inference, the dependence of the determination of the logical relation upon the concrete example will be eliminated. Thus, theoretically, it might be drawn from Dharmakīrti's arguments that there is the bare possibility of examining the concomitance without depending upon the concrete example; however, he himself does not mention this.

IV.2.2. The proof of the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason "breathing, etc." on the ground that a self, which is to be proved, is beyond the domain of senses.

While Dharmakīrti indicates the reason "breathing, etc." for the thesis "a living body possesses a self" as an example of the un-

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[50] Cf. also PVin 3.324a5f.= MATSUDA/STEINKELLNER 1991: 145,13ff.; note 53 (infra). This point is also referred to in ONO 1987: 10f. (& note 47).

common reason in his interpretation of the Wheel of Reasons, in his presentation of fallacious reasons he takes the view that both the positive and negative concomitances of this reason are doubtful. He explains it on the ground that what is to be proved, the self, is beyond the domain of senses (*viprakarṣa*).

> [The reason] "breathing, etc." is in a specific [sense doubtful of its positive and negative concomitances] on the following ground: because a self is beyond [the domain of senses] neither the presence nor the absence [of a self in things] is established; therefore, also with regard to breathing, etc., neither its presence nor its absence in that (i.e., either of the two, that which possesses a self or that which does not possess a self) is established. (PVin 3.322a3f.)[51]

As the existence of the self itself is doubtful, it is more doubtful that the reason "breathing, etc." is present in that which possesses a self. In the same way, the exclusion of this reason from that which does not possess a self is also doubtful.[52] In consequence, both the positive and negative concomitances of the reason "breathing, etc." are doubtful.[53] In the above-mentioned refutation of the Naiyāyi-

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[51] PVin 3.322a3f.: *srog la sogs pa ni khyad par du yin te / bdag bskal* (D223b1; *skal* Q) *bas* (Q; *pas* D) *'jug pa daṅ ldog pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir srog la sogs pa yaṅ de la 'jug pa daṅ ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro //* (ONO 2000: 292,1-3, Japanese translation, p. 300).

[52] For Dharmakīrti's view that the exclusion of the uncommon reason "breathing, etc." from all dissimilar instances is not ascertained merely by means of the non-perception of what is imperceptible (*adṛśyānupalambha*), see PVin 2.42,19-28 = PVSV 13,1-5.

[53] Cf. PVin 3.324a3 = MATSUDA/STEINKELLNER 1991: 145,9: *na cāsann ātmā sattāsādhanavṛtteḥ saṃdigdhaḥ syāt* ("Furthermore, the self is not [yet determined to be] non-existent, since [the reason] fulfils the function of proving the existence [of a self]. [A self] would be [rather] doubtful"), ONO 2000: 304 (Japanese translation), PV 4.237ab; PVin 3.324a5f. = MATSUDA/STEINKELLNER 1991: 145,13-15: *tasmād avyatireke 'py asataḥ sapakṣād vyatirekaḥ saṃdigdhaḥ syāt prāṇādīnām ātmanaḥ* →

kas' claim of the mere negative concomitance, Dharmakīrti does not resort to the argument that since the reason "breathing, etc." belongs only to the subject of inference, it is absent from both similar and dissimilar instances. The basis for his refutation is that since similar instances include a self, which is beyond the sphere of cognition, it is impossible to ascertain whether the reason is present in them or not. In other words, he reduces the uncommon reason to the reason that is doubtful with regard to both the positive and negative concomitances.

IV.2.3. The interpretation of the inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason on the ground of the essential connection.

As far as the logical relation between the reason and the property to be proved is determined by the criterion of the presence of the reason in similar instances and the absence of the reason from dissimilar instances, the problem of how to treat its presence in and absence from non-existent or empirically remote (imperceptible, doubtful) instances arises. In Dharmakīrti's interpretation of inconclusive reasons, he refers to different opinions regarding the determination of whether the reason is present in or absent from these non-existent or unknown things. While he supports Dignāga's view on the exclusion of the reason from non-existent things (cf. § II), he

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saṃdehāt. ata eva vipakṣād api. ekatra hi niyame siddhe 'nyanivartanaṃ sidhyet ("Consequently, although [the Naiyāyikas assert that 'breathing, etc.' can]not be excluded from similar instances [i.e., things that possess a self which are for the Buddhist opponent] non-existent, the exclusion of breathing, etc., [from them] would be doubtful, because the self [itself] is doubtful. On the same ground, [the exclusion of breathing, etc.] from dissimilar instances, too, [is doubtful], because if the necessity [for the presence of breathing, etc.] in one case [i.e., similar instances] were established, its absence from the other [i.e., dissimilar instances] would be established"), translated in ibid., p. 147, ONO 2000: 305 (Japanese translation), PV 4.238-239ab.

also admits the possibility of the presence of the reason in non-existent things (cf. § III). Or when the similar instances include an object that is empirically unknown to the Buddhist, for example a self, he clarifies his position that both the presence of the reason in similar instances and the absence of the reason from dissimilar instances are doubtful (cf. § IV.2.2).

However, he does not offer any consistent rule for treating them. Why not? This is explained by his use of the principle of the essential connection, to which he often refers after having discussed inconclusive reasons. As to the basis for the logical relation between the reason and the property to be proved, he advocates an original view: The determination of the presence of the reason in similar instances and of the absence of the reason in dissimilar instances is grounded on the essential connection, namely, the factual relation that the reason is the same as that which is to be proved or is the effect of that which is to be proved.[54]

In his refutation of the Naiyāyikas' inference of the existence of a self from the reason "breathing, etc." he also shows the inconclusiveness of the reason by means of this essential connection. According to his logical system valid reasons are of two kinds: either the essential property or the effect. In the case of the essential property as the reason, the inevitable relation of the reason with what is to be proved is based on their identity. But when a valid reason is something different from that which is to be proved, it must be the effect of that which is to be proved, that is, when the reason and that which is to be proved denote not the same thing but

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[54] For example, precisely because the negative concomitance is not ascertained by the mere non-perception of the reason in dissimilar instances, Dharmakīrti proposes the essential connection as the basis for the negative concomitance (cf. PVin 2.39,17ff., 45,26ff. and STEINKELLNER 1979: 134, note 520).

different things, the inevitable relation is based on causality. Thus, if the reason, though different from what is to be proved, is not the effect of the latter, it is not a valid reason.

> By means of [the reason "breathing, etc.", which is] a different thing [from that which is to be proved, "self",] and [still] not the effect [of a self, the thesis "a living body possesses a self"] is not proved. On this ground, too, [the reason "breathing, etc." is doubtful of its derivation of the consequence]. It is not proved that breathing, etc., and a self possess a relation of effect and cause, since this (causal relation] is based on cognition (*upalambha*) and non-cognition (*anupalambha*) [in the way that when the cause is cognized its effect is also cognized and when the cause is not cognized its effect is also not cognized, but a self cannot be cognized]. [Thus the reason "breathing, etc." is] doubtful, [not only because there is no ascertainment that "breathing, etc." is present exclusively in things that possess a self or is absent exclusively from things that do not possess a self] but also because there is no [ascertainment that] when ["breathing, etc.", which] is not related [with a self,] is existent, [a self] is existent. (PVin 3.322a4f.)[55]

If "breathing, etc.", which is different from that which is to be proved, namely "self", were a valid reason, then it must be the effect of a self, but this causal relation is not established. "Their [causal] relation is recognized by cognition and non-cognition [namely by the cognition of breathing, etc., in the case of the cognition of a self and by the non-cognition of breathing, etc., in the case of the non-cognition of a self]. However, these (cognitions and non-cognitions) are not established with respect to [a self which is] completely beyond the range of senses (*atyantaparokṣa*)" (PVin

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[55] PVin 3.322a4f.: *don gźan 'bras bu ma yin pa las mi 'grub pa'i yaṅ phyir ro // srog la sogs pa daṅ bdag ni rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i dṅos por mi 'grub ste / de ni dmigs pa* (D223b2; *par* Q) *daṅ mi dmigs pa la* (D; *daṅ* Q) *brten pa'i phyir ro // 'brel pa med pa yod na yod pa yaṅ ma yin pa'i phyir the tshom za'o //* (ONO 2000: 292,3-7, Japanese translation: 300).

3.322b7).[56] Since between different things, i.e., breathing, etc., and a self, no causal relation is recognized, the reason "breathing, etc." is not valid – it is inconclusive.

When the inevitable nexus between the reason and the property to be proved is determined by the method of ascertaining both the presence of the reason in similar instances and its absence from dissimilar instances, one encounters the problem of how to point out examples in cases where similar or dissimilar instances are not existent or are beyond the sphere of cognition. As far as the indication of the inconclusiveness of reasons is concerned, this problem is avoided when the essential connection is introduced as the basis for the establishment of the logical relation between reason and consequence, since the inconclusiveness of reasons is judged merely by the confirmation that there is neither identity nor causality between reasons and that which is to be proved, that is to say, it is not necessary to examine their presence in similar instances and their absence fron dissimilar instances by means of concrete examples.

Summary

According to Dignāga's logic, the judgement whether the reason in an inference is inconclusive or valid is based on whether the reason is absent from all dissimilar instances, namely the negative concomitance. This is shown by means of a concrete example. When giving examples the proponent encounters the problem of how to deal with the example when it is not existent for the proponent, and the problem of whether the establishment of this negative concomi-

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[56] PVin 3.322b7: *de dag gi 'brel pa ni dmigs pa daṅ mi dmigs pa dag las śes pa yin na / de dag ni śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la mi 'grub bo //* (ONO 2000: 293,9-11, Japanese translation, p. 301). Cf. PV 4.209d-210: *ātmopalambhane // tasyopalabdhāv agatāv agatau ca prasidhyati / te cātyantaparokṣasya dṛṣṭyadṛṣṭī na sidhyataḥ //*; ONO 1999: 309.

tance is sufficient to rule out all inconclusive reasons. This paper deals with Dignāga's solutions and Dharmakīrti's improvement on them from the perspective of examining the possibility of deriving consequences without depending on examples.

I. Dignāga notices that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are contrapositive and logically equivalent, but he insists that both *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* must be adduced in syllogisms. However, he thinks that the main basis for deriving the consequence is not the affirmative relation "presence of the reason in similar instances" but the negative relation "absence of the reason in dissimilar instances". Dharmakīrti follows Dignāga's view in his interpretation of inconclusive reasons in the Wheel of Reasons.

II. In order to solve the problem of how to establish the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances when these are not existent, Dignāga considers that the absence of the reason in the non-existent substratum is self-evident on the ground that no property can be present in what is not existent. However, this leaves unsolved the question of how the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* can be established under the condition of the non-existence of dissimilar instances. Dignāga answers this question through the application of the non-affirming negation to the formulation of dissimilar instances. Non-existent dissimilar instances consist of the mere negation of that which is to be proved, namely, mere non-existence. Therefore, a concrete example which is not existent for the proponent can be regarded as being a part of the dissimilar instances through which the negative concomitance is exemplified, even if dissimilar instances do not exist for the proponent. Dharmakīrti also accepts that the example of the negative concomitance need not be a concrete existent. This implies that the existence of concrete examples does not play an important role in the establishment of the negative concomitance; for him, the decisive factor in establishing the negative concomitance is the essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*).

III. Making use of the proposition that no reason is present in non-existent dissimilar instances, Naiyāyikas insist that the reason "being an object of cognition" for the thesis "sound is non-eternal" is present only in the similar instances and hence satisfies only the positive concomitance. Dharmakīrti disproves the establishment of the mere positive concomitance on the ground that the positive concomitance implies the negative concomitance and vice versa. While refuting the possible objection that the reason is present in existent similar instances but neither absent from nor present in non-existent dissimilar instances, he points out that in some cases the reason could be absent from non-existent things and in other cases the reason could be present in them. In regard to the latter cases he mentions that the presence of a property in non-existent things is possible because the absence of properties in non-existent things itself is a property of these things. From this proposition that the absence of the reason in non-existent things is not always the case, the conclusion is drawn that in the case of the non-existence of dissimilar instances the absence of the reason in them cannot be a criterion for determining the establishment of the negative concomitance. This may be one reason why Dharmakīrti introduces the essential connection for the sake of the establishment of the concomitance.

IV Against Dignāga's view that the uncommon reason satisfies the negative concomitance, Dharmakīrti proposes that the uncommon reason is inconclusive precisely because it does not satisfy the negative concomitance. The inconclusiveness of the uncommon reason from the aspect of doubt regarding its exclusion from all dissimilar instances in PVin 2 and 3 may be summarized as follows: (a) This exclusion is doubtful, because, though the reason is a property of a thing and must belong somewhere, it is not determined where it is present. (b) The argument that establishes the exclusion of the uncommon reason "audibility" for the eternity (or non-eternity) of sound on the ground of its non-perception does not

hold, because mere non-perception of audibility does not prove its non-existence; the exclusion of the reason “breathing, etc.” for the thesis “a living body possesses a self” from what does not possess a self is doubtful, because a self which is to be proved is beyond the domain of senses. (c) The establishment of the mere negative concomitance is impossible, because the negative and positive concomitances imply each other since both concomitances are based on the essential connection.

In his interpretation of the two uncommon reasons, Dharmakīrti does not insist on the Dignāga-type of arguments that state that since the uncommon reason belongs only to the subject of inference it is absent from both similar and dissimilar instances. On the contrary, he lays stress on the doubt of its presence in that which is to be proved or its absence from that which is not to be proved. The remarkable point is that he considers that the uncommon reason is not excluded from all things, namely, that the domain to be examined for its presence or absence is divided into contradictory alternatives that comprehend all things. This suggests that there is a bare possibility that the presence of the uncommon reason only in the subject is not presupposed from the beginning, in other words, that this domain also includes the subject. Although this view might open up the way for an examination of the concomitance without dependence upon concrete examples, Dharmakīrti does not mention it.

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D sDe dge edition of the Tibetan canon.

DhTh — Shoryu Katsura (ed.), ***Dh**armakīrti's **Th**ought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proeedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997.* (BKGA 32) Wien 1999.

Q — Peking edition of the Tibetan canon.

WZKS — *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.*

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NBṬ — *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): See NB.

NMu — *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): *Inmyōshōrimonron*, tr. Xuan Zang, *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* 32, 1-6.

NV — *Nyāyavārttika* (Uddyotakara): Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha (eds.), *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.* 2 vols. Calcutta 1936-44 [reprint: Kyōto 1982].

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PVinṬ — *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara): Q 5727.

PVA — *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta): Rāhula Saṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam).* Patna 1953.

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PS 2, 3, 4 — *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga) chapters 2, 3 and 4: See PSV^{K}, PSV^{V} and KITAGAWA 1965.

PSṬ — *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi): Q 5766.

PSV^{K} — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), tr. Kanakavarman and Dad pa('i) śes rab: Q 5702.

PSV^{V} *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), tr. Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ (ge) rgyal (po): Q 5701.

VNṬ *Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipañcitārthā* (Śāntarakṣita): Dvārikādās Śāstrī (ed.), *Ācārya-śrī-Dharmakīrti-viracitā Dharmakīrti-nibandhāvaliḥ* (2), *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇam ācārya-Śāntarakṣita-kṛta-Vipañcitārthavyākhyāyutam evaṃ ācārya-Prabhācandra-kṛta-vyākhyāsanāthā Sambandhaparīkṣā.* (Bauddha Bharati Series 8) Vārāṇasī 1972.

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The Role of *dṛṣṭānta* in Dignāga's Logic

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0. Dignāga discusses example (*dṛṣṭānta*) and pseudo-example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) in his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (henceforth PSV), chapter 4.[1] Most of his discussions in the *svamata* section can be traced back to his earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*. In the *paramata* section he criticizes the views presented in the *Vādavidhi* attributed to Vasubandhu as well as those of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.[2]

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[1] The first part of my presentation at the panel in Lausanne, 1999, which dealt with Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*, has appeared under the title of "Dignāga on *trairūpya* Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke," in Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, *Indo no Bunka to Ronri* (Culture and Logic in India), ed. by Akihiko Akamatsu, University Press of Kyushu, Oct. 2000: 241-266.

[2] A synopsis of PS/PSV/PSṬ chapter 4:

1 Dignāga's own views (*svamata*) on *dṛṣṭānta* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*

1.1 Dignāga's own views on *dṛṣṭānta* (Derge8b4-9a4/60a2-63a3/212b3-226b3)

1.1.1 The *dṛṣṭānta* statement expresses the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (*hetu*)

1.1.2 Two kinds of *dṛṣṭānta* and their proper formulations

1.1.3 Necessity of the two kinds of *dṛṣṭānta* in a single proof

1.1.4 Purpose of *dṛṣṭānta*; components of a proof: reason, pervasion (*vyāpti*) and proposition to be proved (*sādhya*)

1.1.5 *dṛṣṭānta*'s independence from the reason

1.1.6 Relation between the reason and *dṛṣṭānta*

1.1.7 Critique of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.34

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The aim of this paper is to present a summary of Dignāga's discussions on *dṛṣṭānta* in the *svamata* section, from which we will be able to draw some conclusions about the role of *dṛṣṭānta* in Dignāga's logic.[3]

1. Introducing PS 4.6, Dignāga assumes the following process of 'inference for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*, 'inference' in short):

(1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (*liṅga*, e.g., smoke) in the object to be inferred (*anumeya*, e.g., the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*.

1.1.8 Critique of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.35

1.1.9 Necessity for the pervasion to be expressed in *dṛṣṭānta* statement

1.2. Dignāga's own views on *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* (Derge 9a5/63a3-b1/226b3-227b3)

2 Dignāga's critique of the views held by other schools (*paramata*)

2.1 The *Vādavidhi* views (Derge 9a5-9b1/63b1-64a5/227b3-229a5)

2.2 The Naiyāyika views (Derge 9b1-3/64a5-66a3/229a5-236b6)

2.3 The Vaiśeṣika views (Derge 9b3-4/66a3-7/236b6-237b3)

[3] This portion of PSV has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in KITAGAWA 1965. He edited two versions of Tibetan translations of PS and PSV and translated them into Japanese with detailed annotations. Muni Jambūvijaya restored the Sanskrit of the beginning portions of PS and PSV chapter 4 in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1966. He translated into Sanskrit the relevant portions of PSṬ in its footnotes. He did the same for the Vaiśeṣika section of this chapter in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1961. Most recently, Wasō Harada translated the beginning portions of PS and PSV chapter 4 (vv.1-5) in HARADA 1999, note 13. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to those previous studies. I briefly discussed Dignāga's treatment of *dṛṣṭānta* in KATSURA 1984. I would also like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner and his staff at the Austrian Academy of Science for their great help in recovering the fragments of PS and PSV chapter 4.

(2) Next we recall that we previously experienced elsewhere the presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (*tattulya*, e.g., a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (*asat*, e.g., a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., *anvaya* (a positive concomitance) and *vyatireka* (a negative concomitance).

(3) Then we can have an ascertainment (*niścaya*) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as, e.g., that there must be, even though it is imperceptible, a fire at the top of the mountain.[4]

In short, an inferential mark possessing the three characteristics (*pakṣadharmatva*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) can produce the ascertainment of a certain state of affairs regarding an object to be inferred.[5] Dignāga then states PS 4.6 as follows:

> [In 'inference for others' (*parārthānumāna*, 'proof' in short), on the other hand,] with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (*niścaya*) as we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason's (*hetu*)] being a property of the topic (*pakṣa*) of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*), (2) [its inseparable] relation (*sambandha*) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof].[6]

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[4] PSV^{K} 150b5-7: *rjes su dpag pa la yaṅ tshul 'di yin par mthoṅ ste / gal te rtags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la ṅes par bzuṅ na / gźan du de daṅ rigs mthun pa la yod pa ñid daṅ / med pa la med pa ñid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i ṅes pa bskyed par yin no //* Cf. PSV^{V} 61b5, KITAGAWA 1965: 521; PSṬ D223a6: *rjes su dpag pa la yaṅ źes raṅ gi don rjes su dpag pa la'o //*; NMu § 5.5, KATSURA 1981.

[5] Cf. PS 2.1ab: *anumānaṃ dvidhā svārthaṃ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk /*

[6] *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā / pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam //* = NMu v. 13: 如自決定已 悕他決 →

Thus the purpose of a logical proof (*parārthānumāna*) is to produce in the opponent the same kind of ascertainment that is obtained by the proponent through an inference (*svārthānumāna*). This indicates a close parallelism between an inference and a proof.

Commenting upon the above verse, Dignāga clarifies the roles of the three members (*avayava*) of his logical proof, viz., 'proposition/thesis' (*pakṣa*), 'reason' (*hetu*) and 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta*) in the following manner:

(1) The statement of a proposition (*pakṣa-vacana*) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (*anumeya*).

(2) The statement of a reason (*hetu-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (*pakṣadharmatva*).

(3) The statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) to the property to be inferred (*anumeya*).

Then he excludes 'desire to know' (*jijñāsā*), 'application' (*upanaya*), 'conclusion' (*nigamana*) and others from the members of a proof and concludes that there are no members of a proof other than the above three.[7]

定生　說宗法相應　所立餘遠離. Quoted in PVA 487,31; *pāda*s cd in VNṬ 64,22 and NV 130,5.

Cf. also *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by STEINKELLNER (Wien: 1967) 6,17-18: *svaniścayavad anyeṣām api niścayotpādanāya ca sādhanam ucyate* /; *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin (St. Petersburg: 1903-13) 19,1-2: *yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijānīte, tena svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā yayopapattyāsāv artho 'dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ parasmāy upadeṣṭavyā* /; *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (ed. by S.R. Banerjee, Calcutta [2]1981) v. 10: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanaṃ buddhaiḥ / parārthaṃ mānam ākhyātaṃ vākyaṃ tadupacārataḥ* //.

[7] PSV[K] 150b8-151a2: *gaṅ gi phyir phyogs kyi chos ñid bstan pa'i don du* ***gtan tshigs brjod pa*** *daṅ / yaṅ de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba daṅ med na* →

The statement of a proposition is actually the re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself, while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*) of a valid mark in an inferential process. Then the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (*sambandha/avinābhāva*), must correspond to the recollection of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. This is the case because, as I have determined elsewhere, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* with *eva*-restriction represent such an inseparable relation between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the former by the latter.[8] Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof.

According to Dignāga the role of the statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta-vacana*) in a proof is to present the 'inseparable' (*avinābhāva*) relation (*sambandha*) between a reason (*hetu*, i.e., a proving property, *sādhana-dharma*) and a property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (*a-bhāva*) without (*vinā*) the latter, for example, smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (*liṅga*) and the marked (*liṅgin*, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference.[9] It is further called 'restriction' (*niyama*), 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*), 'concomitance' (*anubandha*), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the

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mi 'byuṅ ba'i don du ***dpe brjod pa*** *daṅ / rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa'i don du* ***phyogs brjod pa*** *ste rjes su dpag pa'i yan lag gźan yod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir gźan dag ni śes pa la sogs pa rnams daṅ ñe bar sbyor ba daṅ mjug bsdu ba dag 'dir spaṅs pa yin no //.* Cf. PSV^{V} 61b7-62a1, KITAGAWA 1965: 521-522; NMu § 5.5, KATSURA 1981.

[8] See KATSURA 2000.

[9] See PS 2.21: *liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ //.* Quoted in Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭīkā* (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda 1949) 18,18-19.

second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of a valid reason (*hetu*) or an inferential mark (*liṅga*).

2. With the theory of the 'inseparable relation' or 'pervasion' as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignāga is greatly concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*). In PS 4.1 he states:

> It has been said that a valid reason (*hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*trirūpa*). According to convention (*rūḍhi*), however, it (i.e., the reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharma*) only. The remaining two characteristics [of a valid reason] are [to be] presented by an example [statement] (*dṛṣṭānta*).[10]

Here Dignāga seems to be criticizing some certain unsatisfactory formulations of a proof given by other Indian logicians of his time. In this connection, I assume that he is presupposing, as for example, the following formulation:

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*kṛtakatvāt*
[example]	*kṛtako ghaṭo 'nityo dṛṣṭaḥ*
[application]	*tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabdaḥ*
[conclusion]	*tasmāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[Proof 1]

According to Dignāga, the first characteristic of a valid reason, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*, is implicitly stated in the statement of the reason of the above Proof 1 because the word *śabdasya* is implicitly understood; the statement in its expanded form is *śabdasya kṛtakatvāt*. The second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyati-*

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[10] *trirūpo hetur ity uktaṃ pakṣadharme tu saṃsthitaḥ / rūḍhe rūpadvayaṃ śeṣaṃ dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyate //.* Quoted in VNṬ 88,26-27 with a variant reading.

reka), however, are not mentioned at all in the proof and must in a valid proof be formulated in the statement of an example. Thus it is clear that in a proof of Dignāga's, **the statement of a reason expresses the first characteristic (*pakṣadharmatva*) and the statement of an example expresses the second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*).**

Furthermore, Dignāga states in PS 4.2:

> An example is that [object] in which a reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two kinds: 'similar' (*sādharmya*) and another (i.e., 'dissimilar' *vaidharmya*).[11]

In this connection it is to be noted that Dignāga uses the word *dṛṣṭānta* in two distinct meanings, viz., an object (*artha*) as an example for a proof in PS 4.2 and a statement (*vacana*) that presents an example together with a general law (i.e., an inseparable relation or pervasion between a reason and a property to be proved) in PS 4.1. This is clear from his own comment that *yatra* in PS 4.2c refers to an object to be referred to (*abhidheya*).[12] Jinendrabuddhi justifies Dignāga's usage by way of stating that there is a 'superimposition of identity' (*abhedopacāra*) between the expression (*abhidhāna*) and the expressed (*abhidheya*). Thus the designation *dṛṣṭānta*, which refers to an example object (*artha*, i.e., *abhidheya*), is meta-

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[11] *sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā / khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharmyetaro dvidhā //* Cf. NMu v. 11 説因宗所隨　宗無因不有　此二名譬喩　餘皆此相似. Quoted in *Daśavaikālikasūtrahāribhadrīvṛtti* 34B mentioned in JAMBŪVIJAYA 1966 Appendix: 133; cf. NMu v. 4 = PS 3.15 mentioned in footnote 23.

[12] PSV^{K} 148a7: ***gaṅ la źes brjod par bya ba la*** *thams cad la 'gro ba ni rjes su 'gro ba'o //* PSV^{V} D60a4: *rjes su 'gro ba thams cad du 'gro'o // gaṅ* ***źes pa ni brjod par bya'o*** *//* (**sarvatra gamo 'nugamaḥ /* ***yatreti abhidheye /***)

phorically applied to the statement of an example (*vacana*, i.e., *abhidhāna*).[13]

The *Nyāyasūtra* (henceforth NSū), on the other hand, distinguishes an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), i.e., the third member (*avayava*) of the five-membered proof.[14] It may be a weak point in Dignāga's system of logic that he uses one and the same technical term in more than one meaning. For example, he applies *pakṣa* to both the content of a proposition to be proved and

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[13] PSṬ D213a2-4: *de'i phyir de'i don du dpe brjod par bya ba'o źes pa daṅ / dpe yis rab tu gsal bar byed // ces kyaṅ ṅo // rjod par byed pa daṅ brjod par bya ba dag tha mi dad par ñe bar btags pa la 'di skad ces brjod do // gźan du na gaṅ la źes pa brjod par bya ba la źes pa'i tshig las don kho na dpe ñid de / don gyis gsal bar byed pa yaṅ ma yin no źes pas 'di mi rigs par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa las dpe rjod par byed pa'i ṅaṅ tshul can gyi tshig ni 'dir dpe'i sgras brjod do // (atas tadartham dṛṣṭānta ucyatām iti dṛṣṭāntena prakāśyata iti ca /* ***abhidhānābhidheyayor abhedopacārād evam uktam*** */ anyathā yatrety abhidheya iti vacanād arthasyaiva dṛṣṭāntatā / na cārthena prakāśyata ity ayuktam etat syāt / tasmād* ***abhedopacārād dṛṣṭāntābhidhāyivacanam atra dṛṣṭāntaśabadenoktam*** */)*

PSṬ D213b1-2: *gaṅ la źes pa brjod par bya ba la źes pa 'dis don dpe ñid gsuṅs so // tshig ni de'i rjod par byed pa ñid kyi phyir ñe bar btags pa'i dpe'o // 'di yaṅ / dpe yis rab tu bstan par bya // źes pa 'dis sṅar ñid rig par byas zin to // (yatrety abhidheya ity anenārthasya dṛṣṭāntatām āha / vacanaṃ tu tadabhidhāyitvād upacāreṇa dṛṣṭāntaḥ / etac ca dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyata ity anena prāg eva veditam /)*

[14] See NSū 1.1.25: *laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe buddhisāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ //*, and NSū 1.1.36: *sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam //.* Uddyotakara certainly notices this distinction. See NV ad NSū 1.1.36: *nanu ca karaṇakārakaparigrahāt* ***vacanam udāharaṇam, dṛṣṭāntaś cārthaḥ****; na cānayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ yujyate, na hi viṣāṇādimad ity abhidhānaṃ gavā sāmānādhikaraṇaṃ bhavati / naiṣa doṣaḥ, vacanaviśeṣaṇatvena dṛṣṭāntasyopādānāt, na svatantro dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam / ......*

the statement of such a proposition in a proof formulation; the latter (i.e., the first member of a proof) is called *pratijñā* in NSū.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example statement is to indicate an external object (*bāhyārtha*) as an example.[15] This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality. Furthermore, it was most likely Dignāga who classified examples into two types and named them accordingly, i.e., 'a similar example' (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) and 'a dissimilar example' (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*). His convention was generally followed by Indian logicians after him.

2.1. Now let us see how Dignāga formulates his example statement. He assumes the following formulation as a valid proof:

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*prayatnānatarīyakatvā*t
[similar ex.]	*yat prayatnānantarīyakaṃ tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*
[dissimilar ex.]	(*yan*) *nityam* (*tad*) *aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 2][16]

[15] PSV^K 148b6: *phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no* (**bāhyārtha-pradarśanaṃ hi nidarśye pradhānam*).

[16] PSV^K 148a7-8: *re źig chos mthun pas ni sgra mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byuṅ ba'i phyir ro // gaṅ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba de ni mi rtag par mthoṅ ste dper na bum pa bźin źes bya ba daṅ / chos mi mthun pas rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ma yin par mthoṅ ste nam mkha' bźin źes bya ba lta bu'o //* (**sādharmyeṇa tāvad anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīyakatvāt / yad dhi prayatnānatrīyakaṃ tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā ghaṭa iti / vaidharmyeṇa nityam aprayatnānatrīyakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathākāśam iti /*).

When we compare the two Proofs quoted above, it is clear that in addition to the absence of the statements of application and conclusion in Proof 2 the difference lies in the statement of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*). Proof 1 simply refers to an object, i.e., a pot, which is both 'produced' (*kṛtaka*) and 'non-eternal', in other words, possesses both the proving property (*sādhanadharma/hetu*) and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). As Dignāga criticizes, it does not mention any relation (*sambandha*) between the two properties. Proof 2, on the other hand, mentions such a relation, namely, "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal" (or whatever is P is Q) in a similar example and "Whatever is eternal (i.e., not non-eternal) is not produced by human effort" (or whatever is not Q is not P) in a dissimilar example. It is to be noted that these two statements are logically equivalent because they are in contraposition. In any case Dignāga's example statement, whether similar or dissimilar, expresses the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a proving property by a property to be proven.[17]

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[17] Pakṣilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana, who must have been active before Dignāga, gives two parallel proofs which he seems to regard as independent, though both prove the same proposition by the same reason. Dignāga appears to have incorporated the two proofs into one by adopting both similar and dissimilar examples into one proof. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad NSū 1.1.39:

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*utpattidharmakatvāt*
[exemplification]	*utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādi dravyaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam*
[application]	*na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ, kiṃ tarhi utpattidharmakaḥ*
[conclusion]	*tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[Proof a]

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

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We should not ignore the fact that the word *dṛṣṭa* (observed) qualifies those apparently universal relations mentioned in the example statements of Proof 2, so that their meaning amounts to: It is observed that whatever is P is Q, or it is observed that whatever is not Q is not P. This suggests that Dignāga's statement of pervasion does not necessarily imply a universal law but rather assumes a general law derived from our observations or experiences; in other words, it is a kind of hypothetical proposition derived by induction.[18] In order to justify such an inductive process Dignāga needed to present both positive and negative examples in one set of a proof. Thus, I think that Dignāga's presentation of example statements clearly indicate the inductive nature of his logic.

2.2. Now let us go back to PS 4.2: "An example is that [object] in which the reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by the property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of the property to be proved." This contains Dignāga's suggestion of how to formulate similar and dissimilar examples. Namely, a similar example should be formulated by the reason being followed by the property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyena anugamaḥ*), and a dissimilar example by the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve hetos nāstitā*). Their formulations may be called *an-*

[reason]	*utpattidharmakatvāt*
[exemplification]	*anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyam anityam*
[application]	*tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ*
[conclusion]	*tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[Proof b]

[18] I would like to suggest an etymology of the word *dṛṣṭānta*, which is 'the end' or the culminating point (*anta*) of 'observation' (*dṛṣṭa*). It fits well with the inductive nature of Indian logic.

vaya (continued presence) and *vyatireka* (continued absence) respectively, for they can be put into the following formulae:

> When the reason (P) is present, the property to be proved (Q) is present.
>
> When the property to be proved (Q) is absent, the reason (P) is absent.

Since P is a reason and Q is a property to be proved by that reason, one can rephrase and symbolize the above formulae in the following manner:

> If x is P, then x is Q. $Px \supset Qx$
>
> If x is not Q, then x is not P. $-Qx \supset -Px$

Let us compare the above formulae with *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the *trairūpya* formulae. PS 2.5cd reads: "[A valid inferential mark's (*liṅga*) presence in what is similar to the [object to be inferred] and its absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred)" ([*liṅgasya*] *tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati*).[19] If we assume that 'what is similar to the object to be inferred (*anumeya*)' and 'the absence of the property to be inferred' in PS 2.5cd respectively correspond to the traditional concepts of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*) and a set of dissimilar ones (*asapakṣa/vipakṣa*), they can be reformulated in the following manner:

> When the property to be proved (Q) is present, the inferential mark (P) is present.
>
> When the property to be proved (Q) is not present, the inferential mark (P) is not present.
>
> (N.B.: an inferential mark is equivalent to the reason in a proof.)

When we compare them with the formulae of the two examples mentioned above, the difference lies in the *anvaya* formula,

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[19] For a detailed discussion of the *trairūpya* formulae according to Dignāga, see KATSURA 2000.

namely, the order of P and Q are reversed. As a matter of fact, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of *trairūpya*, rather than those of the examples, represent the more orthodox formulation of the 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' (named by George Cardona): X → Y and -X → -Y.

anvaya and *vyatireka* of the *trairūpya* formulae show how a valid inferential mark is distributed in our Induction Domain (*à la* Richard Hayes) consisting of a set of similar examples and a set of dissimilar examples. If P is found in the domain of Q and not in the domain of -Q, we can assume a certain relation between P and Q. For example, P (e.g., smoke) is a result of Q (e.g., a fire). In the case of *trairūpya*, P is discovered to be the valid logical mark (*liṅga*) of the property to be proved, Q. In this connection, following Vasubandhu's lead, Dignāga considered that the valid mark/reason (P) is inseparably related (*nāntarīyaka*/*avinābhāvin*) to the property to be proved (Q). In other words, in order to be a valid mark/reason, the domain of P should be restricted to and included in the domain of Q. He named such a relation 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) of P by Q and successfully formulated it by introducing the restrictive particle *eva* into the formulae of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the following manner:

> Only (*eva*) when the property to be proved (Q) is present, is the inferential mark (P) present.
>
> When the property to be proved (Q) is not present, the inferential mark (P) is never (*naiva*) present.

It is to be noted that the above formulae present not a logical but rather an ontological relation between two items P and Q, though we can easily derive from such a relation the kind of general law that whatever is P is Q. The purpose of Dignāga's example statements is precisely to formulate such a general law; the order of P and Q is reversed there in order to present it in a logically proper way. In order to avoid confusion, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* expressed in the two examples are called by later authors *anvaya-*

vyāpti (a positive pervasion) and *vyatireka-vyāpti* (a negative pervasion) respectively.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga does not give any argument for justifying the introduction of the *eva* restriction; in other words, he never tried to justify the very foundation of his theory of *vyāpti*. Considering Dignāga's allusion to *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in PSV chapter 5, I am inclined to think that he proposed *vyāpti* or a general law solely on the basis of the fact that no counter-example is observed (*adarśanamātreṇa*) in the domain of dissimilar examples.[20] It suggests the hypothetical nature of the deductive part of Dignāga's logic.

2.3. Let us see again how Dignāga actually formulates the logical relation or *vyāpti* in the example statements of Proof 2.

[similar ex.] *yat prayatnānantarīyakaṃ tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] *yan nityaṃ tad aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathākāśam*

It is clear that he uses the relative pronouns *yad* and *tad* in order to express a kind of universal relation: Whatever is P is Q, or whatever is not Q is not P. He also indicates that the same relation can be expressed by inserting the restrictive particle *eva* in the appropriate place.[21] For example,

[similar ex.] *anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam, yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*

[dissimilar ex.] *aprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityam, yathākāśam*

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[20] See my article, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*," *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 46/1 (1992) 222-231.

[21] See PSV^K 148b8-149a3, which is to be discussed later.

In this context the restrictive particle *eva* behaves almost like a 'universal quantifier'. Generally speaking, Dignāga admits the following two ways of expressing the logical relation or *vyāpti*:

(1)*yad* P *tad* Q / & *yad* -Q *tad* -P /

(2)Q *eva* P / & -P *eva* -Q /

Dignāga is very much concerned with the problem of how to formulate a logical proof in the proper way. We can now present his formulation in a formal manner. 'a' stands for the topic of a proposition (*pakṣa*) or the object of inference (*anumeya*); P stands for the proving property (*sādhana-dharma*), a reason (*hetu*), or an inferential mark (*liṅga*); Q stands for the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*); 's' stands for the similar example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) or the member of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*); and 'v' stands for the dissimilar example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) or the member of a set of dissimilar examples (*vipakṣa*). It is to be noted that in Dignāga's system of logic 'a', being the topic under examination, is not a part of our Induction Domain which consists of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Furthermore, the underlying structure of an Indian proof statement is: "The property-possessor (*dharmin*) 'a' possesses the property (*dharma*) P"; the notion of 'possession' is expressed by the genitive or the locative case-ending or by the suffixes of possession, i.e., *-mat* and *-vat*, or even by the convention of elision of those suffixes (*matup-lopa*).

[proposition]	a possesses Q.
[reason]	Because a possesses P.
[similar ex.]	It is observed that whatever possesses P possesses Q as, e.g., s.
[dissimilar ex.]	It is observed that whatever does not possess Q does not possess P as, e.g., v.

We can translate the above formulae into the following standard symbolism, but it is impossible to convey the sense of 'it is observed that ...' without introducing some device of Modal Logic:

[proposition] Qa

[reason] Pa

[similar ex.] $(x)(Px \supset Qx)\ \&\ (Ex)((Px\ \&\ Qx)\ \&\ (x \neq a))$

[dissimilar ex.] $(x)(-Qx \supset -Px)\ \&\ (Ex)((-Px\ \&\ -Qx)\ \&\ (x \neq a))$

Based on his conviction that a valid proof should be formulated in the way discussed above, Dignāga criticizes what he regards as the wrong formulations of proof given by rival schools. For example, he picks up the following anonymous proof:[22]

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *sarvasya anityatvāt* (Because everything is non-eternal.)

[Proof 3]

On first sight, the proposition and the reason of Proof 3 appear to be incompatible with each other (*viruddha*). However, if one takes into account that the topic of a proposition is not included in our Induction Domain in traditional Indian logic, Proof 3 makes sense when its reason is interpreted in the sense that everything except for sound (i.e., the topic of the proposition) is non-eternal. In this connection, Dignāga points out that the reason of Proof 3 does not really express the reason but actually expresses the dissimilar example. Then he proposes the following formulation:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] (*śabdasya*) *asarvatvāt* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭaḥ* (Everything is non-eternal as, e.g., a pot.)

[Proof 4]

[22] NMu § 1.4, KATSURA 1977 and PS 3.6: *hetupratijñāvyāghāte pratijñādoṣa ity asat / sa hi dṛṣṭānta evokto vaidharmyeṇāsuśikṣitaiḥ //* Quoted in PVA 563,29.

Having criticized the above reason from various points of view, Dingāga proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example by following the basic structure discussed above, namely, the absence of the property to be proved (i.e., *nityatva*) should be followed by the absence of the reason (*asarvatva*). Thus, we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] (*śabdasya*) *asarvatvāt* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *yad anityaṃ tat sarvam, yathā ghaṭaḥ* (Whatever is not eternal is everything as, e.g., a pot.)

[Proof 5]

Further, Dignāga criticizes the formulation of the following proof:[23]

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *kṛtakasya anityatvāt, nityasya akṛtakatvāc ca*

[Proof 6]

According to Dignāga, this apparently correct proof should be reformulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *anityaḥ śabdaḥ*

[reason] *kṛtakatvāt*

[similar ex.] *yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*

[dissimilar ex.] *yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 7]

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[23] NMu § 2.8, KATSURA 1978. NMu v. 4: 說因宗所隨 宗無因不有 依第五顯喻 由合故知因 = PS 3.15: *hetoḥ sādhyānvayo yatrābhāve 'bhāvaś ca kathyate / pañcamyā tatra dṛṣṭānto hetus tūpanayān mataḥ //.* (Quoted in PVA 647,15; cf. VNṬ 82,25-26)

Unlike Dignāga's theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*), which was on the whole accepted by the post-Dignāga Indian logicians whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignāga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians continued to adhere to the traditional five-membered proof formulation, while Dharmakīrti, as is well known, adopted a new proof formulation which consisted of the statements of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) and the reason's being a property of the topic of the proposition (*pakṣadharmatā*); just this formulation was adopted by the post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians. Here is a sample of Dharmakīrti's formulation.

> [*vyāpti*] *yat sat kṛtakaṃ vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ*
> [*pakṣadharmatā*] *san kṛtako vā śabdaḥ*[24]
>
> [Proof 8]

3. In PS 4.3 and its Vṛtti Dignāga attempts to characterize the two examples by similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) or by implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and simple negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*).

> In [the presence of] the proving property (*sādhana*, i.e., the reason) the property to be proved (*sādhya*) should be presented affirmatively and [the reason should be shown to be] absent when the property to be proved is absent. Such being the case, the implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) [of the similar example] and the simple negation (*niṣedha*) [of the dissimilar example] are of different characteristics.[25]

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[24] Cf. *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by M.T. Much, Vienna, 1991: 1.

[25] PS^{K} 4.3: *bsgrub bya bsgrub las sgrub pa yis // bstan bya bsgrub bya med la med // de lta yin na ma yin par // dgag pa msthan ñid mi mthun no //* (**vidhinā sādhane sādhyaṃ khyāpyaṃ sādhye 'sati tv asat / evaṃ sati paryudāso niṣedhaś ca vilakṣaṇau //*). Cf. PSV^{K} 148a8-b3; PSV^{V} D60a6-7; KITAGAWA 1965: 513-4.

The first half of the verse repeats the same formulation of the two examples, i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, as presented in PS 4.2. When Dignāga refers to the two kinds of negation in the second half, he must have in mind the two kinds of examples in Proof 2 (given above) and the negative phrases, such as *a-nityam* in the similar example and *na anityam*, which is actually expressed as *nityam*, in consideration of the double negation, in the dissimilar example. According to Dignāga, the negative particle *a-* of *a-nityam* (non-eternal) in the similar example should be interpreted as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), so that the negation of eternal things (*nitya*) implies/affirms the existence of non-eternal (*anitya*) things. The negative particle *na* of *na anityam* (not non-eternal, i.e., eternal) in the dissimilar example, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a simple negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), so that the negation of non-eternal things does not imply/affirm the existence of eternal things, such as ether (*ākāśa*).

Thus Dignāga concludes that the dissimilar example of Proof 2 is meaningful even for those who do not acknowledge the existence of eternal things, such as the Sautrāntikas.[26] This implies that for Dignāga the dissimilar example does not necessarily need an objective support in reality, provided that there is an objective support for the similar example.

3.1. A question arises: Why are the two examples formulated in the way explained in PS 4.2 and 3? In other words, if a similar example is formulated by "The reason is followed by the property to

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26 PSV^{K} 148b2-3: *de lta na sṅa ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no źes smras pa yin no || de ltar na rtag pa khas ma blaṅs kyaṅ chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no ||* (**evaṃ ca pūrvatra paryudāsaḥ uttaratra tu prasajyapratiṣedha ity uktaḥ | evaṃ ca nityān-abhyupagamasyāpi vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ siddhaḥ*). Cf. PSV^{V} D60a6-7, KITAGAWA 1965: 513-514.

be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyenānugamaḥ*)" or "Px ⊃ Qx", why is the dissimilar example formulated by "In the absence of the property to be proved the reason is absent (*sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā*)" or "-Qx ⊃ -Px", not by "In the absence of the reason, the property to be proved is absent (*hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstitā*)" or "-Px ⊃ -Qx"? It is apparent that the law of contraposition was not known to the opponents, and it was perhaps Dignāga who for the first time among Indian logicians came to realize that such a law should be applied to the formulations of similar and dissimilar examples; unfortunately, however, he does not give either the name or definition of the law.

In any case, Dignāga answers to the above question: Only in that way, not in the reversed way (*na viparyayāt*), can we show that a reason under consideration possesses the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason, namely, "the reason's presence in a set of similar instances only (*hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvam*)" and "its definite absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve cāsattvam eva*)".[27] Here again we see the definitive role played by the restrictive particle *eva* in equating the *trairūpya* formula with the formulation of the two examples.

An objection arises: In that case an actual object like a pot cannot be regarded as a part of an example formulation because with ref-

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[27] PSV^{K} 148b3-4: *gal te gcig la ni gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar bśad la / gñis pa la ni bsgrub bya med na gtan tshigs med pa yin gyi gtan tshigs med na bsgrub bya med pa ma yin no żes bya ba la rgyu ci żig yod ce na / de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs ñid la yod pa daṅ / bsgrub bya med pa la med pa ñid bstan par nus pa yin gyi bzlog pas ni ma yin no //* (**kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam ekatra sādhyānugamo hetoḥ ukto dvitīye tu sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā, na hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstiteti / evaṃ hi hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ sādhyābhāve cāsattvam eva śakyaṃ darśayituṃ na viparyayāt /*). The latter half is quoted in VNṬ 8,23-24. Cf. PSV^{V} D60a7-b1; KITAGAWA 1965: 514.

erence to an actual object we see that a reason is followed by a property to be proved and *vice versa.*

Dignāga rejects the objection: Just as in the statement of a reason a particular property, such as 'being a product', is not intended, similarly in the statement of an example a particular object, such as a pot, is not meant to be followed by a property to be proved, such as 'non-eternity'; thus, the objection is irrelevant. He further states that the main purpose in referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in external reality.[28]

3.2. In PS 4.4 Dignāga points out what kind of undesirable consequences result if, as suggested by the above question, both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated in the same manner, namely, "Px ⊃ Qx" and "-Px ⊃ -Qx" or "Qx ⊃ Px" and "-Qx ⊃ -Px".

> In this connection, if [both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated] in the same way of concomitance, even if unmentioned [as a property to be proved], 'eternity' (*nityatā*) would be proved (*kṛta*) by means of the property of 'not being a product' (*akṛtakatva*), and the property of 'being a result' (*kāryatā*, i.e., a product) by means of the property of 'cessation' (*nāśitva*, i.e., non-eternity);

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[28] PSV^{K} 148b4-6: *'on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bźin du / bsgrub bya yaṅ gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no źe na / ma yin te byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bźin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gro ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no //* (**evaṃ tarhi ghaṭo 'nudāharaṇam / tatra hi yathā hetoḥ sādhyānugamas tathā sādhyasyāpi hetvanugama iti cet / na, kṛtakatvaviśeṣo 'vivakṣitahetur iva ghaṭe sādhyānugamasyāvivakṣitatvāt / bāhyārthapradarśanaṃ hi nidarśye pradhānam /*). Cf. PSV^{V} D60b1-3; KITAGAWA 1965: 514-515.

and [that which does] not pervade [the domain of the property to be proved] would not be accepted [as a valid reason].[29]

He presupposes the following proof formulae which correspond to Hetucakra No. 2:

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*kṛtakatvāt*
[similar ex.]	*yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*
[dissimilar ex.]	*yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 8]

Dignāga points out that if the dissimilar example of Proof 8 were formulated in the reverse way as *yad akṛtatakaṃ tan nityam*, then instead of 'non-eternity' (*anityatā*) 'eternity' would be proved by the property of 'not being a product', which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the similar example were formulated in the reverse way as *yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam*, then instead of 'non-eternity' the property of 'being a product' would be proved by 'non-eternity', which is absurd.[30]

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29 *nityatākṛtakatvena, nāśitvād vātra kāryatā / syād anuktā kṛtāvyāpiny aniṣṭaṃ ca samānvaye //* Quoted in VNṬ 8,24-26 with variant readings. Cf. NMu v.12: 應以非作證其常　或以無常成所作　若爾應成非所説不遍非楽等合離.

30 PSV^{K} 148b7-8: *gal te chos mthun pa'i dbaṅ gis gaṅ ma byas pa de rtag go źes brjod na / ma byas pa'i phyir dam ma bcas pa ñid kyi rtag pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ci ste chos mi mthun pa'i dbaṅ gis gaṅ <mi> rtag pa de ni bya ba'o źes de ltar yaṅ brjod na / mi rtag pa'i phyir byas pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // (*yadi sādharmyavaśena yad akṛtakaṃ tad anityam ity ucyate / akṛtakatvenāpratijñātam eva nityatvaṃ sādhitaṃ syāt / atha vaidharmyavaśena yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam ity evam apy ucyate / anityatvena kṛtakatvaṃ sādhitaṃ syāt /).* Cf. PSV^{V} D60b3-4; KITAGAWA 1965: 515.

Then he examines Hetucakra No. 8 whose 'reason' (*hetu*) does not pervade the whole domain of the property to be proved or the set of similar instances (*sapakṣa*), unlike in the above case. It runs as follows:

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*
[similar ex.]	*yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*
[dissimilar ex.]	*yathākāśam*

[Proof 9]

Dignāga sees the problems that entail if two examples are not properly formulated. If a similar example is formulated as "Whatever is non-eternal is produced by human effort" (*anityaṃ prayatnānantarīyakam eva*) and a dissimilar example as "Whatever is not produced by human effort is eternal" (*aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ nityam eva*), then one of the similar examples, i.e., lightning (*vidyut*), which is non-eternal but not produced by human effort, should be regarded as eternal, as well as being produced by human effort, which is absurd. In order to avoid such an absurd consequence, Dingāga suggests the following formulation:[31]

[31] PSV^K 148b8-149a3: *ma khyab pa la yaṅ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid kyi gtan tshigs la ñes pa 'di yod de / glog la sogs pa rnams rtag pa ñid daṅ / rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid kyi ñes pa yod do // rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa* ***ñid*** *yin la mi rtag pa yaṅ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba* ***ñid*** *yin no źes gal te de latr* ***ṅes par gzuṅ*** *na skyon 'dir 'gyur ba yin na / gaṅ gi tshe rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ma yin pa* ***ñid*** *ni rtag ces* ***ṅes par gzuṅ ba*** *yin gyi / rtsol ba las byuṅ ba'o źes ma yin pa de'i tshe ñes pa med pa yin te / de ltar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byuṅ ba la med par brjod pa yin no // de bźin du mi rtag pa* ***ñid*** *ni rtsol ba las byuṅ ba las źes bya ba* (**avyāpiny api prayatnānantarīyakatve hetāv asty ayaṃ doṣaḥ / vidyudādīnāṃ nityatvaṃ prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ ca prasajyata iti doṣo 'sti / asty ayaṃ doṣaḥ yady evam avadhāryeta aprayatnānatarīyakaṃ nityam evety anityaṃ ca prayatnānantarīyakam eveti / yadā tv evam avadhāryate apra-* →

[proposition]	*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*
[reason]	*prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*
[similar ex.]	*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam, yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*
[dissimilar ex.]	*aprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityam, yathākāśam*

[Proof 10]

An objection may arise: If the domain of the reason should be restricted to the domain of the property to be proved as in Hetucakra No. 8 (= Proof 10), then the other type of reason (in Hetucakra No. 2 = Proof 8), whose domain is co-extensive with that of the property to be proved, would not be a valid reason because there is no restriction of the reason (*hetvavadhāraṇa*). Dignāga answers by saying that the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) is made in accordance with the speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāyavaśāt*); in other words, the speaker chooses which property is to be restricted, so that it can become a reason. So in Hetucakra No. 2, not the property of being non-eternal (*anityatva*), but the property of being a product (*kṛtakatva*) is chosen to be restricted as the valid reason, even though their domains are theoretically co-extensive.[32]

Another objection: Just as non-eternity is inferred from the absence of the property of being produced by human effort (i.e., the reason)

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yatnāntarīyakam eva nityaṃ na prayatnānatrīyakam iti tadā nāsti kaścid doṣaḥ / evaṃ nityatvasya prayatnānatarīyake 'bhāva ukto bhavati / tathānityam eva prayatnānatarīyakam iti /). Cf. PSV^{V} D60b3-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 515-516.

[32] PSV^{K} 149a3-4: *'dir / gal te yaṅ gtan tshigs* ***ṅes par gzuṅ ba****'i phyir don gźan med par 'gyur ba de lta na* ***brjod pa po'i bsam pa'i dbaṅ gis ṅes par bzuṅ ba****'i phyir </> rtsol ba las byuṅ ba* ***ñid*** *la rtag pa ñid med par brjod do źe na /* (**atra yady api hetvavadhāraṇāt hetvantarābhāvaḥ prāptaḥ / tathāpi vaktrabhiprāyavaśād avadhāraṇaṃ tasmāt prayatnānantarīyakatvasyaiva nitye 'bhāva ucyate /*). No corresponding PSV^{V}; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516.

in eternal things (i.e., a set of dissimilar instances), similarly the property of not being produced by human effort can be inferred from the absence of eternity in those which are produced by human effort, which is absurd because the unintended proposition would be proved as a result. Dingāga points out that in order to avoid such confusion we should formulate the dissimilar example in the form of absence of the reason only (*eva*) in the absence of the property to be proved (*hetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāvaḥ*).[33]

4. Enough for the proper formulation of example statements. Now Dignāga discusses the important topic of whether we really need both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof.

A question arises: If the dissimilar example is formulated by means of the absolute absence of the reason in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva*), then there is no error at all in the similar example, such as "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal" (*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam*), which implies that there is no need to formulate a similar example, as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated.

To this Dignāga answers: If so, the notorious erroneous reason called 'unique and inconclusive' (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) would

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[33] PSV^{K} 149a4-6: *mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te / de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byuṅ ba med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid rjes su dpog pa de bźin du rtsol ba las byuṅ ba <la> rtag pa ñid med pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byuṅ ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' ba bsgrub pa de ñid yin no // de'i phyir gtan tshigs* ***kho na*** *bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o // (*viṣamopanyāsaḥ / tathā hi yathā nitye prayatnānanta-rīyakatvābhāvād anityatvānumānam evaṃ prayatnānantarīyake nityatvā-bhāvād aprayatnānantarīyakatvānumānam iti tad evāpratijñātārthasā-dhanam / tasmād dhetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāva upadarśyaḥ /)*. No corresponding PSV^{V}; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516.

become a valid reason. For example, the following is an example of a proof based on the unique and inconclusive reason:

[proposition] *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *śrāvaṇatvāt* (Because it is audible.)

[Proof 11]

Since the reason 'audibility' is the unique property of sound, the topic of the proposition, it is regarded as 'unique' to sound, or as not being a property of either the eternal or non-eternal – with the exception of sound – things in the world. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (*anvaya*), it certainly possesses the third characteristic (*vyatireka*), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible, and there are many instances of things that are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, "Whatever is not eternal is not audible, as, e.g., a pot" (*yad anityaṃ tad aśrāvaṇam, yathā ghaṭaḥ*), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, "Whatever is audible is eternal" (*yac chrāvaṇaṃ tan nityam*), that is applied with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; for the unique and inconclusive reason, such as 'audibility', should be a valid reason, which is absurd.[34] In other

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[34] PSV^{K} 149a6-7: *'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa ñid ñe bar bstan na / mi rtag pa ñid ni rtsol ba las byuṅ ba'o żes bya ba 'di la ñes pa ci żig yod ce na / dper na rtag pa ñid ni mñan par bya ba yin te / mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun moṅ ma yin pa yaṅ rtag pa ñid la gtan tshigs su 'gyur ro //* (**atheha sādhyābhāve 'bhāva evopadarśitaḥ / anityam eva prayatnānatarīyakam iti atra hi na kaścid doṣa iti cet / yathā nityam eva śrāvaṇam, vinaśvare 'bhāvād asādhāraṇam api nityatve hetuḥ syāt /*). No corresponding PSV^{V}; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 516-517.

words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should be able to formulate both similar and dissimilar examples.

The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (*arthāpatti*); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by human effort is non-eternal." However, this is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world that is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support.

Dignāga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (*arthāpatti*) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by means of implication.[35] Dignāga still holds his position that the two examples are necessary, though they are not necessarily explicitly stated; either one of them can imply the other, or both.

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[35] PSV^{K} 149a7-b1: *gal te ñes pa 'di med de dper na mi rtag pa ñid ni rtsol ba las byuṅ ba'o źes bya ba 'dir śugs kyis bsgrub bya <mi> rtag pa la sgrub pa rñed pa ñid yin pa de ltar rtag pa ñid ni mñan par bya'o źes rtag pa la mñan par bya ba ñid bstan par ni nus pa ma yin no źe na / gal te śugs kyis gñi ga rñed pa yin na de kho bo cag mṅon par 'dod pa ñid yin te śugs kyis sam gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas gñi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro //* (*'naiṣa doṣaḥ / yathānityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam ity atra arthāpattyā sādhye 'nitye sādhanaṃ labdhaṃ bhavati, evam nityam eva śrāvaṇam iti nitye śrāvaṇatvaṃ darśayituṃ na śakyata iti cet / yadi tarhy arthāpattyobhayaṃ labdhaṃ tad asmābhir anujñātam eva, arthāpattyā vā anyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt //*). The last phrase corresponds to NMu (KATSURA 1981: 72) 或由義准一能顯二, which is quoted in *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti* (ed. by RANIERO GNOLI, Roma 1960): 18,17. No corresponding PSV^{V}; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

So far Dignāga has insisted on the necessity of a similar example in addition to a dissimilar example; now he argues for the necessity of a dissimilar example. An opponent points out: if 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) is expressed in the form of the reason's being followed by the property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ*), then it is not necessary to state its absence in the absence of the property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve nāstitā*); hence there is no necessity to formulate a dissimilar example. Note that Dignāga uses the word 'pervasion' for the first time in a technical sense in this particular portion of PSV.[36]

The opponent further remarks that it may be meaningful to formulate a dissimilar example, provided that the mere existence of the reason in a set of similar instances (*sapakṣe hetoḥ sadbhāvamātram*) is intended by Dignāga in the formulation of a similar example; in that case, however, it is meaningless to refer to an external object as an actual example; consequently, 'pervasion' should be expressed in a similar example.[37]

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[36] PSV^{K} 149b1-2: *gal te gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba* ***khyab pa*** *rab tu bstan par bya ba yin na / de ni mi rtag pa las gźan la med pa'i phyir bsgrub bya med na med do źes brjod par mi bya ba daṅ / (*yadi tu hetoḥ sādhyānugama vyāptiḥ darśitāḥ, tasyānityād anyatrābhāvāt, sādhyābhave ca nāstiteti na vaktavyam /*). Cf. PSV^{V} D60b5-6: KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

[37] PSV^{K} 149b2-4: *ci ste yod pa tsam yin na rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid kyaṅ med na bum pa'i <mi> rtag pa ñid kyaṅ med pa'i phyir phyi rol gyi don la bltos pa 'di ni dpe yin no // źes brjod par mi bya'o źes bya ba'i ñes pa 'di ni yod do (że na)*[a] */* ***khyab pa*** *ñid kyi gtaṅ tshigs ni bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar brjod par bya ste / (*atha sadbhāvamātram, prayatnānantarīyakatvenāpi ghaṭe 'nityatvasyāpy avinābhāvitvāt, bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanam iti na vaktavyam ity asty eṣa doṣa iti / vyāptir eva hetoḥ sādhyānugamena vaktavyā /*).

[a] Following PSṬ *że na* should be deleted. Cf. PSV^{V} D60b6; KITAGAWA 1965: 517.

In this connection, Dignāga seems to accept the opponent's criticism. Namely, he admits that when a pervasion is explicitly expressed in a similar example, the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved is shown by implication (*arthāpattyā*), which makes it unnecessary to formulate a dissimilar example. However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows the reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the form of the reason's absence in the absence of the property to be proved.[38] Dignāga seems to be conceding that it is not absolutely necessary to formulate both examples as long as the pervasion is expressed in one of the two examples.

An objection arises: If it is enough for a similar example to state the reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, then there is no need to define it in terms of the reason's being followed by the property to be proved (*sadhyenānugamo hetoḥ*) as in PS 4.2a. It is to be noted that *anugama* is equivalent to *vyāpti* in this context. To this Dignāga replies: The purpose of formulating a similar example in that way is to reject the reversed formulation, namely, the property to be proved being followed by the reason (*sādhyasya hetunānugamaḥ*).[39]

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[38] PSV^{K} 149b4-5: *gnas skabs 'di la śugs ñid kyis bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med par bstan pa'i phyir chos mi mthun pa'i dpe sbyar bar mi bya'o || gaṅ gi tshe dpe gñi ga sbyar bar bya ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la | khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no ||* (**asyāṃ cāvasthāyām arthāpattyā sādhyābhāve hetor abhāvaḥ pradarśita iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭānto na prayoktavyaḥ | yadā tu dṛṣṭāntadvayaṃ prayoktavyaṃ tadā sapakṣe sanmātraṃ pradarśyam, vyāpteḥ sādhyābhāve 'bhāvena pradarśitatvāt |*). Cf. PSV^{V} D60b6-61a1; KITAGAWA 1965: 517-518.

[39] PSV^{K} 149b5-6: *'on te de ltar na gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba ni chos mthun pas rab tu stan to źes bya ba 'di brjod par bya ba ma* →

In order to justify the rejection of the reversed formulation, Dignāga presents a rather complicated argument. First he refers back to PS 3.22 where he defined the valid reason (*hetu*).

> Of the [nine reasons mentioned in PS 3.21][40] the valid reason is that which is either present [wholly] or in two ways [i.e., present and absent] in the similar instances (*sajātīya*) and which is absent in the absence of the [similar instances]; the reversed is the 'incompatible' (*viruddha*) [reason] and the rest comprise the 'indeterminate' (*aniścita*) [reason].[41]

As is well known, of the nine types of reasons in his Hetucakra, Dignāga accepts only two as valid, namely, No. 2 'the property of being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) and No. 8 'the property of being produced by human effort' (*yatnaja*). The difference between the two valid reasons lies in the fact that the former pervades the whole domain of similar instances (*sapakṣa*), while the latter is present only in part of it. He then points out that in order to include the latter under the valid reason, the second characteristic of a valid reason should be restricted in the following manner: "It is present only in the similar instances" (*sajātīya eva san*). He also notes that the two example statements present the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), while the reason

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yin no że na / 'di yaṅ bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du 'gyur ro // (*'na tarhi vaktavyam idaṃ hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ sādharmyeṇa pradarśita iti / etat punaḥ sādhyasya hetunānugamapratiṣedhārthaṃ syāt /*). Cf. PSV[V] D61a1; KITAGAWA 1965: 518.

40 *prameyakṛtakānityakṛtaśrāvaṇayatnajāḥ / anityayatnajāsparśā nityatvādiṣu te nava //* (= NMu v. 6: 所量作無常 作性聞勇發 無常勇無觸 依常性等九). Quoted in NVTṬ 247,8-9.

41 *tatra yaḥ san sajātīye dvedhā(/dvidhā) cāsaṃs tadatyaye / sa hetur viparīto 'smād viruddho 'nyas tv aniścitaḥ //* (= NMu v. 7: 於同有及二 在異無是因 翻此名相違 所餘皆不定). Quoted in NVTṬ 247,1-2.

statement presents the first characteristic, i.e., the reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*).[42]

Now by rejecting the reversed formulation of a similar example, Dingāga seems to think that a reason is properly restricted to the domain of a property to be proved and, consequently, that the second characteristic of a valid reason is shown by a similar example. Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate a similar example. The above remark has been made in order to include Hetucakra No. 8 as a valid reason, for the reversed formulation of a similar example is possible at least theoretically in the case of Hetucakra No. 2.

Now an objection may arise. If a reason is present only in the similar instances (*sajātīya eva san*), one can naturally assume that it is absent in the dissimilar instances (*vijātīye 'sattvam*); hence, there is no need to mention 'absent in the absence of the [similar instances]' (*asaṃs tadatyaye*) in PS 3.22b. Dignāga argues that such a formulation has the purpose of restricting in such a way that a valid reason is absent only in the absence (*atyaya*) of the similar instances but not in dissimilar (*vijātīya*) items in general. Similarly in the dissimilar example, a valid reason is absent only in the absence of a property to be proved but not in different (*anya*) or dissimilar items.[43] Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate the dissimi-

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[42] PSV^{K} 149b6-8: *'on te bkag pa ni don med pa yin te </ ma yin te />* ***mthun pa'i phyogs la yaṅ rnam pa gñis*** *żes brjod pa'i phyir ro // phyogs kyi chos ni gtan tshigs kyis brjod pa'i phyir 'dir ni gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba yin te / de la gdon mi za bar rigs mthun pa* ***kho na*** *la yod żes* ***ṅes par gzuṅ bar bya****'o* (*że na*) / (**atha nārthas tatpratiṣedhe, na, san dvidhā ceti vacanāt / hetuśeṣaś cātra pradarśitavyaḥ pakṣadharmatvasya hetunaivoktatvāt / tatrāvaśyaṃ sajātīya eva sann ity avadhāryam eva /*). Cf. PSV^{V} D61a1-2; KITAGAWA 1965: 518.

[43] PSV^{K} 149b8-150a2: *de ltar na rigs mthun pa* ***ñid*** *la yod ces bya bas bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba* ***kho na*** *gtan tshigs so żes* ***ṅes par bzuṅ ba*** *na / rigs mi mthun pa la yod pa dgag pa thob pas ṅes pa'i don du 'gyur* →

lar example, even when it can be assumed from the similar example.

The same line of arguments can be found in PSV ad PS 2.5cd when Dignāga presents the theory of *trairūpya*, where he justifies the formulation of the third characteristic of a proper reason apart from that of the second characteristic.[44] In this context, he gives other instances of the same type of arguments from PSV chapters 3 and 4.[45] Having made a few more remarks,[46] Dignāga gives his final answer with respect to why it is necessary to formulate both similar and dissimilar examples.

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te / ji ltar de daṅ bral ba la med pa ni de daṅ bral ba ***ñid*** *la med pa yin gyi rigs mi mthun pa la ma yin la / bdag med pa la sogs pa la ma yin pa de bźin du 'dir yaṅ bsgrub bya med pa* ***kho na*** *la med pa yin gyi / gźan pa la ma yin rigs mthun pa la yaṅ ma yin no // (*tarhi sajātīya eva sann iti sādhyenānugama eva hetor iti avadhāraṇe vijātīye sattvapratiṣedhaprāptir iti niyamārthaḥ syād yathā tadatyaya evāsan na vijātīye 'nātmādau tathehāpi sādhyābhāva evābhāvo nānyatra nāpi vijātīye /).* Cf. PSV^{V} D61a3-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 518-519.

[44] See KATSURA 2000.

[45] PSV^{K} 150a3-4: *rigs mi mthun pa'i bsgrub bya la rjes su 'gro ba yod na / 'gal ba la 'am mi 'gal ba la yod pas don du ma sgrub par byed pa'i gtan tshigs 'gal ba'i gtan tshigs ñid du bźad pa yin no // gaṅ yaṅ chos mthun pa tsam gyis brjod pa la ma ṅes par thal bar 'gyur ro źes 'chad par 'gyur ba de la lus can ma yin pa ñid ni rtag pa med pa la yaṅ yod pa'i phyir źes bstan par bya ba yin gyi / gźan pa daṅ 'gal ba ñid med <la yod> pa'i phyir źes ni ma yin no // (*vijātīye tu sādhyānugame sati viruddhe 'viruddhe vā sattvād anekārthasādhanasya hetutā viruddhahetutā vyākhyātā / yadāpi sādharmyamātroktāv anaikāntikaḥ syād iti vakṣyati tatra amūrtatvasya nityābhāve 'pi sadbhāvād iti pradarśyate, na tv anyatra viruddhe vā sadbhāvād iti /).* Cf. PSV^{V} D61a4-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 519.

[46] PSV^{K} 150a4-8; PSV^{V} D61a5-7; KITAGAWA 1965: 519-520.

Here a question arises: Are the two forms of the examples together regarded as a proving statement (*sādhanavacana*), or either one of them as in the case of the statement of the reason? – isn't there only one reason in one proof? Dignāga replies: Both forms together are regarded as a proving statement. Otherwise,[47]

> If [it were allowed that] either one or both [of the examples] were not mentioned [in a proof], even 'common' (*sādhāraṇa*), 'specific' (*viśiṣṭa* = *asādhāraṇa*), or 'incompatible' (*viruddha*) [reasons] would be regarded as a valid reason (*sādhana*) [, which is absurd]. Therefore, the examples [in a proof] should be two.[48] (PS 4.5)
>
> (1) If a similar [example] only were stated, then [a reason might be] present even in the absence of a property to be proven (i.e., in the dissimilar instances); consequently, a common [and uncertain (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) reason] would be suspected of being a valid reason. Or (2) if a dissimilar [example only] were stated, then [a reason might be] absent even in the domain similar to what is to be proved (i.e., in the similar instances); consequently, an uncommon [and inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) reason] would be [regarded as a valid reason]. (3) If neither of the two [examples] were stated, then [a reason might be] absent in the similar instances and present in [its] absence [i.e., in the dissimilar instances]; consequently, an incompatible (*viruddha*) [reason] would be [regarded as a valid reason]. Therefore, both [examples] should be stated as

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[47] PSV^K 150a8-b1: *'on te ci dpe rnam pa gñis kyis tshig sgrub byed yin ni / ci ste gtan tshigs bźin du gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba ñid yin źe na / rnam pa gñi ga yin no źes brjod de / gźan du na ...* Cf. PSV^V D61b1-2; KITAGAWA 1965: 520.

[48] PS^K 4.5: *re re 'am gñi ga ma brjod pa'i // thun moṅ ba daṅ khyad par can // 'gal ba ñid kyaṅ sgrub byed 'gyur // de phyir dpe ni gñis yin no //* Cf. PS^V *thun moṅ daṅ ni khyad par ñid // 'gal ba'aṅ sgrub byed ñid du 'gyur // re rer gñis ka ma brjod na // des na dper brjod gñis su bya //.* KITAGAWA 1965: 520.

> the countermeasures (*pratipakṣa*) to such [pseudo-reasons] as 'incompatible' and 'inconclusive'.[49]
>
> To some [opponent], if one [of the two examples] is known, then even one [example which is unknown to him], being stated, is regarded as a member of proof (*sādhana*).
>
> Or, just as in the case of verbal cognition (*śābda*), if both [*anvaya* and *vyatireka*][50] are known [to both parties], either one of the two [examples] will indicate both by implication (*arthāpattyā*); consequently, there is no need to state both.[51]

Dignāga justifies his position by saying that unless two examples are formulated, pseudo-reasons such as 'incompatible' and 'inconclusive' (both common and unique) could be regarded as valid reasons. As a matter of fact, in *Hetucakra* he mentions both kinds of examples for each of the nine reasons. However, Dignāga admits a couple of exceptional cases. Namely, when one of the examples is well known to the opponent, it is enough to state the other; and

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[49] PSV^{K}150b2-4: *gal te chos mthun pa kho nas brjod na de'i phyir bsgrub bya med pa la yaṅ 'gyur bas thun moṅ ba ñid gtan tshigs su dog pa yin no || ci ste chos mi mthun pa ñid kyi brjod na de'i phyir bsgrub bya'i rigs la yaṅ med pa'i phyir thun moṅ ma yin pa ñid 'gyur ro || gal te gñi ga ma brjod na de'i phyir rigs mthun pa la med par 'gyur la med pa la yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir 'gal ba ñid du 'gyur ro || de'i phyir* ***gdon mi za bar 'gal ba daṅ / ma ṅes pa'i gñen por gñi ga yaṅ brjod par bya'o ||***. KITAGAWA 1965: 520-521; cf. PSV^{V} D61b2-4; cf. PVSV 11,7-8: *eṣa tāvan nyāyo yad ubhayaṃ vaktavyaṃ viruddhānaikāntikapratipakṣeṇa /* = NMu § 5.4, KATSURA 1981.

[50] Cf. PSV ad PS 2.4; KITAGAWA 1965: 87-88 and PSṬ D89b2.

[51] PSV^{K} 150b4-5: *gaṅ źig la cuṅ zad rab tu grub pa yin pa'i phyir gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba brjod pa yaṅ sgrub byed yin no || sgra kho na la* (read *sgra bźin du* = PSV^{V}) *don gñis rtogs pa'i phyir ram / gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas śugs kyis gñi ga bstan pa'i phyir gñi ga brjod par mi bya'o ||* Cf. PSV^{V} D61b4-5; KITAGAWA 1965: 521; cf. PVSV 18,17: *arthāpattyā vānyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt* = NMu § 5.4, KATSURA 1981.

when both examples are well known, it is enough to state either one of them. Of course, this is a practical decision, and theoretically speaking, Dignāga insists on the necessity of the two examples. It may be interesting to note in passing that such a practical solution is already mentioned in NMu.

As I have discussed elsewhere, Dignāga was aware of the logical equivalence of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* with *eva*-restriction; consequently, he could have said that one example, being properly formulated, could indicate both by implication (*arthāpattyā*). Nonetheless, he held to the necessity of the formulation of two examples in one proof. I take it that this attitude of Dignāga's reflects the inductive nature of his system of logic. He wanted to have both similar and dissimilar examples in our world of experience (or the induction domain) in order to induce the general proposition of pervasion (*vyāpti*).

5. In PSV chapter 4, verse 6, which I discussed at the beginning of this paper, comes next. In the rest of *svamata* section Dignāga deals with the following topics:

(i) It is necessary to formulate the 'example' separately from the 'reason' but the formulations of the two should not be unrelated.[52]

(ii) Dignāga criticizes the ill-formed proof formulae commonly used by his contemporaries who adopt the Nyāya definition of the reason (NSū 1.1.34 & 35: *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ, tathā vaidharmyāt*).[53]

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[52] PS & PSV 4.7-8 (^K151a2-7; ^V62a2-5); KITAGAWA 1965: 522-523.

[53] PS & PSV 4.9-10 (^K151a7-b4; ^V62a5-b3); KITAGAWA 1965: 523-525.

(iii) Further, he points out that the mere statement of an actual example without reference to a general law of pervasion will require further examples *ad infinitum*.[54]

(iv) Dignāga recognizes ten types of pseudo-examples, which become the standard classification among later Buddhist logicians. With reference to a similar example, (1) one which lacks a reason (*sādhanavikala*), (2) one which lacks a property to be proved (*sādhyavikala*), (3) one which lacks both (*ubhayavikala*), (4) one in which the positive concomitance is stated in a reverse way (*viparītānvaya*), and (5) one in which it is not stated at all (*anavaya*).

Similarly with reference to a dissimilar example, (1) one which lacks a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved, (3) one which lacks both, (4) one in which the negative concomitance is stated in a reverse way (*viparītavyatireka*), and (5) one in which it is not stated at all (*avyatireka*).[55]

6. In conclusion I would like to point out the following:

(1) Dignāga recognizes two senses of the term *dṛṣṭānta*, namely, an example object (*artha*) and an example statement (*vacana*).

(2) He recognizes two kinds of examples: 'similar' (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) and 'dissimilar' (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*). The former as an object exhibits the presence of both the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the proving property (*sādhanadharma* or *hetu*), while the latter exhibits the absence of both properties. The former as a statement is formulated in the form of the positive concomitance (*anvaya*), i.e., the presence of the proving property is

[54] PS & PSV 4. 11-12 (^{K}151b4-152a5; ^{V}62b3-63a3); KITAGAWA 1965: 525-527; cf. NMu v. 14: 若因唯所立　或差別相類　譬喩応無窮　及遮遣異品.

[55] PS & PSV 4.13-14 (^{K}152a5-b5; ^{V}63a3-b1); KITAGAWA 1965: 527-529.

followed by the presence of the property to be proved, and the latter in the form of the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), i.e., the absence of the property to be proved is followed by the absence of the proving property.

(3) The two statements of examples are logically equivalent like the second and the third characteristics (*anvaya-vyatireka*) of a valid inferential mark (*liṅga*) with *eva*-restriction. Consequently, theoretically speaking, there is no need to formulate the two examples in one proof as other Indian logicians do. However, Dignāga insists on the necessity of presenting the two examples in one proof, which seems to indicate the inductive nature of his system of logic.

(4) Dignāga is greatly concerned with the proper formulation of a proof, especially that of the example and criticizes the proof formulae of other contemporary logicians.

(5) Finally the role of the two examples in Dignāga's logic is to present respectively the positive and the negative concomitances (*anvaya-vyatireka*) of a valid inferential mark and, hence, to reveal the relation (*sambandha*), which is called *avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*, between a proving property and a property to be proved. It is Dignāga who for the first time in the history of Indian logic succeeded in formally defining this relation by employing the restrictive power of the particle *eva*, which he inherited from Indian Grammarians.

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The Role of the Example in Ancient Indian Logic

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I

In the present paper I want to demonstrate two things: 1. It is possible to assign a significant function to the reference to examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) in inferences and proofs, if one takes into consideration what the doctrines connected with the term "Indian Logic" were meant to account for. 2. Notwithstanding the possibility of allotting a theoretical function to examples one can recognise an indeterminacy with respect to the exact nature of the role they were intended to play, and it appears that the textual sources do not provide sufficient clues for a definite decision between different alternatives.

Regarding the theme and subject matter of the theoretical systems of "Indian Logic" which represent the early period before Dharmakīrti, I will make a number of assumptions relying partly on my own previous research in order to concentrate on the question of what can be said about the theoretically assignable role of examples *given* that those suppositions are mainly correct. As a starting point for a determination of the subject matter I surmise that "Ancient Indian Logic" goes back at least to the following three roots: 1) Common-sense inference, 2) establishment of doctrines in the frame of scientific treatises (*śāstra*), 3) justification of tenets in debates. Both 1) and 3) together relate the field with which "Indian Logic" is concerned to that of epistemology in general, but whereas 3) creates a connection between Indian Logic and the issue of the justification of theses and beliefs, 1) is suited to establish a link to the topic of the acquisition of knowledge. This in its turn brings

into play the problem of means of knowledge and more particularly the question of whether there are means of acquiring knowledge which perform an analogous function to that of perception and which might even function as a substitute for perception in specific situations where reliance on perception is not available.

II

The practice of common-sense reasoning implicitly supposes an affirmative answer to the above-mentioned question and Indian Logic makes that explicit at least in the more developed stages of its history. If one views the matter on the most abstract level it resorts to an exploitation of a principle of coherence of experience for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. This abstract idea is, however, implemented in a more specific way, and it seems that in the earlier periods of the historical development inference is mainly connected with the notion of inferring something on the supposition that "normality-conditions" are fulfilled. More concretely, some state of affairs is considered as being inferable because the supposition of its non-existence entails that some alternative state of affairs would obtain which has to be regarded as being abnormal in comparison to the former state of affairs and in view of established knowledge and other previous experience. In this connection common-sense knowledge and experience shared by some community play a prominent role, but possibly the circumstance that this is not always so is crucial for the understanding of the function of examples in Indian Logic. Probably it is to a large extent due to the connection with the above mentioned factor 2), i.e., the vindication of the tenets of scientific treatises (*śāstra*), that reference to commonly shared knowledge was not unexceptionally available or convenient. However this may be, one can easily discern a significant role examples can play *if* one supposes that inference is connected with the notion of normality in the above-described manner and that

well-known facts do not constitute the only ingredient of the background of previous knowledge and experience that is relevant for the determination of coherence: The adduction of examples performs under the mentioned premises the function of establishing whether certain hypothetical states-of-affairs exhibit normality or deviance from the norm. In principle reference to examples is implicit even in cases in which the relevant background consists of well-known facts. The difference is merely that in such cases there is no need to point out the relevant facts in an explicit manner and accordingly the *adduction* of examples might be dispensable. Nevertheless, the fact persists that even here it must hold good that corresponding facts and examples exist and *can* be adduced in principle, if inference should possess the nature that has been assumed by us.

It should not surprise us that reference to examples comes into play even in the context of the justification of beliefs and tenets. If it is true that some knowledge can be acquired by exploiting a principle of coherence of experience and more specifically a default-principle of avoiding suppositions of abnormality, the link to the issue of the justification of opinions and assertions is pretty obvious: In some cases and to a certain extent at least justification consists in pointing out that the content of some pertinent opinion or thesis has been or could have been acquired as knowledge by exploiting the principle of coherence and by implementing the maxim that suppositions of abnormality should be reduced as far as possible. On the other hand, as far as we know, Indian Logic has narrowed down the general idea of "preserving the presumption of normality" to a special case. It is concerned with the specific issue of inferring the occurrence of a certain property with respect to some particular entity on the basis of the exemplification of some (other) property by the same entity. Accordingly the topic of normality comes into play under the particular aspect of a regularity by which the occurrence of some property is connected with the occurrence of some other

property at some identical locus. As a result of this it became relevant to ascertain whether concomitance of two properties conforms to normality or not. More particularly, the relevant problem was whether the occurrence of some property together with the non-occurrence of some other property would exhibit abnormality to some significant degree. In this context the role of example consists in the assessment of precisely that question. It is plausible, however, that, although it would be exaggerated to regard statistical considerations pertaining to the regularity by which the exemplification of one property is concomitant with the exemplification of some other property as the *only* apropos criterion, facts of this sort are pertinent for the evaluation of normality and abnormality regarding the co-occurrence of properties. Even if one did not consider the feature that the occurrence of some property P1 is more often connected with the occurrence of some property P2 than with its absence as something which conceptually or analytically follows from the notion that P1 is regularly connected with P2, such a requirement must be fulfilled at least in cases in which regularities of co-occurrence are exploited in order to infer the exemplification of some property P2 from the exemplification of some property P1. Accordingly, reference to examples which testify that in a statistically considerable number of cases the occurrence of P1 goes hand in hand with the occurrence of P2 constitutes at least a necessary regulative for the assessment of whether pertinent co-occurrence-relations conform to normality given that this should be employed for the purpose of inference.

In this way one can explicate in a precise manner a possible theoretical function of examples exhibiting the co-occurrence of properties. Because of the specific way in which the principle of coherence of experience has been exploited in the ancient Indian theories of inference and proof, the role of examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) amounts to the same as if one vindicated the validity of Defaults of certain varieties of recently developed theories of Commonsense-Reasoning

by demonstrating that the default inference rules correspond to empirical regularities supporting the claim that this is the case by referring to particular instances of co-occurrence of pertinent properties. Due to the circumstance that, as mentioned above, Indian Logic is connected with the establishment of doctrines of scientific and metaphysical treatises and thus exceeds the limits of the realm of everyday reasoning, it happens that explicit demonstrations of "normality-connections" are called for. On the other hand, the link to the topic of justification entails that regularities or even universal propositions are not employed simply as premises for the derivation of conclusions. In many cases "Defaults" and the corresponding regularities themselves are to no lesser degree in need of justifying support than the particular conclusions which can be derived from certain facts by hypothesising the Defaults as valid.

However, at least the relatively later versions of "Indian Logic" exhibit both "positive" and "negative" examples. The former ones exemplify the co-occurrence of the "indicator" or the "proving" property and the property which is to be inferred or the *probandum* whereas the latter ones instantiate the absence of both properties or, in other words, the co-occurrence of their complements. The decisive point is that a considerable number of Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist logical doctrines require the adduction or at least the existence of both positive and negative examples. It needs to be explored whether there are theoretical reasons which *could* justify this double postulate.

Let us suppose that there is a box containing 200 red and white balls made of different materials and that we have been given the information that the balls were painted such that *some* regularities exist between their colour and other properties, but we do not know *what* the regularities are. Let us now assume that 50 balls have been taken out, and that it turns out that all of them are red and 45 are made of wood. Are we entitled to conclude that wooden balls in the box are normally or generally red? It is evident that an addi-

tional premise is required in order to make *any* conclusions from the samples to the existence of regularities. After all it could happen that when the balls were put into the box, first all the white balls and only then the red balls were inserted so that most of the red balls were located at the top. The fact that all the samples were red was possibly due to the circumstance that we had started from the top when we took out the balls one after the other. Obviously the mere fact that the supposition of regularity of concomitance between two properties has not been refuted by counterexamples is by itself entirely insignificant. This circumstance attains significance with respect to the establishment of a regularity only in combination with the supposition that a considerable number of examples have been investigated which have been chosen in an unbiased manner. Accordingly, "negative examples" are suited to perform an important theoretical function in this context: Their adduction can be exploited for a, so to speak, "meta-reflection" on the significance of the adduction of those examples which exemplify a concomitance of the pertinent properties. Whereas the presentation of "positive" examples rules out the possibility that lack of knowledge of disconfirming instances with respect to the supposition of some regularity is due to the fact that the relevant issue has not been investigated at all, the presentation of "negative" examples is suited to throw light on the question of whether the adduction of positive examples is unbiased. As soon as negative examples have been pointed out it is at least ruled out that the only reason why the investigated examples do not refute the supposition of a co-occurrence-regularity between two properties lies in the fact that exclusively cases instantiating the property that is supposedly regularly connected with some other property have been taken into consideration. Of course, the requirement of negative examples is only reasonable as long as no universally instantiated properties are involved. But since situations in which the exemplification of such properties is to be inferred or proven are quite uncommon, this

should not surprise us. As far as I can see, there is no text which explicitly ascribes the above-described function to "negative examples". Nevertheless, the possibility that considerations of this sort have motivated the introduction of this element and that the above-sketched theoretical justification reflects to some degree reasoning-processes which have actually occurred in history is by no means low. There are reasons to believe that the requirement of the existence and the presentation of negative examples originated relatively late, at least later than the concept of examples in general, and this appears to harmonise well with the supposed assignment to a "meta-level" of reflection, a reflection which pertains to the relevance of the adduction of "positive examples".

III

The asserted attribution of the function of vindicating "defaults" to examples leaves, however, room for a certain indeterminacy which is relevant in various respects. Let us consider the following "default", which in a symbolic notation that has become quite common reads

Republican (x) : Non-Pacifist (x) / Non-Pacifist (x)

and which expresses that given the information that somebody is a Republican, one is entitled to derive that he is not a pacifist, unless other information exists which indicates that the subject in question is not a non-pacifist, i.e., that he is a pacifist. The justification for this default would lie in a regularity which links up the property of being a Republican with the property of being a non-pacifist. In other words, the default is supported by the circumstance that Republicans normally or as a rule are also non-pacifists. But now the problem arises as to how the relevant normality-hypothesis is confirmed. In the present case it is conceivable that reference to supporting examples constitutes at least *one* possible method of establishing the hypothesis. This would correspond to argumentations in

which one answers in view of the question why Republicans are normally non-pacifists by saying something like: “Look at Republicans like Reagan, Nixon, Eisenhower.... etc.” Possibly it was precisely this common way of supporting regularity-claims in everyday discourse which the theorem of examples was intended to reflect. Nevertheless, the following problem poses itself: Should one assume that reference to examples is the only possible way of confirming normality-hypotheses that support defaults? Seen from the objective point of view, this tenet is presumably false, but it might still hold true that such an outlook lay behind the fact that a number of doctrines of the Indian logical tradition considered the presentation of examples as compulsory. If this were the case one would probably have to state that the pertinent theories imposed too narrow restrictions and accordingly embody too coarse a conception of the subject matter.

This conclusion is, however, not cogent. There is also another alternative: The requirement of the existence and presentation of examples could be equally grounded on the consideration that hypotheses of regularities should be subjected to some test. The underlying principle is not that distribution of properties in sample cases constitute the decisive criterion for suppositions of regularities, but merely that assumptions of regularities should be controlled by reference to instances that are suited to reveal facts concerning the distribution of the pertinent properties. This solution would be objectively superior and more reasonable. It leaves room for the option of grounding regularity-assumptions on considerations pertaining to laws or law-like connections. Regarding the above-cited default, this would mean that it is legitimate to relate the pertinent regularity-hypothesis to, say, contemplations about aspects of the content of the political program of the Republican party, the policy that has been practised by representatives of this party, etc. in conjunction with the reasoning that anybody who embraces a pacifistic outlook would probably not join a party with

such characteristic features – and these considerations might in their turn go back to more general law-like psychological principles. Even under such premises examples could perform a significant function, but the decisive point is that they would play their role in the form of a regulative principle destined to control the validity of the reasoning of the above-depicted sort. In other words, the theoretical account would imply reflection on the validity of regularity-assumptions on more than one level: On the first level regularity-assumptions are grounded by reference to laws or law-like principles of a more general scope, whereas the validity of those first-order considerations is in its turn controlled by a test on a "meta-level" consisting in the consideration of the actual distribution of the pertinent properties in view of examples. To be sure, this entails that the level of reasoning which most directly pertains to the justification of the regularities underlying defaults has been left inexplicit in the theoretical accounts represented by what is commonly called "Indian Logic". But this constitutes by no means a decisive counterargument against the significance of the last mentioned alternative according to which reference to examples should be relegated to a meta-level. First of all, the theoretical possibility of attributing such a function can hardly be denied. But even from a historical viewpoint the alternative is not bereft of relevance. For, on the one hand, determining the function of examples in accordance with the latter alternative is *objectively* decisively superior in view of certain cases and, on the other hand, our second alternative must not be taken to imply a general exclusion of first-order functions to examples. It amounts rather to the claim that reference to examples plays the role of a means of assessing the justification of regularity-assumptions *either* directly *or* indirectly.

The prospects for a definite settlement of the question of whether the first or the second alternative has to be regarded as "historically correct" appear to me extremely dim. The reason is not that the

source-material is too sparse or that it has been insufficiently investigated in my opinion, but that I presume that there simply *is* no determined answer to the problem. We are probably confronted here with an *objective* indeterminacy resulting from the fact that the above-posed question has not been reflected upon in Indian logic and epistemology. It is only possible that *we* give our verdict about what should or might be objectively preferred in consideration of the character and the intended purposes of other theoretical elements or the concerned theories as a whole. In this respect the answer seems to be that, on the one hand, the second alternative is definitely more adequate but, on the other hand, the possibility of using the relative distribution of properties in view of examples as an immediate justification of regularity-assumptions should not be generally ruled out. Everything which has been said so far on the function of examples holds good irrespective of whether we hypothesise as relevant regularities allowing for exceptions – a notion which appears to have been envisaged in the earliest stages of historical development – or stricter regularities, according to which no exceptions are allowed to occur in the entire domain of the universe that remains if the pertinent subject of inference is left out of consideration – a conception which was prominent sometimes in later periods.

IV

On the background of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs one can sketch an assessment of the standard of reflection that has been attained in the earlier stages of Indian logic and epistemology. On the one hand we can ascertain a high level of reflection in connection with the "methodology" of inference and proof. It has not only been recognised that what functions as the basis and that which is inferred or proven in some particular case of inference and proof must conform to some rule that allows for similar proce-

dures in analogous cases but also that the rules, e.g., defaults, cannot be arbitrarily chosen if inference and proof should function as possible means of (acquiring) knowledge. On the background of the specific subject matter with which Ancient Indian Logic was concerned it was stipulated that possible inference-rules have to be backed by objective regularities and accordingly depend on normality-assumptions. A decisive fact is that the Indian theorists did not acquiesce in that, but, pushing the process of reflection still further, demanded that the pertinent normality-suppositions should be subject to some control. It is probable that at least in the earlier phases the only means that had been explicitly envisaged as being suited for such a role was the investigation of concomitance-relationships concerning pertinent properties in view of examples. Even in this connection, the degree of reflection was remarkable. One did not content oneself with the postulate that regularity-assumptions must be backed by previous experience on account of the fact that known examples only corroborate but do not disconfirm the supposition, but required in addition that some care must be taken in order to mitigate the danger of acquiring a distorted picture of the objective situation because of some defect in the process of the discovery of relevant examples. The pertinent flaw consists in a bias pertaining to the selection of cases such that the chances of encountering disconfirming instances are impaired for non-objective reasons, i.e., reasons which are not grounded in the objectively existing concomitance-relationships.

On the other hand, the high degree of reflection in the methodological respect appears to be counterbalanced by a deficiency of reflection on the methodological account itself. In other words, abundance of reflection on the methodology of experience stands in contrast to scarcity of reflection pertaining to the "meta-theoretical" level. In particular, it seems that the Indian tradition of logic and epistemology has not undertaken investigations pertaining to the following two questions: 1. Supposed that one's own theory yields

an adequate account of certain epistemic practices, is it also complete in the sense that it does not leave out of consideration other practices which deserve to be accounted for? 2. Supposed that one's own theory yields an adequate account of certain epistemic practices, *why* is it adequate at least to that extent?

These questions are by no means futile, and even if they were, they would not be evidently so. We have seen that the doctrines which might be subsumed under the term "Ancient Indian Logic" were concerned with regularities pertaining to the occurrence of two different properties. On this background, it should be natural to pose at least the following questions: a) Are there no other regularities than those relating to the exemplification of two properties by some identical property-bearer? b) Why is it so that regularities are actually apt to play the role that is assigned to them in one's own theory? These questions are appropriate because a) probably calls for an affirmative answer, and the problem that is involved in b) can be elucidated. We have claimed at the beginning that the early Indian theories of inference and proof could be regarded as implicitly exploiting a principle of coherence of experience. That something of the sort must be presupposed emerges from the fact that without this supposition it appears inexplicable why adduction of examples should have any bearing on the cogency of an inference or proof relying on the exemplification of one property and deriving from this fact the exemplification of some other property. Why is it not legitimate to assert that the circumstance that some property P1 has been experienced as being regularly concomitant with some property P2 generally has not, i.e., never has, any relevance for the assessment of the probability of the concomitance of the concerned properties in the particular instance which needs to be investigated? To be sure, it does not generally hold good that regularity of concomitance in other cases increases the probability of concomitance in some particular case, and it is probably Dharmakīrti to whom this insight can be credited. Nevertheless, even Dharmakīrti and

those who stood in his tradition acknowledged that *sometimes* regularities that are observable in other instances possess a bearing on the validity of inferences and proofs, and it is precisely this fact which needs an explication. A principle of coherence of experience is apt to furnish this.

Nevertheless, once one has clearly identified the problem in this way, another question emerges, namely: Why should a principle of coherence of experience hold good? This is by no means necessarily a vain question because it seems that there is at least one possible answer to the problem: Coherence of experience is required in order to distinguish between a world as it objectively is, on the one hand, and ourselves as ones who possess experiences of this world and possess opinions about it on the other. Without such a principle it becomes difficult to discern on which basis any substantial distinction can be drawn between what is objectively the case and what is merely believed or imagined to be the case in the world of experience. In the present context this point is relevant because the form of regularity-assumption which could be reduced to such a "transcendental principle" is decisively weaker than that which probably was hypothesised in the entire Indian tradition of logic and epistemology. It appears neither legitimate to derive from this that there are any regularities which are *never* violated in some region or at some time during the history of the universe nor does it yield a sufficient basis in order to claim that, *if* there are strict regularities, i.e., regularities which are unexceptionally complied with in the world, extrapolations of regularities which have always been instantiated in other cases to some particular case are absolutely safe. The first proposition does not follow because the "transcendental principle" merely says that *if* experience and the idea of an objectively existing world are possible the world must be supposed to exhibit *some* degree of regularity. The idea that some spatial or temporal part of the universe does not exhibit usual regularities and possibly no regularities at all is not incoherent because the

idea that there are objective facts of the world, which can for principal reasons not be assessed as what they are, is not inconsistent. For the emergence of a non-empty idea of an objectively existing world it is sufficient that regularities occur at some time in some region. For similar reasons the above-indicated principle does not militate against the existence of miracles. On the other hand, that regularities occur to some extent is equally required in order to guarantee a meaningful application of the concept of a miracle. After all, miracles are what they are only on the backdrop of regularities. This puts into question the scope of the validity of the extension-principle, which was implicitly presupposed by doctrines belonging to the tradition of "Indian Logic".

It is well known that Dharmakīrti extended the realm of inferences and proofs to cases where previous experience and empirical regularities do not come into play in the above-depicted manner. Intuitively, certain cardinal examples of so-called *svabhāvahetu*s exploit conceptual connections. Under certain aspects the unification of the original theory designed for reasoning under incomplete information with an account of reasoning under surplus information appears like a mismarriage. On the background of the remarks of the preceding paragraph it could be argued, however, that the two different theoretical components are not entirely unrelated after all. Possibly the notion of coherence can find a place even in the context of inferences relying on the exploitation of connections which appear to be conceptual-analytical. In contradistinction to cases that hypothesise empirical regularities it might be appropriate to speak of conceptual coherence here. The idea is that somebody who would, e.g., subsume something under the concept of a palm-tree and at the same time be reluctant to subsume the same object under the concept of a tree should be regarded as being conceptually inconsistent. Now, a tighter connection with the inference-type that is characterised by empirical regularities could be created under the supposition that both coherence of experience and coherence of

concepts are required for the possession of knowledge about an empirically given world. Nevertheless, this would at best yield a mitigation of the allegation that Dharmakīrti's unification of different types of reasoning in a common theoretical framework was inappropriate. Among other things the problem of the role of examples demonstrates this: Whereas there is no problem in ascertaining an intuitively plausible justification for the requirement of confirming examples in the context of reasoning relying on empirical regularities, it is extremely difficult to discern a comparable utility of examples with respect to reasoning that refers to certain well-known instances of *svabhāvahetu*s.

V

In the preceding investigations I have tried to establish that on account of *objective theoretical* reasons examples play a significant role in the framework of Indian theories of inference and proof. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings some clarifications might be appropriate.

The question of the *historical motives* of the various tenets concerning examples in Indian theories of inference has not been *directly* assessed. Nevertheless, the investigations possess an *indirect* bearing on this issue: If, as it is entailed by some of our previous statements, certain theorems pertaining to examples can be justified for objective reasons, it is natural to suppose that precisely those facts were at least partly responsible for the occurrence of subjective motivations for adopting particular tenets regarding examples in the history of "Indian Logic". More specifically, since general postulates of the existence, the discovery or the presentation of examples are appropriate on the background of a certain specification of what "Ancient Indian Logic" was about, it becomes not only less plausible to consider the theoretical features which are entailed by the historically existing maxims concerning examples as mere im-

perfections or even as symptoms of an "archaic way of theorising", but also the supposition that the phenomenon of examples in Indian theories of inference can only be "historically" explained is not any more compelling. Possibly *both* "historical" *and* "teleological" accounts are required in this field.

As the remark that has been made above at the end of paragraph III indicates, the present article must not be misunderstood as involving the claim that the theoretical function which has been attributed there to examples crucially depends on the circumstance that the inference-rules corresponding to regularity-assumptions possess the character of "defaults". Indicators of such a conception in fact exist in the framework of the older versions of Indian theories of inference and proof, but they occur in different contexts – as, e.g., in connection with the phenomenon of "incorrect logical reasons" (*hetvābhāsa*) of the *viruddhāvyabhicārin*-type and elsewhere – and are not essentially related to examples. Similarly, the attribution of the theoretical role of examples which has been advocated above is to some extent independent of the question of whether the pertinent regularities are "strict", i.e., not allowing for any exceptions, or "soft", i.e., representing regularities of some statistical or "tendential" nature. It is precisely for this reason that postulates concerning the existence, detection or presentation of examples were largely unaffected by shifts concerning the conception of relevant regularities and could survive for a long period in the history of "Indian Logic". In this connection it is important to note that phenomena of "jumping" from evidence to conclusions resulting from the nature of the pertinent type of "reasoning under incomplete information" can be located at *two* different places: On the one hand, "jumping" occurs whenever the relevant regularities are not "strict"; in such cases the corresponding inference rules might be most appropriately conceived as "defaults" which authorise a person to assume the attribution of some property to some entity – or the assumption of the existence of some state of affairs in some particular region at

some particular time – on the basis of different information pertaining to the exemplification of certain properties by certain entities – or the existence of some state-of-affairs –, *provided* that information supporting some other conclusion is not available (in the pertinent situation of inference or proof). On the other hand, processes of reasoning under incomplete information and of "jumping" to assumptions typically occur in connection with the acceptance of regularity-assumptions. This is most prominently the case if "empirical regularities" are hypothesized on a purely "inductive" basis, by generalisation from observation (or non-observation) concerning individual cases. The decisive point is, however, that even in other cases in which (also) other considerations come into play, the basis of evidence is usually weaker and does not (strictly) entail the proposition that is embodied in the relevant regularity-assumption. But this is precisely the reason why – as it has been pointed out above – the attribution of a significant theoretical function to examples does *not* presuppose that regularities are (conceived as being) established by purely inductive reasoning-processes.[1]

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[1] If it is true that the Buddhist "logician" Īśvarasena advocated the view that non-perception is a separate *pramāṇa* by which the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) or the pervasion between two items is established, he deserves to arouse our interest for different reasons: First, he must be credited with the awareness of a problem which appears to have been neglected by a considerable number of other thinkers of his tradition, namely the problem of the means of obtaining knowledge about regularities (provided, of course, that the concept of knowledge is applicable with respect to such cases). Secondly, he must be credited with having developed a doctrine which implicitly focuses on the possibility of knowledge which is not knowledge of things (*either* particulars *or* universals). If there is some object of knowledge at all, one would most plausibly relate it to the content of a ‚that'-sentence containing a universal quantification. Thirdly, and most importantly, such a doctrine points to a conception of "means of knowledge" according to which the fact that some belief has →

The above "teleological" explanation pertains to the function of examples as an "institution" in a manner similar to the account of the existence of the "institution" of custom-declarations. It must not be misunderstood as an attempt to justify postulates pertaining to the existence, discovery or presentation of examples in individual cases. It is *one* thing to address the question of why some government has introduced the rule that every immigrant is obliged to fill in a custom-declaration form and *another* thing to deal with the question why this rule should be complied with in individual cases. A reasonable answer to the first question is by no means automatically a reasonable answer to the second. Even if it were true that the rule of filling in custom-declaration forms at the border of some country serves the purpose of diminishing the probability that certain goods are smuggled in, it does not follow that compliance with this requirement in all individual cases serves the same purpose. Given that it is well known that some particular person is honest and that the circumstances are such that he could not gain much by smuggling in forbidden goods and that this person arrives from abroad at the border of his country with no luggage – in such a situation it might be quite implausible to suppose that the probability of the occurrence of smuggling is significantly diminished by requiring that even this individual person should fill in a customs-declaration form. *If* compliance with the rule is to be justified at all

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been obtained in compliance with this means is not tantamount to being true. There is room for the possibility that a belief or even knowledge has been acquired by a *pramāṇa* although having been acquired by the pertinent *pramāṇa* is no guarantee against falsehood. It might not be surprising that Dharmakīrti could not find this idea very attractive. But this should not prevent *us* from paying due attention to this doctrine and respect to its creator. If Īśvarasena really advocated the views which are suggested by certain sources, it must be deeply regretted that he has fallen into oblivion and that his works had been so completely superseded by the writings of his successor Dharmakīrti.

in such cases, *different* reasons might be appropriate which are at best *indirectly* connected with the purpose of diminishing the risk of illegal import: One could for example argue that if exceptions are allowed in certain cases a demand for making exceptions in other cases could originate so that in the long run not only the pertinent regulation but even the totality of the rules and the laws of some community might be generally disobeyed. The distinction between giving a rationale for the introduction of rules and giving a rationale for compliance with rules in individual cases is straightforward and under certain aspects it might appear almost trivial. Yet it is apropos to mention it at this place, not merely because the postulate of examples in "Indian Logic" possesses in fact certain similarities to custom-regulations, but, more importantly, because misunderstandings could otherwise arise if one compared the above account with explicit statements about the role of examples occurring in certain (later) texts.

I presume that on the background of the previous remarks a view which I advocate but, as it appears, is not generally accepted at present attains more plausibility: Not only the assessment of the role of examples but the investigation of Indian theory of inference in general must not be restricted to the identification of "intended meanings" of individual textual passages. Explorations in this field cannot be *exclusively* based on documentary evidence but require in addition considerations pertaining to objective features of the concerned theories. The "empirical" dimension needs to be supplemented by an *a priori*-component if studies on "Indian Logic" aspire to achieve significant results. The information which the sources contain often resemble rough sketches of an architect which outline a number of features but leave not only details but even certain aspects and dimensions unspecified. It is incumbent upon *us* to add required specifications not only for practical purposes, but even in the framework of theoretical reflections. If we desire to make use of blueprints for the construction of buildings or

other objects,[2] the necessity of making such additions is evident. It might be less obvious, however, that the exigency "to transcend the realm of that which is explicitly given" arises even in the context of quite elementary theoretical considerations, like, e.g., the question what certain drafts could mean for us, and that this need can even occur in the context of the question of what documents of a past age might have meant to their creator. It seems that there are scholars who are inclined to embrace the tenet that any kind of supplementing specification that is not explicitly provided by textual sources is, if not illegitimate, at least beyond the scope of disciplines like Indology and Tibetology. But what is the purpose of studying topics like Indian theories of inference and what precisely needs to be done in their view? One suspects that the answer might be: The aim is understanding those theories or particular features of them and the work to be done consists in finding out what authors who wrote on the topic in the Indian tradition actually thought. However, we must insist on asking: What does this precisely

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[2] Note in passing that it is by no means uncommon that blueprints do not specify which building-materials should be used. But this lack must neither mean that it is objectively unimportant which materials are chosen nor that the architect considered this as irrelevant. Sometimes the shape and the size of a building – which might be specified in a blueprint – restrict the possibilities of choice in this regard irrespective of what the draughtsman might have had "in mind". If new materials not yet known at the time of the creation of a blueprint are invented it can be foolish to refuse to employ them even in view of the fact that the creator of the draft might have explicitly recommended other options. Not only this, such an attitude could even go against an architect's intentions inasmuch as his primary aspiration was that such materials should be used which are optimally suited for the realisation of his ideas and this intention can also underlie certain specifications that are explicitly provided by him. If these remarks achieve the effect that scholars stop employing the notion of the intention of an author in a naïve manner they have not been made in vain.

mean? Should it mean that the only task which matters – at least within the boundaries of Indology, etc. – aims at a correct and detailed specification of thought-processes or other psychological events that occurred at a certain time "in the heads" of the authors whose texts are investigated? But how should this be compatible with the tenet that understanding is a pertinent objective? What should one say about somebody who commits himself to detailed investigations concerning the thickness of the lines of a blueprint, their exact length, colour, intensity, etc., the kind of pen with which they have been drawn, the quality of the material on which the drawings have been imprinted and so on and so on in the hope that by merely doing this he might obtain a deeper understanding of the "meaning" of the blueprints? Is it really recommendable to endorse the views of scholars who *identify* the task of understanding with the exploration of historical details?

Example and Exemplification in Early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

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Based on earlier dialectical traditions represented by the oldest passages of the *Nyāyasūtra* and the dialectical passages of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, the later tradition of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in general support as a matter of common knowledge a five-membered proof consisting of proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*) or exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*), and conclusion (*nigamana*).[1]

Within these members of proof the example plays a special role. It introduces an external instance into the proof that is substantially different from the instance to be proved (*sādhya, pakṣa*) and that is at the same time analogous with respect to the proving property (*sādhanadharma*) and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). The following investigation attempts to clarify how this member of proof was understood in the early dialectical tradition of the

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[1] This kind of five-membered proof is also supported by early Buddhist dialectical manuals on logic such as the *Tarkaśāstra* (cf. TŚ 37,24f. in TUCCI 1929), the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (cf. AS 105,1ff and ASBh 151,6ff.) or the early Sāṃkhya tradition represented by Vārṣagaṇya's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1982: 264). In the Vaiśeṣika tradition, Praśastapāda altered the terminology of the five members to *pratijñā*, *apadeśa* for *hetu*, *nidarśana* for *udāharaṇa*, *anusandhāna* for *upanaya*, and *pratyāmnāya* for *nigamana*; cf. fn. 37.

Carakasaṃhitā and in the early Nyāya tradition,[2] and to delineate its role within the scope of proof.

With regard to the early Vaiśeṣika tradition, which to a greater extent is ontologically orientated, we are confronted with a theory of inference, but not with an autonomous theory of proof or with references to the function of examples. This paper will therefore concentrate on Praśastapāda who apparently belongs to another historical stratum, since his theory of proof or inference for others (*parārthānumāna*)[3] is based on the three characteristics of a logical reason (*trairūpya*) of the Buddhist tradition,[4] and his third step of proof, the exemplification (*nidarśana*), serves as the verbal presentation of the invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*) within an example. Moreover, in contrast to the Nyāya tradition, he supports a theory of fallacies of the exemplification (*nidarśanābhāsa*); this will be discussed at the end of this article.

1. Differences and similarities in the early dialectical traditions

Despite the fact that the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Nyāyasūtra* differ in their respective structure of proof,[5] the function of the illustrating

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[2] This article mainly deals with the *Nyāyasūtra* and its earliest commentary, the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* will be dealt with only marginally.

[3] Cf. fn. **Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.**ff.

[4] Cf. KATSURA 1983, 1985, 2000 and OETKE 1994a.

[5] In the *Carakasaṃhitā* the proposition (*pratijñā*) is not a constituent of the proof (cf. OETKE 1994: 47f.) and is listed as an independent topic of debate (*vādamārgapada*, cf. PRETS 2000: 371 and 375f.). The dialectical proof or establishment (*sthāpanā*) of this proposition is treated as consisting of the reason (*hetu*), the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*). Cf. CarS vi 8.30f.: "The proposition is the communication of the [object] to be proved. As for ex- →

example seems to be more or less the same. The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in Caraka's presentation of proof[6] as well as the definitions of the reason (*hetu*), the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) and the application (*upanaya*) in the *Nyāyasūtra*[7] show the relevance of the example for proving the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) in the instance to be proved (*sādhya*), since in the case of the generally accepted example both properties, the property to be proved and the proving property, are seen to exist in a relationship.

Nevertheless, there are some substantial differences between the two texts. The *Nyāyasūtra* make a distinction between the general example (*dṛṣṭānta*) and the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) within the proof, while the *Carakasaṃhitā* uses the same term for both the general example and the formulation of the example within the establishment (*sthāpanā*) of the proposition (*pratijñā*). Moreover, in

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ample: The *puruṣa* is eternal. 'Proof' (*sthāpanā*) is the proof (or establishment) of exactly that proposition by means of reason, example, application, and conclusion. First is the proposition and afterwards the proof. For what can be proved when it has not been proposed?" *pratijñā nāma sādhyavacanaṃ; yathā – nityaḥ puruṣa iti. tasyā eva pratijñāyā hetudṛṣṭāntopanayanigamanaiḥ sthāpanā. pūrvaṃ hi pratijñā, paścāt sthāpanā, kiṃ hy apratijñātaṃ sthāpayiṣyati.* Moreover, in contrast to Caraka's "proof" or "establishing the thesis" (*sthāpanā*), the *Nyāyasūtra* do not have a technical term for what one would call "proof" as an independent category. The five individual members of the proof are merely listed under the topic "members" (*avayava*) and are defined without any hint of a generic concept (cf. NSū 1.1.32: *pratijñāhetvudāharaṇopanaya-nigamanāny avayavāḥ.*), although the *Nyāyasūtra* use the notion of *sthāpanā* within the definition of the "eristic wrangle" (*vitaṇḍā*): "This [kind of disputation (scil. *jalpa*)] without establishing (*sthāpanā*) the counter-thesis is the eristic wrangle." *sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā.* NSū 1.2.3.

6 Cf. fn. 11.

7 Cf. fn. 18.

contrast to the simple positive example as presented in the proof of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the *Nyāyasūtra* distinguishes two kinds of exemplifications: a positive and a negative.

2. *Carakasaṃhitā*

The definition of the *dṛṣṭānta* in the *Carakasaṃhitā* runs as follows: "*dṛṣṭānta* is [that object or state of affairs] with regard to which uneducated persons and wise men have the same understanding that explains [the instance] to be explained."[8] The *Nyāyasūtra* defines the general example (*dṛṣṭānta*) with almost the same wording. The similarity[9] of these two definitions is obvious. The determination of Caraka's definition, namely, that the example explains the instance to be explained (*yo varṇyaṃ varṇayati*) could hint at the role of the example within the proof, since *varṇya* – at least in special contexts[10] – seems to be used as synonym for the "instance to be proved" (*sādhya*).

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[8] CarS [vi 8.34] 267,6f.: *dṛṣṭānto nama yatra mūrkhaviduṣāṃ buddhisāmyaṃ yo varṇyaṃ varṇayati.* Caraka illustrates the *dṛṣṭānta* in the following way: "As for example: 'fire is hot', 'water is liquid', 'earth is solid', 'the sun is illuminating'; or [as in the following example]: 'In the same way as the sun is illuminating, the knowledge of the Sāṃkhya is illuminating'." (*yathāgnir uṣṇaḥ, dravam udakam, sthirā pṛthivī, ādityaḥ prakāśaka iti*; *yathā vādityaḥ* ⟨$CarS_1$, $CarS_2$: *ādityaḥ* CarS⟩ *prakāśakas tathā sāṃkhyajñānaṃ* ⟨*sāṃkhyavacanaṃ* $CarS_1$, $CarS_2$⟩ *prakāśakam iti.* CarS [vi 8.34] 267b,7-10).

[9] Cf. fn. 14.

[10] Cf. the fallacious reason (*ahetu*) called *varṇyasama* in CarS [vi 8.57] 271a,32-36: *varṇyasamo nāmāhetuḥ – yo hetur varṇyāviśiṣṭaḥ; yathā kaścid brūyāt – asparśatvād buddhir anityā śabdavad iti; atra varṇyaḥ śabdo buddhir api varṇyā, tad ubhayavarṇyāviśiṣṭatvād varṇyasamo 'py ahetuḥ.*

Although Caraka does not define the *dṛṣṭānta* as a member of proof, his delineation of the establishment of the proposition gives a clear picture of what he understands to be exemplified by an example, namely, both properties of the subject of proof, the property to be proved (*sādhya*) and the proving property (*hetu*, scil. *sādhana*): "proposition (*pratijñā*): 'The *puruṣa* is eternal'; reason (*hetu*): 'because it is not produced'; example (*dṛṣṭānta*): 'like ether'; application (*upanaya*): 'and just as ether is unproduced and it is eternal, so is the *puruṣa*'; conclusion (*nigamana*): 'therefore it is eternal'."[11] In this connection it must be mentioned that another version of the *sthāpanā*-passage of the *Carakasaṃhitā* exists, supported by different editions and manuscripts, which gives a different and even more explicit presentation of the example. In this reading the example exemplifies both properties: the property to be proved (*sādhya*), eternity, and the proving property (*sādhana*), not having been produced, and is accordingly also followed by a different reading of the application (*upanaya*). Subsequent to the same formulation of proposition and reason, this version reads: "example: 'ether is unproduced and it is eternal'; application: 'and just as ether is unproduced, so is the *puruṣa*'."[12]

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[11] CarS vi 8.31: *nitya puruṣa iti pratijñā; hetuḥ – akṛtakatvād iti; dṛṣṭāntaḥ – yathākāśam iti; upanayaḥ – yathā cākṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityaṃ tathā puruṣa iti; nigamanam – tasmān nitya iti.*

[12] $CarS_2$ 358a,31-33: *dṛṣṭāntaḥ – akṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam, upanayo – yathā cākṛtakam ākāśaṃ tathā puruṣaḥ.* Some of the 44 editions of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, most of them edited before 1900 and shortly afterwards, and all 30 manuscripts of the *Carakasaṃhitā* consulted to date by the author contain exactly this textual reading with minor variants ($CarS_2$ is the latest edition following this reading). The majority of the mostly later editions support the reading of CarS. It seems that the later editions followed the reading of the Jalpakalpataru (first published in 1868; cf. HIML IB, p. 3) of Gaṅgādhara Kavirāja (JKT 1577,23 = $CarS_3$ 1577,2f.) who most likely →

Disregarding the question of which reading is authentic, the example in Caraka's presentation of proof obviously plays the central role of representing an instance in which both properties are undoubtedly known to exist in a relationship that implicitly allows one to deduce one property from the other, as can be seen by the formulation of the application (*upanaya*). Although the question of this relationship or coexistence, its validity, and its implications is not explicitly discussed,[13] Caraka presupposes the understanding of these two properties' relationship as a matter of common sense.

3. *Nyāyasūtra*

To all appearances the general example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is defined in the *Nyāyasūtra* with regard to formal debate in general and not with regard to proof, the parts of which are themselves treated as topics of debate: "An object with regard to which normal people and scholars have the same understanding is the example."[14]

Pakṣilasvāmin explains the wording of the Sūtra's definition[15] in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* with an explanation of the difference between

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changed the wording of the manuscript on which he wrote his commentary. That Gaṅgādhara also had a manuscript in his hands that reads as $CarS_2$ as well as all the consulted manuscripts can be seen from his *Mṛtyuñjayasaṃhitā* – a rearrangement of the *Carakasaṃhitā* – in which he supports the reading of the *dṛṣṭānta* as found in $CarS_2$. The *Mṛtyuñjayasaṃhitā* (cf. HIML 1A, p. 186), which is not recorded in the NCC, is preserved – so far as is known – in only one manuscript at the Sanskrit College of Calcutta (handlist Āyurveda No. 153).

[13] For an attempt at possible implications cf. OETKE 1994: 50-52.

[14] NSū 1.1.25: *laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe buddhisāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.*

[15] Cf. fn. 14.

"normal people" (*laukika*) and "scholars" (*parīkṣaka*)[16] and concludes his remarks by referring to the importance of the role of examples in discussions and proofs: "Insofar as opposing opinions (*pratipakṣa*) are contradicted with the help of the contradiction of examples, and one's own opinions are established in accordance with examples, [the example] corresponds to the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) of the [five] members of proof (*avayava*)."[17]

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[16] Cf. NBh 258,4-259,2: *lokasāmānyam anatītā* ⟨*lokasāmyamanatitāḥ* NBh_2⟩ *laukikā naisargikaṃ vainayikaṃ buddhyatiśayam aprāptāḥ. tadviparītāḥ parīkṣakāḥ, tarkeṇa pramāṇair arthaṃ parīkṣitum arhantīti. yathā yam arthaṃ laukikā budhyante, tathā parīkṣakā api. so 'rtho dṛṣṭāntaḥ.* Cf. also NBh 44,11 where Vātsyāyana defines the example as "an object within the range of perception." *pratyakṣaviṣayo 'rtho dṛṣṭantaḥ* ⟨NBh_3; NBh, NBh_1 and NBh_2 om. *dṛṣṭāntaḥ*⟩. Cf. TPhSI II pp. 121f.

[17] NBh 259,2-4: *dṛṣṭāntavirodhena hi pratipakṣāḥ pratiṣeddhavyā bhavantīti, dṛṣṭāntasamādhinā ca svapakṣāḥ sthāpanīyā bhavantīti, avayaveṣu codāharaṇāya kalpata iti.* As opposed to the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Uddyotakara criticizes the Sūtra's definition because of the restriction of examples to those understood by both normal people (*laukika*) and scholars (*parīkṣaka*). He argues that if one has to bear in mind what ordinary people know, such examples as ether (*ākāśa*) can not be put forward in discussions, since one cannot assume that everybody is aware of the fact that something like ether exists (cf.: *evaṃ cākāśāvarodha* ⟨$NV_{1,2}$: °*kāśādyavarodhaḥ* NV⟩ *iti. yadi punar evam avadhāryeta* ⟨$NV_{1,2}$: °*dhāryate* NV⟩ *laukikānāṃ parīkṣakāṇāṃ ca yo viṣayaḥ sa dṛṣṭānta ity alaukikārtho na dṛṣṭāntaḥ syād ākāśādiḥ* ⟨$NV_{1,2}$: °*ādir iti* NV⟩. *udāharaṇatvena tu laukikaparīkṣakaviṣayasyābhidhānaṃ na punar laukikaparīkṣakāṇām eveti.* NV 498,2-4). Therefore he reduces the definition of the example – at least in the context of proof – to that which can be understood by several people or a discussion group having an equal intellectual capacity: "The meaning of the Sūtra is that the example is an object which is in the range of an equal understanding [of a certain group of people]." *buddhisāmyaviṣayo 'rtho dṛṣṭanta iti sūtrārthaḥ.* NV 498,1f.

In contrast to the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the means of proof known as "exemplification" (*udāharaṇa*) is defined in the *Nyāyasūtra*. It is determined through a special example (*dṛṣṭānta*) and occurs, as previously mentioned, in a positive and a negative form: "The exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) that possesses, because of its similarity to the [instance] to be proved [inasmuch as it too has the proving property], the property [to be proved] of that [instance]; or [exemplification (*udāharaṇa*)] is opposite in its opposite case."[18] The negative form of the exemplification therefore may be understood in the *Nyāyasūtra* as simply a reversal, which would lead us to the following definition: The negative exemplification (*vaidharmyodāharaṇa*) is an example that does not possess, because of its dissimilarity to the instance to be proved (insofar as it does not have the proving property), the property to be proved of that instance. But the negative exemplification defined in this way could also entail incorrect inferences because a property to be proved, e.g., fire on a mountain, can be inferred by the proving property, e.g., smoke, but if the circumstances are reversed, e.g., inferring smoke by means of fire, the inference would not be correct in all cases since there are objects having fire but no smoke, e.g., a red hot iron ball. If the two properties were objects of a mutual implication such as properties that are produced and that are non-eternal, this consequence would not arise because of its dissimilarity to the instance to be proved with regard to the proving property. Under the presupposition that the author(s) of the *Nyāyasūtra* were aware of this fact, the definition of the negative exemplification would have to be defined in the following way: The negative exemplification is an example that does not possess, because of its dissimilarity to the instance to be proved (insofar as it does not have the *property to be*

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[18] NSū 1.1.36f.: *sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam. tadviparyayād vā viparītam.*

proved), the proving property of that instance. But there is no hint that these problems are comprehended by the author(s) of the *Nyāyasūtra*. It is rather to be supposed that the role of the example is to point out an instance or a group of instances in which both the proving property and the property to be proved exist together or do not exist together.[19] Nevertheless, the exemplification most likely represents for the *Nyāyasūtra*, comparable to the *Carakasaṃhitā*, these experienced instances which implicitly exemplify a kind of positive and/or a negative concomitance of the property to be proved and its proving property as a matter of common sense.

This presumption is also corroborated by a Sūtra's rejection[20] of one of the so-called "sophistical refutations" (*jāti*)[21] of proofs, in which the *Nyāyasūtra* uses the function of the example for denying the opponent's argument: "In addition, [the argument of the opponent is also not cogent] because [only] a property which has been recognized in the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) as proving the property to be proved (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*) is [known to be a] logical reason (*hetu*) and, because this [property] is possible in both ways (i.e., exis-

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[19] Cf. the example of a *vaidharmyodāharaṇa* in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* in fn. 33, in which Vātsyāyana uses the same order of the sentence as in the *sādharmyodāharaṇa* ("A substance which possesses the property of being produced, such as a cooking vessel, is known to be non-eternal." *utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādi dravyam anityam*): "A substance which does not possess the property of being produced, such as the Ātman, is known to be eternal." *anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam.* Exactly this is an example in which the two properties imply each other, and does not contribute to the solution of the problem.

[20] According to MEUTHRATH 1996: 218ff. and TPhSI I p. 34, this Sūtra seems to be a later addition in NSū 5.1. This supposition has already been pointed out by RUBEN 1928: 219f., fn. 299f.

[21] Cf. NSū 5.1.32: *sādharmyāt tulyadharmopapatteḥ sarvānityatvaprasaṅgād anityasamaḥ.*

tent in similar and non-existent in dissimilar examples) there is no non-difference [of everything]."[22]

The eminent role by the *udāharaṇa* within the logical proof in the *Nyāyasūtra* can also be seen in connection with the definitions of the logical reason (*hetu*) and the application (*upanaya*), both of which are defined by means of the *udāharaṇa*. The logical reason achieves its ability to prove the property to be proved only by means of the *udāharaṇa*,[23] and the application depends on that which is exemplified in the *udāharaṇa*.[24]

4. The *Nyāyabhāṣya*'s interpretation of *udāharaṇa*

Vātsyāyana tries to demonstrate that the proving property (*sādhana*) and the property to be proved (*sādhya*) in the example are related to each other. On the basis of this relationship between the means of proof and the object of proof (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*) that is gained by experience, he assumes the validity of the inferential knowledge: "In the [proof that sound is non-eternal because it origi-

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[22] NSū 5.1.34: *dṛṣṭānte ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena prajñātasya dharmasya hetutvāt tasya cobhayathābhāvān nāviśeṣaḥ.* Cf. also NBh 1145,9-1146,5.

[23] Cf. the definition of the logical reason in NSū 1.1.34f.: "The logical reason (*hetu*) is that which proves the [property] to be proved [in the instance to be proved] because of its similarity to the exemplification. In the same way [it proves the property to be proved in the instance to be proved] because of its dissimilarity [to the negative exemplification]." *udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ; tathā vaidharmyāt.*

[24] Cf. the definition of the application in NSū 1.1.38: "The application is the conclusive determination of the [instance] to be proved dependent on [both forms of] the exemplification expressed by 'it is so' and 'it is not so' respectively." *udāharaṇāpekṣas tathety upasaṃhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ.*

nates, the situation is as follows]: Whatever originates has the property of origination; and such [an entity] does not exist after existing [for a while], it ceases to exist, it vanishes, [and] therefore it is non-eternal. In such a manner, being produced is the proving [property] and non-eternity is the [property] to be proved. This relation of means of proof and object of proof of these two properties is reliably ascertained in a [special case] because of its similarity [to the instance to be proved]. One who perceives this [relation] in the example infers with regard to sound: Sound is also non-eternal because it has the property of origination, like a cooking vessel and the like. The exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is that through which the relation of means of proof and object of proof of the two properties is exemplified."[25] The same relationship is also considered by Vātsyāyana for the dissimilar example: "In the second (namely, the dissimilar) example, one recognizes by means of the absence of one of the two properties the absence of the other one [and] infers with regard to the [instance] to be proved by means of the absence of one [of the properties] the absence of the other."[26]

Because the relationship between reason and consequence is perceivable, Vātsyāyana, when attributing a corresponding means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) to each of the means of proof, assigns percep-

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[25] NBh 308,7 – 309,4: *tatra yad utpadyate tad utpattidharmakam. tac ca bhūtvā na bhavati, ātmānaṃ jahāti nirudhyata ity anityam. evam utpattidharmakatvaṃ sādhanam anityatvaṃ sādhyam. so 'yam ekasmin dvayor dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ sādharmyād vyavasthita upalabhyate. taṃ dṛṣṭānta* ⟨*dṛṣṭantan* NBh$_1$ 48,7⟩ *upalabhamānaḥ śabde 'py anuminoti, śabdo 'py utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ sthālyādivad iti. udāhriyate 'nena dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāva ity udāharaṇam.*

[26] NBh 311,3f.: *uttarasmin dṛṣṭānte tayor dharmayor ekasyābhāvād itarasyābhāvaṃ paśyati, tayor ekasy*⟨*ekatarasya* NBh$_3$⟩*ābhāvād* ⟨NBh$_1$, NBh$_2$: *bhāvād* NBh, NBh$_3$⟩ *itarasyābhāvaṃ* ⟨NBh$_1$, NBh$_2$: *bhāvaṃ* NBh and NBh$_3$⟩ *sādhye 'numinotīti.*

tion (*pratyakṣa*) to *udāharaṇa*: "The exemplification belongs to the range of perception because by means of something visible something invisible is established."[27] In addition, with regard to the purpose of the exemplification, he states: "The purpose of the exemplification is to demonstrate in one instance that the two properties exhibit the relationship of the object of proof and the means of proof (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*)."[28]

However, there are still questions left open by the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. On the one hand, Vātsyāyana clearly states that the proof is an aggregate of statements (*śabdasamudāya*),[29] but on the other he treats the *udāharaṇa* as an object (*dṛṣṭānta*).[30] Another unanswered prob-

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27 NBh 316,7: *pratyakṣaviṣayam udāharaṇaṃ dṛṣṭenādṛṣṭasiddheḥ.* Cf. also NV 17,9-12.

28 NBh 317,9: *dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāvapradarśanam ekatrodāharaṇarthaḥ.*

29 Cf. NBh 47,2 or NBh 315,4: *avayavasamudāye ca vākye*; also cf. the example of an *udāharaṇa* clearly brought forward as a statement: *utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādy dravyam anityam ity udāharaṇam.* NBh 315,7f.).

30 With regard to the *udāharaṇa*-Sūtra (NSū 1.1.36), Uddyotakara is aware of the fact that the *udāharaṇa*, as a statement, cannot be defined as an object. Cf. an objection raised against the syntactical construction of the Sūtra (*dṛṣṭānta udaharaṇam*) in NV 561,13f.: "*udāharaṇa* is a statement, because [the word *udāharaṇa*] implies an instrumental factor [in the sense of *udāhriyate anena*], but the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is an object; and there is no referential identity of these two." *nanu ca karaṇakarakaparigrahād vacanam udāharaṇaṃ dṛṣṭāntaś cārtho na cānayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇaṃ yujyate.* Therefore he states: "The meaning of the [Sūtra] is an indirect definition (*upalakṣaṇa*) of the exemplification." NV 561,7: *asyodāharaṇopalakṣaṇam arthaḥ.* Cf. Vācaspati's commentary with regard to this interpretation: "[Uddyotakara] mentions the literal sense of the [Sūtra by saying]: '*asya*'. An example being an object cannot, by its own nature, be a definition of an exemplification which is simply a formulation. Therefore [he] has stated: '*udāharaṇopalakṣaṇam*' with the intention [to →

lem is the role of the similar and the dissimilar exemplification.[31] Is it necessary to adduce both examples? It seems as though it is not. In his commentary to NSū 1.1.39, Vātsyāyana cites two sets of proofs for the same proposition, one based on similarity (*sādharmya*) and the other based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), which seem to be alternative possibilities of proof. He introduces the first set with the following words: "If the reason is put forward, for the present, according to the similarity" and the second set with the wording: "If [the reason] is also put forward according to the

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express] that [the Sūtra], by indirectly defining a formulation by that which is expressed by it, is furnished with being the definition [of the exemplification] and having a referential identity." *asya tātparyam āha – asyeti. dṛṣṭānto 'rtharūpo nodāharaṇasya vacanātmakasya svarūpato lakṣaṇaṃ saṃbhavati. tasmāt svābhidhāyakavacanopalakṣakatvena lakṣaṇatvaṃ samānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca bhajata ity abhisandhinoktam – udāharaṇopalakṣaṇam iti.* NVTṬ 562,3-6.

[31] With regard to the *Nyāyabhāṣya*'s view, Uddyotakara clearly states that it is not necessary to adduce the negative example to an affirmative proof (cf. NV 538,15-17 ad NSū 1.1.35: *udāharaṇam, anityaḥ śabda utpattidharmakatvāt. anutpattidharmakaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam ātmādaya iti bhāṣyam. etat tu na samañjasam iti paśyamaḥ, prayogamātrabhedāt*). The negative example is to be applied only in the case of indirect reasoning (*avīta*) with regard to the reason having only a negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*); cf. NV 565,18: *udāharaṇam avītahetau draṣṭavyam iti.* But the background of Uddyotakara's logical understanding has completely changed. For his purposes he has adapted Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya* and has extended Dignāga's wheel of reasons by adding inferences in which either similar (*sapakṣa*) or dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) do not exist. From that he deduces three kinds of reasons, namely a reason having a positive and a negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekin*), a reason having only a positive concomitance (*anvayin*) and a reason having only a negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*). Cf. NV 294,6: *trividham iti. anvayavyatirekī, anvayī, vyatirekī ceti.* For the definitions and examples of these reasons cf. NV 294,6-11.

dissimilarity."[32] This phrasing amounts to an understanding of two different methods of proving which are neither necessarily bound to each other, nor essential conditions of the proof: "If the reason (*hetu*) is put forward for the present according to the similarity, the [proving] sentence [runs thus]: 'Sound is not eternal' is the proposition (*pratijñā*); the reason (*hetu*) [for that] is: 'because it is endowed with the property of being produced'; the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*): 'a substance that is endowed with the property of being produced, such as a cooking vessel, is not eternal'; the application (*upanaya*): 'and in the very same way [as the cooking vessel], sound is endowed with the property of being produced'; 'therefore, sound is not eternal because it is endowed with the property of being produced' is the conclusion (*nigamana*). If, on the other hand, [the reason] is put forward according to the dissimilarity, [the proving sentence runs thus]: 'Sound is not eternal, because it is endowed with the property of being produced; a substance that is not endowed with the property of being produced, such as the Ātman, is known to be eternal; and not in this very way [as the Ātman], sound is not endowed with the property of being produced; therefore, sound is not eternal because it is endowed with the property of being produced'."[33]

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[32] Cf. fn. 33.

[33] NBh 315,6-16,3: *tatra sādharmyokte tāvad dhetau vākyam – anityaḥ śabda iti pratijñā, utpattidharmakatvād iti hetuḥ, utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādi dravyam anityam ity udāharaṇam, tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabda ity upanayaḥ, tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti nigamanam. vaidharmyokte 'pi – anityaḥ śabdaḥ, utpattidharmakatvāt, anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam, na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ, tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti.*

5. The Vaiśeṣika tradition and Praśastapāda

In the early Vaiśeṣika tradition we find a theory of inference but no theory of proof or the like. The term *dṛṣṭānta* occurs in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra only once as a simple illustrating example.[34] The first Vaiśeṣika author dealing with proof is Praśastapāda who differentiates, like Dignāga, between inference for oneself (*svaniścitārthānumāna*)[35] and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*)[36]. The inference for others is nothing but the proof consisting of the same five members as those of the Nyāya school, although with a different wording.[37] The third step of proof, the exemplification (*nidarśana*), is twofold according to Praśastapāda, as in the Nyāya tradition or in the Buddhist tradition,[38] namely an exemplification by means of similarity (*sādharmyanidarśana*) and of dissimilarity (*vaidharmyanidarśana*).[39] They are defined as the demonstration of

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[34] Cf. VSū 7.1.20.

[35] Cf. PDhS 562,5 – 563,14. For Praśastapāda's theory of inference cf. NENNINGER 1992.

[36] Cf. PDhS 577,6f.: "The presentation by means of the five-membered formulation of the state of affairs which has been ascertained by oneself is inference for others." *pañcāvayavena vākyena svaniścitārthapratipādanaṃ parārthānumānam.* Cf. also PDhS 577,7-9.

[37] Cf. PDhS 599,5f.: "The members [of proof], on the other hand, are [the following]: proposition, reason, exemplification, application and conclusion." *avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusandhānapratyāmnāyaḥ.*

[38] Cf. for instance NP 1,15f.: *dṛṣṭānto dvividhaḥ. sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca.*

[39] Cf. PDhS 611,15: "The exemplification is twofold: by means of similarity and by means of dissimilarity." *dvividhaṃ nidarśanaṃ sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca.*

the positive and the negative concomitance in the sense of a universal proposition: "Of these, the exemplification by means of similarity is the demonstration of the fact that the universal of the evidence (*liṅga*) is accompanied by the universal of that which is to be inferred (*anumeya*). As for example: 'That which has motion is known to be a substance, such as an arrow.' The exemplification by means of dissimilarity is the demonstration of the absence of the evidence in that which is contrary to that which is to be inferred. As for example: 'That which is not a substance does not have motion, such as [the universal] being'."[40]

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[40] PDhS 611,16-20: *tatrānumeyasāmānyena liṅgasāmānyasyānuvidhānadarśanaṃ sādharmyanidarśanam. tad yathā yat kriyāvat tad dravyaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yatha śara iti. anumeyaviparyaye ca liṅgasyābhāvadarśanaṃ vaidharmyanidarśanam. tad yathā yad adravyaṃ tat kriyāvan na bhavati yathā satteti.* NENNINGER 1992: 105 has observed that the examples of the exemplifications that are brought forward with the formula "*yat-tad*" must be understood as universal propositions because otherwise it does not make sense that Praśastapāda supports fallacies of the exemplification (*nidarśanābhāsa*) which are comprised in the reverse formulation of the concomitance (*viparītānugata* and *viparītavyāvṛtta*).

In contrast to the Nyāya tradition,[41] but in principle similar to the Buddhist tradition that advocates five fallacies of the exemplification (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*),[42] Praśastapāda supports six fallacious forms of the exemplification (*nidarśanābhāsa*) for both exemplifications respectively. Four of these fallacies refer to the object of the exemplification and two are related to the formulation of the concomitance: The fallacious forms of the example may be 1. unproved with regard to the evidence (*liṅgāsiddha, liṅgāvyāvṛtta*), 2. un-

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[41] Only Bhāsarvajña in the tenth century is an exception in the Nyāya tradition through his support of the same twelve *udāharaṇābhāsa* as Praśastapāda, namely six fallacies of the exemplification by means of similarity (*sādhyavikala, sādhanavikala, ubhayavikala, āśrayahīna, avyāptyabhidhāna, viparītavyāptyabhidhāna*) and six fallacies of the exemplification by means of dissimilarity (*sādhanāvyāvṛtta, sādhyāvyāvṛtta, ubhayāvyāvṛtta, āśrayahīna, avyāptyabhidhāna, viparītavyāptyabhidhāna*). In addition to these twelve fallacies of the exemplification whose deficiency is ascertained (NBhūṣ 322,6-324,17), he supports eight more of these fallacies whose deficiency is doubtful (NBhūṣ 324,19-29), namely again four fallacies of the positive example (*saṃdigdhasādhya, saṃdigdhasādhana, saṃdigdhobhaya, saṃdigdhāśraya*) and four of the negative example (*saṃdigdhasādhyāvyāvṛtta, saṃdigdhasādhanāvyāvṛtta, saṃdigdhobhayāvyāvṛtta, saṃdigdhāśraya*). One of the later commentators of the *Nyāyasāra*, Bhaṭṭarāghava, reports in his *Nyāyasāravicāra* (NSāV 59,4-6) that Trilocana also supported these fallacies with a doubtful deficiency.

[42] Cf. for instance NP 5,19-22 for the fallacies of the positive example: *tatra sādharmyeṇa tāvad dṛṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ. tadyathā sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ, sādhyadharmāsiddhaḥ, ubhayadharmāsiddhaḥ, ananvayaḥ, viparītānvayaś ceti.* For the fallacies of the negative example cf. NP 6,14-17: *vaidharmyeṇapi dṛṣtantābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ. tadyathā sādhyāvyāvṛttaḥ, sādhanāvyāvṛttaḥ, ubhayāvyāvṛttaḥ, avyatirekaḥ, viparītavyatirekaś ceti.* Praśastapāda supports the same fallacies of the exemplification, but he adds the *āśrayāsiddha* ("having an unproved substratum") as a fourth variety concerning the object of the exemplification.

proved with regard to the object to be inferred (*anumeyāsiddha, anumeyāvyāvṛtta*), 3. unproved with regard to both (*ubhayāsiddha, ubhayāvyāvṛtta*) and 4. having an unproved substratum (*āśrayāsiddha*), or 5. the formulation of the concomitance is missing (*ananugata, avyāvṛtta*) and 6. the formulation of the concomitance is inverted (*viparītānugata, viparītāvyāvṛtta*).

He illustrates these fallacious forms for both the exemplification by means of similarity (*sādharmyanidarśanābhāsa*) and the exemplification by means of dissimilarity (*vaidharmyanidarśanābhāsa*) with the following argument: "Sound is eternal, because it is formless. That which is formless is known to be eternal, (1.) like an atom, (2.) like motion, (3.) like a cooking vessel, (4.) like darkness, (5.) like ether and (6.) [the formulation]: 'That which is a substance has motion.' [These are] the fallacies of the exemplification by means of similarity (*sādharmyanidarśanābhāsa*) that have [an example in which either] (1.) the evidence (*liṅga*), (2.) the object to be inferred (*anumeya*), (3.) both [of them] (*ubhaya*), [or] (4.) the substratum (*āśraya*) is unproved (*asiddha*), [or] (5.) [the exemplification] does not [formulate] the positive concomitance (*ananugata*) and (6.) [the exemplification] has an inverted [formulation] of the positive concomitance (*viparītānugata*). That which is not eternal is known to have form, (1a.) like motion, (2a.) like an atom, (3a.) like ether, (4a.) like darkness, (5a.) like a pot and (6a.) [the formulation]: 'That which has no motion is not a substance.' [These are] the fallacies of the exemplification by means of dissimilarity (*vaidharmyanidarśanābhāsa*) which have [an example in which either] (1a.) the evidence (*liṅga*), (2a.) the object to be inferred (*anumeya*), [or] (3a.) both [of them] (*ubhaya*) are not absent (*avyāvṛtta*), [or] (4a.) with regard to which the substratum (*āśraya*) is unproved (*asiddha*), [or] (5a.) [the exemplification] does not [formulate] the negative concomitance (*avyāvṛtta*) and (6a.) [the

exemplification] has an inverted [formulation] of the negative concomitance (*viparītavyāvṛtta*)."[43]

For his illustration of these fallacies Praśastapāda uses an argument that he does not accept as valid, because the property "formlessness" (*amūrtatva*) applied as the logical reason occurs partly in the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*), as for instance with regard to the property "pleasure" (*sukha*), and is therefore an inconclusive reason (*sandigdha, anaikāntika*)[44]. Nevertheless, it serves his purpose to exhibit the four failures of the example regarding the similar domain (*sapakṣa*) and the four failures regarding the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*) according to the *trairūpya* conditions: 1. An atom (*paramāṇu*) is lacking the property of being without form (*amūrta*); it does not serve as a similar example with regard to the evidence.

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[43] PDhS 611,21 – 612,2: *tad yathā nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt, yad amūrtaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tan nityam, yathā paramāṇur yathā karma yathā sthālī yathā tamo 'mbaravad iti. yad dravyaṃ tat kriyāvad dṛṣṭam iti ca liṅgānumeyobhayāśrayāsiddhānanugataviparītānugatāḥ sādharmyanidarśanābhāsāḥ. yad anityaṃ tan mūrtaṃ dṛṣṭam, yathā karma yathā paramāṇur yathākāśaṃ yathā tamaḥ ghaṭavad. yan niṣkriyaṃ tad adravyaṃ ceti liṅgānumeyobhayāvyāvṛttāśrayāsiddhāvyāvṛttaviparītavyāvṛttā vaidharmyanidarśanābhāsā iti.*

[44] Cf. PDhS 604,26-605,1: *yas tu sann anumeye tatsamānāsamānajātīyayoḥ sādhāraṇaḥ sann eva sa sandehajanakatvāt sandigdhaḥ. yathā yasmād viṣāṇi tasmād gaur iti.* The argument brought forward by Praśastapāda to illustrate the fallacious exemplifications is used in the *Nyāyapraveśa* to demonstrate the inconclusive reason (*anaikāntika*) which occurs partly in the similar and the dissimilar domain respectively (*ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛtti*) NP 4,16-20: *ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā – nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt. nityaḥ pakṣaḥ. asyākāśaparamāṇvādiḥ sapakṣaḥ. tatraikadeśa ākāśādau vidyate 'mūrtatvaṃ na paramāṇau. nityaḥ pakṣaḥ. asya ghaṭasukhādir vipakṣaḥ. tatraikadeśe sukhādau vidyate mūrtatvaṃ na ghaṭādau. tasmād etad api sukhākāśasādharmyeṇānaikāntikam.*

2. Motion (*kriyā*) is not a similar example at all because it lacks the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma, anumeya*), eternity. 3. The cooking vessel (*sthālī*) neither has the proving property nor the property to be proved; it is neither eternal nor formless. 4. Darkness (*tamas*) is not an entity of its own; it is nothing but the absence of light. Therefore one cannot speak about its properties. 1a. Motion as a dissimilar example does not fulfil the third condition of *trairūpya* because the evidence, formlessness, is a property of motion. 2a. An atom is not a dissimilar example at all because it is endowed with the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma, anumeya*), eternity. 3a. Ether (*ākāśa*) has both the proving property and the property to be proved; it is eternal as well as formless. 4a. As for darkness (*tamas*), the same holds good as in the case of the similar example; it is not an entity of its own.

The fifth and the sixth fallacies, as explained above, refer to the formulation of the exemplification, not to the object of the exemplification. 5. Ether (*ambara*) is a correct similar example since it is endowed with the property to be proved, eternity, and also exhibits the proving property, formlessness. 5a. A pot (*ghaṭa*) is also a correct dissimilar example, since it is not eternal and is not formless. Although the examples in 5 and 5a are correct, they do not form correct exemplifications because the example is given directly following the reason (... *amūrtatvād ambaravat,* ... *amūrtatvād ghaṭavat*) without formulation of their respective concomitance.

Structurally seen, the fault of the sixth variety is clear. The formulation of the concomitance is inverted in both examples given. But the examples used by Praśastapāda for this inverted formulation are inconsistent with the inherently incorrect proof (sound is eternal, because it is formless) which he had previously used to demonstrate the other fallacies of the exemplification: 6. "That which is a substance has motion" and 6a. "That which has no motion is not a

substance." Praśastapāda refers back to the correct argument submitted on the occasion of the explanation of the exemplification,[45] apparently to point out that even in a correct proof the inverted formulation of the concomitance leads to a fallacious exemplification and therefore a faulty representation of the proof.[46]

6. Conclusion

The brief outline above of the different views regarding examples and their role in proofs may be summarized as follows: The *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Nyāyasūtra* most probably already assumed – according to the definitions of the general example (*dṛṣṭānta*)[47] as a matter of common sense – that these two properties exist in a relationship. This coexistence or relationship of the two properties in the example – at least in the early stage of reflection – has been thought to be a vindication of the conclusiveness of the reason to prove the property to be proved in the instance under consideration.

This way of justifying the validity of the reason by a commonly accepted coexistence of two properties in an analogous example, which was not specified by the early texts and therefore was open to attack, was objected to quite early by certain, most probably Buddhist circles, who argued against the necessity of such kinds of relationships based on mere similarity and dissimilarity.[48] But it is

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[45] Cf. above fn. 40.

[46] Compare NENNINGER 1992:106.

[47] Cf. fn. 8 and 14.

[48] Cf. KAJIYAMA 1991; cf. also TUCCI 1929 where the twenty refutations of syllogistic arguments of the early Buddhist manual **Upāyahṛdaya* (*fang-pien hsin-lun*) are retranslated into Sanskrit from the Chinese translation: *eṣāṃ viṃśatividhānāṃ sāro dvividhaḥ. vaidharmyaṃ sādharmyañ ca. sajātīyatvāt sādharmyaṃ vijātīyatvād vaidharmyam. arthasya* →

not the aim of this paper to discuss the problem of this early confrontation of opinions regarding the validity of proofs, rather to hint at the underlying problem for the further development of theories with regard to that which the exemplification should accomplish for the process of proving.

It seems that Pakṣilasvāmin tried to find a way out of the dilemma by clearly distinguishing between the instance to be proved (*sādhya*) and the properties associated with it. This idea enabled him to abstract a relation between the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the proving property (*sādhanadharma*), which is ascertained in the example irrespective of the instance to be proved, and expressed in the proof by the exemplification.

As for Praśastapāda, by using a theory of *trairūpya* and the concept of a positive and a negative invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*) of the universals of the evidence and the object to be inferred, his logical understanding has completely changed. The twofold exemplification (*nidarśana*), as the third step of proof, serves the purpose of demonstrating the universally valid positive and the negative concomitance.

Similar to the Buddhist tradition, Praśastapāda advocates, in contrast to the traditional Nyāya point of view, six fallacious forms of the exemplification (*nidarśanābhāsa*) for both exemplifications respectively, of which four fallacies refer to the exemplifying object and two are related to the formulation of the concomitance.

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hi tat samāśrayatvāt te viṃśatidharmān vyāpnuvataḥ. UH 26,7-9. These kinds of refutations were categorized under the notion of *jāti* by the *Nyāyasūtra* (cf. NSū 5.1), and ways to invalidate them were looked for, according to their respective argumentative structure (cf. PRETS 2001).

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The Early Dharmakīrti on the Purpose of Examples

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The 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta*) is not one of the special topics in Dharmakīrti's first work, the **Hetuprakaraṇa*.[1] Here in the **Hetuprakaraṇa*, Dharmakīrti presents his logical ideas and interpretations for the first time, and in very close relationship to his immediate Buddhist and non-Buddhist predecessors and contemporaries.[2] In his later works Dharmakīrti continues to elaborate and refine his ideas, formulations, solutions and problems, most of which are fully expressed or at least indicated in an undeveloped way in the **Hetuprakaraṇa*. But his innovative thoughts are voiced most clearly already here, and it is here that we can see just what is original in his proposals and where he changed the tenets of the

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[1] I follow Frauwallner's proposal to consider the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with the prose text, which was later looked upon as a commentary on the verses, as Dharmakīrti's work of youth (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1954). Prof. Frauwallner tentatively called this text consisting of verses and elaborating prose the **Hetuprakaraṇa*, and assumed that the prose was mildly edited when Dharmakīrti later incorporated this work into the *Pramāṇavārttika* as its first chapter, on *svārthānumāna*. So far I have found no reason to deviate from this working hypothesis.

[2] In addition to the theories and conceptions of Dignāga, whose *Nyāyamukha* and *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* represent the authoritative horizon and subject of his explanations, the ideas of Dharmakīrti's own teacher Īśvarasena and of Kumārila, the Mīmāṃsaka who is opposed to many of Dignāga's ideas, can be considered as the main 'context' of his early work (cf. 1966, 1988, 1997).

Buddhist logical tradition by interpreting Dignāga's formulations. I limit my present investigation, therefore, to this first work of Dharmakīrti's.[3]

Since its main subject is 'inference for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*), the absence of this topic is conspicuous and as such telling of the idiosyncratic character of the master's new logic. There is a passage, however, which I would like to call the '*dṛṣṭānta*-passage' (PVSV 17,13-19,22), from which we can extract exhaustive information on Dharmakīrti's ideas on the purpose or function[4] of the

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[3] By offering an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's view on the purpose of examples I also correct an earlier and premature statement made with regard to the purpose of the examples in an inference according to Dharmakīrti. In 1971: 204 I wrongly said that the ascertainment of the invariable logical connection or 'pervasion' (*vyāptiniścaya*) is made by demonstrating this connection in the case of an example by means of the appropriate valid cognition (I repeated this mistake in an unpublished lecture at the First International Dharmakīrti Conference 1982 in Kyoto). This is, however, not the case (cf. my paper at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference 1991a: note 49). Against my original assumption of a necessary function or role of the examples for ascertaining 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) it will become clear that for the latter the examples have no function that is logically necessary. The issue of the purpose or function of the examples and their formulations clearly has to be separated in Dharmakīrti's logic from that of the ways for ascertaining a 'pervasion' (*vyāptiniścaya*).

For a different approach to this topic, cf. the paper by M. P. Marathe, "Dharmakīrti on Dṛṣṭānta," in N. H. Samtani (ed.), *Śramaṇa-Vidyā – Studies in Buddhism. Prof. Jagannath Upadhyaya Commemoration Volume I.* (Samyag-Vāk Series 3) Varanasi 1987, 65-80.

[4] Before going into details, I would ask my readers to accept a special convention for the use of the terms 'purpose' and 'function' in this particular connection. For I think that these terms, when clearly defined, can be effectively used for explaining the difference in the conceptions on the usage of examples in Dignāga and the early Dharmakīrti. I would like to →

'example' within the framework of the logical system proposed. Having concluded long elaborations (PVSV 10,13ff.) against the possibility of attaining any certainty for a logical reason's non-deviating from that which is to be proven by means of mere non-cognition (*adarśanamātra*), in his re-affirmation of the fact that a reason conveys the desired knowledge only because of the presence of an 'essential connection' (*svabhāvapratibandhād eva*), Dharmakīrti also touches upon the two kinds of examples (*dṛṣṭānta*). A complete translation of this '*dṛṣṭānta*-passage' is added in an appendix to this paper in order to provide a comprehensive impression of Dharmakīrti's treatment of the topic and my understanding of this passage. In the following I shall not only highlight the main points of Dharmakīrti's argument, but I shall also try to point to the various moments of close relationship between his words and expressions and Dignāga's.[5]

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make the following distinction: 'purpose' is a goal, aim, or objective in general that examples are assumed to have in an inference or proof, while their 'function' is an operating role, a task to be fulfilled as a logical requirement in an inference such that without its being accomplished an inference would not result. Answering the question for the 'purpose' would explain what in an inference is served by presenting examples, while answering the question for the 'function' would explain how examples serve an inference. This distinction will help to explain, as will be seen, that examples may have a necessary 'function' as well as an identical 'purpose', and that they may also not have such a 'function', yet may still have a 'purpose'.

[5] An attempt to observe just that particular relationship would not have been possible, of course, without the detailed presentation of Dignāga's *dṛṣṭānta* ideas in Shoryu Katsura's groundbreaking paper and Takashi Iwata's examination of Dignāga's ideas on the inconclusive reasons, both contained in this volume. Without their clarifications of Dignāga's views an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's opinion would have been quite hypothetical and risky.

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The very beginning of the *dṛṣṭānta*-passage (*sa evāvinābhāvo dṛṣṭāntābhyāṃ pradarśyate*) already demonstrates the two characteristics of much of Dharmakīrti's writing: he follows and/or intimates that he follows Dignāga, and makes his own point at the same time. The predicate of this sentence (*dṛṣṭāntābhyāṃ pradarśyate* PVSV 17,14), which is repeated several times,[6] seems to be a distinct echo of Dignāga's formulation *rūpadvayaṃ śeṣaṃ dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyate* (PS 4.1'c-d),[7] or even more closely of PSV on PS 4.6 (K: *yaṅ de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba daṅ med na mi 'byuṅ ba'i don du dpe brjod pa daṅ* /; V: *de rjes su dpag par bya ba daṅ med na mi 'byuṅ ba ñid du bstan pa'i don du dpe'i tshig yin no* //; cf. KITAGAWA 1965: 522 and KATSURA 2004: 136ff. with n. 7). While, however, Dignāga says that "the remaining two forms [i.e., the second and third form] (of the reason) are indicated (*pradarśyate*) by the example" (PS 4.1'c-d), or that "The statement of an example is made in order to indicate that (the reason) is inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) to the (property) to be inferred"

This shows once more how difficult it is to judge Dharmakīrti's contributions to the post-Dignāga tradition in the many aspects where he seems to refer to Dignāga explicitly or indirectly as long as we have only a very partial knowledge of Dignāga's logical works. Now that we have reached the stage of interpreting Dharmakīrti on a level more subtle than the mostly doxographical one of the past, we will have to elaborate the ideas of his predecessor in more detail and clarity. For the later philosopher's genius will not be correctly appreciated if Dignāga, the tradition's founder, is not better known. The study of Dignāga's epistemology and logic that, after all, had its impact on all Indian traditions of this kind, will therefore be a major task for our future work.

[6] *dṛṣṭāntenopadarśyate* PVSV 17,22f.; *dṛṣṭāntena ... °pradarśaṇaṃ manyamānaḥ* PVSV 18,18; *dṛṣṭāntena ... pradarśyate* PVSV 19,20f.

[7] Quoted in VNṬ 92,9; cf. KATSURA 2004: 140 n. 10.

(PSV on PS 4.6, cf. KATSURA 2004: 138; my brackets), Dharmakīrti has something else in mind as being indicated by the example.

The *avinābhāva* that, for Dignāga, is indicated by means of the similar and dissimilar examples is so indicated because the examples demonstrate the two forms of the reason's positive (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) with that which is to be proven.[8] These two forms are all the content Dignāga offers for the concept of an inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*), and without Dignāga's making reference to similar and dissimilar examples in an inference (*svārthānumāna*), the statement of examples in a proof (*parārthānumāna*) for the purpose of indicating the inseparable relation of the two properties involved would be meaningless. These examples, therefore, have the necessary 'function' of generating the inferential result or a proof's success. This 'function', naturally, is also their 'purpose' according to Dignāga. In Dharmakīrti's sentence, however, the subject *avinābhāva* is understood in a different way. The emphasising *sa eva* clearly bears a deictic meaning and thereby identifies *avinābhāva* without much ado with the immediately preceding term 'essential connection' (*svabhāvapratibandha*).[9]

In other words: both say that the examples indicate the inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*). But with Dignāga this is instantiated in the second and third form of the logical reason without which the rea-

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[8] Cf. KATSURA 2004: 139f.

[9] The two sentences PVSV 17,12-13 conclude an important section by emphasising again, in the first sentence, the singular function of the *svabhāvapratibandha* for any logical success, and then, in the second which starts with *sa ca*, meaning this 'essential connection', by repeating this connection's two modes. The following *sa eva* of our section's beginning refers quite naturally to the same. This is also supported by PVSVṬ 76,12f. (~ PVṬ 47b7).

son would fall short of its definition. As the examples, whether being remembered or reported to someone, thus actually provide logically necessary requirements, i.e., the cognition of two of the three forms of the reason, they can be said to have an integral 'function' for the inference or proof. Without their application or formulation the inseparable relation between the reason and that which is to be proven would just not be known. This 'function', of course, can also be seen as being their 'purpose'.

With Dharmakīrti, the examples have no such 'function' as elements necessary for generating an inferential cognition. Of course, the 'three marks' remain undisputed as characterising a sound reason. But they are not the sufficient causes of an inference, and therefore cannot explain the inseparable relation between the reason and the problematic property. This inseparable relation between two concepts, rather, is identified as a relation in reality, the 'essential connection' (*svabhāvapratibandha*). This relation is the basis which allows for an inferential cognition to come about. And the ascertainment in one of its two kinds, namely, 'real identity' (*tādātmya*) or 'causality' (*tadutpatti*), is that which for Dharmakīrti bears the 'function'-moment in generating an inference. This 'essential connection' is indicated by examples, but only in a proof to someone who does not know about this factual connection between the two concepts, or in an inference to oneself, in case one does not remember. When this relation is known, there is no need for indication by examples. They, thus, have no operative 'function', either for inference or for proof.[10]

What then is their 'purpose'? To answer the question, we need to determine first the purpose of the whole '*dṛṣṭānta*-passage' in this particular place in the text. Dharmakīrti does not find it worth mentioning, but it is evident that the whole '*dṛṣṭānta*-passage' treats the

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[10] Cf. PV 1.29 and OETKE 1994: 122f.

topic of the examples' purpose in the context of proof (*parārthānumāna*). Words of pronouncing and declaring abound, e.g., *pra-, upadarśyate, khyāpyate, vācyaḥ*. Yet Dharmakīrti does not deal here with proof.

According to my analysis of the content, he presents his own idea on the firm ground of a sound logical reason in counterposition to the idea that its inseparability can be known from its mere non-cognition (*adarśanamātra*) in dissimilar instances,[11] which he discusses at length in PVSV 10,13-16,27 (kk.15-24). Dharmakīrti's own theorem is placed right at the beginning: "Therefore, this (reason) does not deviate on account of an essential connection" (... *iti tasya svabhāvapratibandhād avyabhicāraḥ*. PVSV 17,2f.). Then, after showing just how the reason's absence in the dissimilar depends on nothing else than one of the two kinds of 'essential connection' (... *ity ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ*. PVSV 17,7), he states in conclusion to this final paragraph (PVSV 16,28-17,13; kk.25-27) that "precisely this inseparable relation is indicated by the examples."[12]

Dharmakīrti then supports this assertion by way of two arguments, using in each case an appeal to the authority of formulations found in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*.[13] In the first case (PVSV 17,15-18,14), he shows how the concept of an 'essential connection' is implied in Dignāga's view that a dissimilar example does not need a factual basis (*āśraya*), i.e., a real locus.[14] In the second (PVSV 18,15-

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[11] In Dharmakīrti's expression, the fact that the reason does not not deviate (*na vyabhicāratā*) is only because it is not known to occur in dissimilar instances (cf. PV 1.15).

[12] *sa evāvinābhāvo dṛṣṭāntābhyāṃ pradarśyate*. PVSV 17,13f.

[13] Cf. notes 5 and 12 in the appendix.

[14] Cf. PS 4.3 and KATSURA 2004: 152f.

19,16), he shows that Dignāga's statement that the formulation of one example by implication (*arthāpattyā*) indicates the other one[15] also presupposes the reason's 'essential connection' with the argued property.

Both appeals to Dignāga naturally show that Dharmakīrti shares these views of Dignāga's: that the formulation of a dissimilar example does not necessarily presuppose the reality of its contents,[16] and that the two formulations of the examples need not both be given because of their mutual implication.[17] But Dharmakīrti's point here is that both these views can only be held under the assumption that the inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) between the two properties involved is no other than their 'essential connection' in reality. Only because of the fact that the logical nexus between two properties is based on an 'essential connection' is Dignāga able to propound the peculiarities of the two examples' formulations here referred to.

Since the logical nexus or inseparable relation as identified with an 'essential connection' does not depend on examples for its ascertainment, the two examples do not have a logical 'function' in the sense mentioned above. Therefore an inference can be made from the reason alone, provided the 'essential connection' is known (PV

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[15] *arthāpattyā vānyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt* quoted from the *Nyāyamukha* (cf. note 12 of the appendix) in PVSV 18,17.

[16] Thus Dharmakīrti evades the infamous *dṛṣṭāntāsiddhicodanā* (cf. PVSV 4,24). Cf. also PVSV 104,21f. and PVin 2.46,23-47,5 that is a slightly edited parallel version of PVSV 17,15-18,9.

[17] This is often found, e.g., in PV 4.220cd (cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 78f. = 1999a: 105f.), in PVin 2.7,7-12 (the Sanskrit original of which has meanwhile been identified by Yaita in TR 81,14-16; cf. YAITA 1991: 126) and 7,27-32 where the *Nyāyamukha* cited in PVSV 18,17 is also cited, in NB 3.26, and in HB § 4.15.

1. 29'c-d). The 'purpose' of the examples, thus, is only to indicate this 'essential connection' in case it would not be known (PV 1. 29a-c'). The example conveys in this case the knowledge (*khyāpyate* PVSV 17,20) that the property to be proven is identical in reality with the property used as reason (PVSV 17,20f.). And this knowledge, a 'valid cognition' (*pramāṇa*) which is indicated by the example, is the result of a quite different enterprise whose task it is to ascertain the 'essential connection' of two properties as consisting of either their real identity or their causal relationship (PVSV 17,21-23 and 18,3-4). This, however, is nothing else than an ascertainment of the pervasion (*vyāptiniścaya*).[18]

There are no other passages in Dharmakīrti's first work that could give us more information on the 'function' or 'purpose' of the two kinds of examples. On the basis of the section presented here it can be summarised, therefore, that according to Dharmakīrti examples and their formulations have no logical 'function' at all. They can, however, have a 'purpose' for the psychological process of making someone aware of the only basis on which cognitions can be logi-

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[18] This is clearly summarised by Karṇakagomin following his explanation of the sentence *sa evāvinābhāvo dṛṣṭāntābhyāṃ pradarśyate* (PVSV 17,13f.): "The following is (thereby) explained: only a valid cognition which grasps the relation between the proving (property) and the (property) to be proven grasps the pervasion (*vyāpti*). Since the proving (property's) dependence on that which is to be proven is already grasped by this (valid cognition), the absence (of the proving property) in the case of an absence of that which is to be proven is (also) certainly grasped (thereby). Only this valid cognition which grasps the inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) **is indicated by the [similar and dissimilar] examples**, because it has been forgotten." (*etad uktaṃ bhavati – sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratibandhagrāhakaṃ eva pramāṇaṃ vyāptigrāhakam. tenaiva sādhanasya sādhyāyattatāgrahaṇāt sādhyābhāve 'bhāvo gṛhīta eva. kevalaṃ tad avinābhāvagrāhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vismṛtatvād* ***dṛṣṭāntābhyām*** *upa****darśyate***. PVSVṬ 76,14-16)

cally derived, which is the otherwise ascertained cognition of the relationship between the reason and the problematic property, and which is nothing else than their 'essential connection' as a given fact of reality. Since according to Dignāga the two examples, whether needing to be formulated or available by mutual implication, seem to be necessary for establishing two of the reason's characteristics for its being capable or deriving an inference, theirs certainly is a logical 'function'. Only on this point does Dharmakīrti seem to differ from his predecessor, although, of course, this is not at all his intention.

Appendix

I am aware of the fact that English translations should not be burdened with too many footnotes and brackets. While restriction comes easily with regard to the former as more explanation on the present topic is planned to be presented in my forthcoming translation of the PVSV's logic, for clarity's sake the regular use of the latter is unavoidable, and then even in two forms. Dharmakīrti's writing is generally acknowledged as being notoriously difficult, and it well befits the translator to justify his version of Dharmakīrti's intent by indicating as clearly as possible what is, according to his understanding, already implied in these statements, and what he thinks must be added in order to not only correctly interpret Dharmakīrti's meaning but also transmit this more context-related interpretation to the reader. With the help of brackets the translator offers the reader a chance to judge the interpretational success: the translator may not have correctly recognised the syntactic and systematic elements needing to be added as implied in these often elliptic sentences, or he may not have contextually and systematically interpreted the contents of a statement in an appropriate way. Round brackets, therefore, are used to indicate all parts of sentences that are syntactically understood but not verbally expressed, as well as Sanskrit terms added for explanatory identification. Square brackets indicate additional explanatory material that has the purpose of clarifying the textual and systematic relationships of a term or argument. In addition, I also use single quotation marks to indicate terminological usage.

Another peculiarity of this translation needs to be explained. I am presently experimenting again with translating Dharmakīrti's term *svabhāva* with a single word. In the past I differentiated its two meanings in Dharmakīrti's writings by translating the term when it meant 'concept' by "essential property" ("wesentliche Beschaffenheit"), and when it meant 'real nature' by "essence" ("Wesen"). My reasons for yet another attempt to improve on this will be given in the introduction to the forthcoming translation mentioned above. Here only this: I now translate the term only with "essence", but add a superior marker "c" for 'concept', and "n" for 'nature' to in-

dicate the different meanings which I still hold to be borne by the term as already proposed in 1971.

Translation of PVSV 17,13-19,22

[Therefore a reason (*hetu*) conveys the knowledge of that which is to be proven (*sādhya*) only on account of an essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*). And this (essential connection) bears the name of 'real identity' (*tadbhāva*) or of 'causality' (*tadutpatti*).][1]

[1 Supporting the theorem of an 'essential connection' by referring to tenets of Dignāga's]

Precisely this inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) [which is either one of these 'essential connections'] is indicated by the [similar and dissimilar] examples (*dṛṣṭānta*).

[11 Dignāga's view that the formulation of a dissimilar example does not need a real basis presupposes this theorem]

> **Therefore a (factual) basis (*āśraya*) [i.e., a real locus] in the case of the dissimilar example is not assumed to be necessary here [in the tradition that follows Dignāga[2]]. For also from the statement "and**

[1] From the conclusion of the preceding paragraph (PVSV 16,28-17,13), which explains the dependence of the reason's absence in dissimilar instances as being based on the two kinds of 'essential connection'.

[2] This is an interpretation of *iha* on account of the argumentative purpose of the following two main paragraphs (PVSV 17,15-18,14 and 18,15-19,16). It is not in agreement with Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin who explain "**here**, in case of an essence[c] or an effect as reason" (PVṬ 48a1 ~ PVSVṬ 76,18). This makes sense, too, if only superficially, but it drains all the power of an appeal to Dignāga's authority from the verse's statement.

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when this (dissimilar instance)[3] is absent [as a fact], that (logical reason)[4] does not (occur)"[5] one knows

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For Dignāga's position, cf. the explanations ad NMu k.4 and 11, as well as PS 3.20 and PS 4.3 (cf. IWATA 2004: 98ff., KATSURA 2004: 152f., and OETKE 1994: 51f. with n. 7).

[3] According to Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin (PVṬ 48a2 = PVSVṬ 76,21) "when these (i.e., the essence[c] as pervading property or the cause) are absent", which has the same meaning, more or less, for these properties are absent when their real bearers are absent. It is interesting to note, however, that both commentators seemed to have missed the fact that this phrase is part of an – evidently rephrased – quotation from Dignāga (cf. note 5). This point was missed by both previous translators (cf. MOOKERJEE-NAGASAKI 1964: 67 and MATILAL 1986: 22). Matilal (1986: note 10) criticizes the translation by Mookerjee and Nagasaki, but nevertheless also misunderstands the reference of *tad* in *tadabhāve.* He too takes *tadabhāva* to mean the absence of the *sādhya*, while non-existence of a real dissimilar instance is meant here, as was correctly seen by Katsura in his translation of the *Nyāyamukha* (KATSURA 1978: § 3.4) where he explains *tad* as *vipakṣa.*

[4] *tad* refers to *liṅga* (cf. PVṬ 48a3 = PVSVṬ 76,21).

[5] Both Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin quote two passages from Dignāga in this connection that contain the respective objection and Dignāga's answer (PVṬ 49a7f. = PVSVṬ 78,22-24). These quotations have the purpose of testifying that Dignāga rejected the necessity of a factual existence for instances adduced in dissimilar examples. Since both authors give *nyāyamukhādau* as the source, it is not clear whether the Nyāyamukha or the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti are meant (for NMu [KATSURA 1978: § 3.4; TUCCI 1930: 27] cf. OETKE 1994: 51f., for PSV ad PS 3.20 [KITAGAWA 1965: 492] cf. IWATA 2004: 98f.). Dharmakīrti evidently refers to Dignāga's answer that says, in Oetke's paraphrase, "that in the case of the non-existence of *vipakṣas* the logical reason also does not occur in this realm and no fault exists because there is in no way a doubt here." This is the context of the second quotation (*tadā sandeha eva nāsti, tadabhāvāt tatrāvṛtteḥ.* PVSVṬ 78,24; cf. KATSURA 1975: →

this (common absence of the reason and of that which is to be proven)[6]. (k.28)

[111 The purpose of these two examples is to inform someone of this 'essential connection' in the case of its not being known]

For

Surely in the example (the fact) is conveyed to (someone) who does not know (either of) these (two

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75f.) which contains the answer to the first: *yadā tarhy ākāśādikaṃ nityaṃ nābhyupaiti* (em. : *tābhyupaiti* Ms) *prativādī, tadā kathaṃ nityāt kṛtakatvasya vyatirekaḥ* (PVSVṬ 78,22f.), and which seems to correspond literally to both sources, NMu (T 1928, 2a17f.; T 1929, 7b14f.) and PSV (KITAGAWA 1965: 492,15f.). The causal clause, in fact, must have been recast by Dharmakīrti for his k.28c into *tadabhāve ca tan na,* for there is no other phrase in this context available for a similar correspondence, and the topic is not treated elsewhere as far as I know.

Since Dharmakīrti, at the end of this section in PVSV 18,13f. (on which occasion the commentators produce the above fragments), again refers to this idea of Dignāga's, and, at the beginning of the following section, undoubtedly quotes from the Nyāyamukha, there can be little doubt that these sentences are taken from the final prose section on NMu k.4.

Nevertheless, it remains somewhat problematic that Dharmakīrti should choose to rephrase this sentence. True enough, for metrical reasons he could not have incorporated the words of the *Nyāyamukha* into his verse as they are, in all probability. But that he took to changing the phrase, in fact, weakens his argument. For, after all, his point here is that his idea of the *svabhāvapratibandha* is implied in a statement of Dignāga's. One would expect this statement to be cited literally rather than in an adjusted form. Yet the crucial point of Dignāga's meaning is well presented, and as such even the altered sentence serves its purpose well enough.

[6] Supplied with PVSV 18,8f.: *...prasidhyati vyatirekaḥ.* Cf. also IWATA 1993: 123 and n. 47 for an interpretation of this line adduced in PVA 483,3.

facts), (namely) that [the property to be proven] is [in reality nothing but] that (reason) or (its) cause. (k.29a-c')

[1111 In the case of an essence[c] (*svabhāva*) being the logical reason]

Surely in the example (the fact) that the property to be proven **is** [in reality nothing but] **that** (reason) (*tadbhāva*) **is conveyed** in the mode of (its) being the essence[n] of that (reason) because (it) is tied to nothing but that (reason). A valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) (of the kind) "That which produces an essence[n] as being caused (*kṛtaka*) produces (it) as being endowed with an impermanent (*anitya*) essence[n]" is indicated by the example. Otherwise the restriction that, because of the presence of the one property, the one that differs from it must also be present, would be lacking. Then one might apprehend that the proving (property) deviates from that which is to be proven. By this valid cognition, moreover, (the fact) is conveyed that the property to be proven is tied to nothing but that (proving property). For something caused, which has come about as such, is something transient with the property of existing (only) for a phase (*kṣaṇa*) on account of nothing other than its own cause. For (we) deny that that (which is caused) is (of) this (nature, i.e., transient) on account of a different (cause) (than its own).

[1112 In the case of an effect (*kārya*) being the logical reason]

Or that (the property to be proven, namely,) a different entity **is** (its) **cause** (*hetubhāva*), is indicated by the example in the form of (the cognition) "because it is present only when this is present."

[1113 It is possible – in accordance with Dignāga – to do without a factual basis (*āśraya*) in the dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*) only if the examples convey an 'essential connection']

When in this way it is generally known [through the examples], that [that which is to be proven] is [in reality] this (reason) or (its)

cause, (then the property of) being caused does not occur in the absence of impermanence, and smoke (not) in the absence of fire. To wit: the (property to be proven) is [in reality] the essence[n] or the cause of this (reason). How (then) could (this reason) be present without its essence[n] or cause? Thus, the common absence (of these two properties) is established **in the case of the dissimilar example** even without **a (factual) basis.**[7]

[1114 In the case of this 'essential connection' being known, only the reason needs to be stated]

To those, on the other hand, who are already familiar with (the fact that that which is to be proven) is [in reality] this (reason) or (its) cause, (i.e.,)

> **For to those who know (this), only the mere reason needs to be mentioned.**[8] (k. 29'c-d)

The purpose for which an example is stated, that is (already) achieved. Thus, of what avail is its formulation then? (After all) even in the case that these (examples) are indicated[9] (Dignāga), in consideration of (the question) "What is the use of a (factual) basis in the case of a dissimilar example?"[10] declined [the necessity of] a (factual) basis.

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[7] This paragraph (PVSV 18,5-9) is also translated in Dunne 1999: chapter 4, n. 99.

[8] The kk. 28-29 (there as 26-27) are treated in Matilal 1986: 22f.

[9] Namely to someone who does not know the 'essential connection'.

[10] This question does not seem to be quoted from Dignāga. Rather it seems to give the gist of the little digression towards the end of NMu on k. 4 to which Dharmakīrti draws attention in PV 1.28c above at the beginning of the first section of the present text. For it is in regard to this refer- →

[12 Dignāga's view that the formulation of either example implies the other also presupposes the theorem of an 'essential connection']

> **In the case of (a logical reason) whose connection is known for precisely this reason**[11]**, the formulation of either one of the two (examples) calls to mind (*smṛtiḥ samupajāyate*), by way of implication (*arthāpatti*), the second as well.** (k. 30)

When (Dignāga) says "or because either (formulation of an example), by way of implication, indicates both",[12] also in this (passage) he says that the second (formulation) is obtained through the formulation of (the other) one, assuming that the example indicates (that which is to be proven) to be [in reality nothing but] the (reason) or (its) cause.

[121 These implications in the case of an essence[c] being the logical reason]

[1211 The implication of common absence (*vyatireka*)]

To wit: When (in the form of) "that which is caused is impermanent" it is stated that (the latter) is not a different entity, clearly the (property to be proven) is [in reality] the essence[n] of the (former property) that is known to be tied to nothing but the (latter property) through a valid cognition. For (the latter property) is restricted to being [in reality] the (former). Therefore someone who knows that [this property to be proven] is [in reality] that (proving property) by way of implication (also) has (the knowledge) that [the

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ence that Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin quote the two sentences discussed in note 5.

[11] I.e., because the examples already indicated the 'essential connection' of the reason for those who were not aware of it (cf. k.29a-c').

[12] Cf. NMu (KATSURA 1981: § 5.4, fragment 6; TUCCI 1930: 43f.); 1997: n. 92 ; cf. also KATSURA 2004: 168 and n. 51.

property of] being caused does not occur in the absence of impermanence. For something (*bhāva*) does not exist in the absence of (its) essence[n], since (they) are not different. Otherwise even (the statement) "if this (property of being caused) occurs, (impermanence) occurs" would not be (possible).

[1212 The implication of common occurrence (*anvaya*)]

In the same manner [this implication holds good] for someone who thereby already knows that [the property to be proven] is [in reality] this (proving property) when (he) is told: "If this (property of being caused) does not occur, (impermanence) does not occur." To wit: This (property to be proven) is [in reality] the essence[n] of this (proving property), so that (the latter) does not occur in the absence of the (former), as otherwise it would not be possible [that it does not occur of necessity]. Thus, the common occurrence (*anvaya*) comes **to mind** through understanding that the (latter property) is the essence[n] of the (former).

[122 These implications in the case of an effect being the logical reason]

[1221 The implication of common absence (*vyatireka*)]

In the same way smoke is an effect of fire, when (someone is) told "where smoke (occurs), there is fire," so that in the case of smoke, fire necessarily occurs. Since otherwise there would be no restriction for a different entity (*arthāntara*) to be tied to that (proving entity), the (latter) entity (*bhāva*) would be independent. Then (however) it (would) even in the absence of the (former) not be absent, for (its own) essence[n] (would) not be deficient[13]. But of necessity an effect has a cause. For precisely that is the character of a cause's being a cause, that in regard to the existence (*bhāva*) of a

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[13] Karṇakagomin correctly says *dhūmasvabhāvasyāvaikalyān* (PVSVṬ$_{MS}$: *dhūmasvabhāvasya vaikalyān* PVSVṬ 86,19f.).

different entity (it) establishes the essence[n] [of that entity]. And (it is the character) of an effect to exist only when that (cause) exists. But this (indeed) is the case with smoke. Therefore the cognition of the common absence "smoke does not occur in the absence of fire" comes about by implication for someone who knows, in the mode of the common occurrence "smoke is the effect", that it is an effect of that (fire).

[1222 The implication of common occurrence (*anvaya*)]

In the same way, by implication he recognizes the common occurrence "fire necessarily occurs in case of smoke" after having been told that smoke does not occur in the absence of fire. For otherwise (it may be asked) why it could not (also) occur in the (latter's) absence.

[1223 Explanation of the statement of absence in the case of a reason that is too specific (asādhāraṇahetu)]

(Question:) Is it not the case that aural cognition (*śravaṇajñāna*)[14] [as an effect of sound], even if it is not an effect of (other) eternal or non-eternal entities, (nevertheless) does not occur in the absence of these? (Answer:) Indeed (it) does not not occur [although only by being not ascertained]. For exactly with regard to these two (areas of eternal or non-eternal entities) is one in doubt on account of this (aural cognition). Otherwise, how could one be in doubt on ac-

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[14] In Dharmakīrti's usage, aural cognition is synonymous with 'audibility' (*śravaṇatva*). On Dharmakīrti's treatment of the reason that is 'too specific' (*asādhāraṇa*), the usual instance of which is 'audibility' in an inference of sound's permanence, cf. ONO 1999: 308-312 where the verses PV 4.205-210, 218-221 and 258-259 are translated and interpreted in this context, and TILLEMANS 1990: 63 (= 99) as well as 77f.(= 104f.) where the important verses PV 4.207-220 are interpreted. This supplements the statements in the following paragraph.

count of a consideration of that (aural cognition's) occurrence (in sound) when (it) is ascertained as being absent [in eternal or non-eternal entities]? But it is just because the occurrence (of aural cognition) [in eternal or non-eternal entities] is not ascertained that it is said to not occur.

[122 Conclusion: the formulation of an example indicates an 'essential connection'. Otherwise even the common occurrence (*anvaya*) and the common absence (*vyatireka*) would not be obtainable by implication]

If, furthermore, the example does not indicate the relationship of cause and effect for fire and smoke, then even (the statement) "where smoke (occurs), there is fire" would not be (possible), because of the lacking (essential) connection. On which grounds (moreover) would the common absence (in the form of) "smoke does not occur in the absence of fire" be obtained by implication, and (on the other hand) would the common occurrence come **to mind**, as then the (reason's) absence in the dissimilar mode would (also) be unestablished?

[1 Conclusion]

Therefore, the example indicates nothing but this 'essential connection' as explained (above)[15] with the purpose of establishing something else when one (entity) is factually existent. For (such proving of something else) is impossible when this ('essential connection') does not exist.

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[15] Probably referring to PVSV 2,20-3,4.

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T	*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.* Tōkyō 1924ff.
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PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga): s. KITAGAWA 1965.

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga): s. KITAGAWA 1965.

VNṬ *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (Śāntarakṣita): Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya with the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita.* Patna 1935/1936 [Appendix to JBORS 21, 22].

HB *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* (VKSKS 4) Wien 1967. [References are to the pagination with asterisk.]

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Inductiveness, Deductiveness and Examples in Buddhist Logic*

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A number of us have been, for some time now, wrestling with the question of whether or not, and to what degree, traditional Asian logics, be they Buddhist, non-Buddhist, later or earlier, Indian or Tibetan, are inductive or deductive. Part of the problem has been to understand how particular writers and schools defined and explained key concepts such as valid reasons, similar and dissimilar instances (*sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa*), the use of the examples and the establishment through examples of the pervasion (*vyāpti*), i.e., the implication between the reason and the property to be proved. Broadly speaking, this is the historical and textual side of the problem, involving the collection of data and the close reading of texts: it is, and will be for quite some time to come, a major task. That said, although the interest and importance of this task is far from exhausted, it is, I think, worthwhile to backtrack a bit and re-examine what we're looking for and what we might be talking about when we speak of induction and deduction and such notions. It is possible to base ourselves temporarily on the philological data that we already have, and put the emphasis on the interpretation and analysis of this data in the light of a more precise working understanding of what constitutes inductive or deductive reasoning. In what follows I shall deal primarily with Buddhist logics, but some of the discussion can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to other tradi-

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* My thanks to Mark Siderits and Koji Tanaka for their remarks, which I will try to take up in a later publication. This will have to do for now.

tional Asian logics as well. One caveat that is important to make from the outset, however: I don't think that the problems which we might have in deciding whether or to what degree Buddhist logics are inductive or deductive are just caused by an application of utterly ill-fitting and inappropriate Western concepts to resistant data that does not profitably lend itself to such schemata. We do have legitimate needs to come up with well thought out generalisations about styles of reasoning. And while there certainly are sterile debates occasioned by the application of ill-fitting schemata, it is, I am convinced, equally stultifying to *immediately* retreat to the position that non-Western styles of reasoning are *sui generis* and maintain that the quest to understand their general features in any traditional or modern Western terms is therefore bound to fail. Suffice it to say for the moment that there is good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate, comparative philosophy and that I have the modest hope that I can show in what follows that the present problem of induction versus deduction in Buddhist logic is a case where some comparative logic may be appropriate and helpful.

The present paper is another rather longish postscript to a previous article, "On *sapakṣa*," which was written in 1984, added to and published in 1990 and reprinted (with some relatively minor revisions) in 1999.[1] In that article I had looked at two understandings of the notions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, i.e., respectively the "similar instances" and "dissimilar instances" figuring in the theory of the triple characteristic (*trairūpya*) of logical reasons. The first was that of Dignāga (and some Tibetan thinkers like Sa skya Paṇḍita) and took *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as excluding the subject (*pakṣa*, *dharmin*); the second was probably that of Dharmakīrti, and certainly that of later Indian logicians of the *antarvyāpti*, or "intrinsic entailment / intrinsic pervasion" tendency, as well as the logicians

[1] References are to the 1999 reprint in TILLEMANS 1999.

of the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school: for them the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* did not need to exclude the subject. In that paper I had also looked at the so-called "logical reason which is uncertain" (*anaikāntikahetu*) due to being "overly exclusive" (*asādhāraṇa*), and here too there were two divergent opinions correlated with the views that might be taken on *sapakṣa*. Taking the Dignāga-Sa skya Paṇḍita view, or what I had termed the "orthodox scenario," the *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* reason was one which was neither present in similar nor in dissimilar instances because of being exclusive to the subject – recall that the subject is supposedly excluded from *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. On the "orthodox scenario," a reasoning like sound is impermanent because it is audible is overly exclusive, because there are no similar instances, i.e., audible, impermanent things which would be non-sounds. Taking the Dharmakīrtian and Antarvyāptivāda stance, however, the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* is one which we cannot "ascertain" (*niścaya*, *niścita*), or know, to be present in similar or dissimilar instances. For this latter group of thinkers the problem was not one of the reason's actually being present or not, nor of there being similar instances. What is important to note is that on this stance, there will actually be *sapakṣa* for the sound-impermanent-audible reasoning, but there will be no examples. While the reason will be present in the *sapakṣa*, people other than the intelligent (who can supposedly dispense with examples) will not be able to *know* that it is present, for in an *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* no example (*dṛṣṭānta*) distinct from the subject can be given. The *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* has evolved into an epistemic problem about what people of differing intelligence can and cannot know.

One simplification which, I think, we can now make with reasonable confidence is to close the gap between Dharmakīrti and Antarvyāptivāda. In his 1986 article Kamaleswar Bhattacharya had shown that there was clear evidence in *Pramāṇavārttika* I that Dharmakīrti himself had espoused the central tenet of Antarvyāpti-

vāda, viz. the dispensability of examples, so that a proto-Antarvyāptivāda was already present in Dharmakīrti and we could probably stop looking for its origins in Jainism or in later Buddhist schools.[2] In "On *sapakṣa*," I cautiously tried to go a bit further, showing that the key verse in *Pramāṇavārttika* was also taken as evidence of Dharmakīrti's Antarvyāptivāda by certain Tibetan authors (notably Ña dbon Kun dga' dpal), and that, moreover, passages from *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, such as k. 220, tended to show that Dharmakīrti held a view on *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* which came down to the same as that of later Antarvyāptivādins.[3] The sim-

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[2] See BHATTACHARYA 1986. The verse in question is *Pramāṇavārttika* 1,27: *tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dṛṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ / khyāpyete viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //*. See BHATTACHARYA 1986: 93-94; TILLEMANS 1999a: n. 33.

[3] See TILLEMANS 1999a: 105-106. In k. 220 *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are specified as *sādhya* and *asādhya* respectively, i.e., everything which has the property to be proved and everything that lacks this property. Cf. Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana,* which defines *sapakṣa* as "all which has the property to be proved" (*sādhyadharmayuktaḥ sarvaḥ*) and *vipakṣa* as "all that does not have it" (*atadyuktaḥ*). Ratnākaraśānti then states that the presence of the reason in the *sapakṣa* and its absence in *vipakṣa* is "to be apprehended in one or another property-possessor" (*yatra tatra vā dharmiṇi grahītavyau*), by which he means either the example or the subject of the reasoning itself. See Y. KAJIYAMA, *The Antarvyāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti.* Tokyo 1999: 100: *katham idānīm anumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe vāsattvam eva niścitam iti hetos trairūpyam avagantavyam /*

matau sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau /
sattvāsattve tatra hetos te grāhye yatra tatra vā //

sādhyadharmayuktaḥ sarvaḥ sāmānyena sapakṣaḥ atadyuktaś cāsapakṣa iti / tasmin sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva yathākramam anvayavyatirekau tau punar yatra tatra vā dharmiṇi grahītavyau yatra śakyau grahītum /.

plification which I now propose is just the following : let us, for our purposes at least, treat Dharmakīrti and the Antarvyāptivādins in the same breath as essentially one and the same school.

Now, at the end of "On *sapakṣa*" I had stated, without much argument, that the Dignāgean conception of *sapakṣa* as excluding the subject seemed to be a key element in a looser, more inductive sort of logic, whereas the Dharmakīrtian conception harmonized with a move towards deductiveness. It is to this idea that I wish to return. I want to return to the problem of what, if any, bearing does the reliance upon examples have in this supposed evolution. How do we interpret the various Indian and Tibetan Buddhist logic texts which speak of establishing, ascertaining or apprehending the pervasion on the basis of examples?[4] Does the Dignāgean position, or Bahirvyāptivāda, "extrinsic entailment," where one insists upon the use of one and sometimes two examples, have anything to do with induction? And if so, is the move to Antarvyāptivāda something of a shift from an inductive logic to one which is more deductive because examples become optional? These then are questions which were inadequately treated in "On *sapakṣa*" and which will be the central questions to answer in the present paper. In order, however, to proceed in anything other than an impressionistic fashion we need to have a clearer understanding what we shall mean by "inductive" and "deductive reasoning."

For our purposes, and without pretending to resolve possibly unsolvable philosophical issues as to what are good and bad inductive

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[4] Cf. the characterization of Bahirvyāptivāda and Antarvyāptivāda in BHATTACHARYA 1986: 89: "the primary distinction, as expressed by the ancient logicians, seems to be this : there is *bahirvyāpti* 'external concomitance' when this concomitance is apprehended in a corroborative example (*dṛṣṭānta*), whereas there is *antarvyāpti* 'internal concomitance' when it is apprehended in the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference itself."

proofs, we could begin with the criterion for deductiveness and inductiveness that Henry S. Leonard gave in his *Principles of Reasoning: An Introduction to Logic, Methodology and the Theory of Signs*.[5] It should be obvious that inductive proofs will be judged in terms of evaluative notions that are very different from formal validity or invalidity; in fact the notions of goodness and badness at stake are devilishly difficult, perhaps impossible, to specify in anything like a rigorous way. But however we judge the goodness or badness of reasonings – and we certainly do make such judgments – it is a distinctive feature of inductive proofs that there is at least one statement which, if added as a further premise to what was considered a good proof, will turn that proof into a bad one. Thus, if it is deemed a good reasoning for us to conclude that all tomatoes will be killed by cold at 0°C on the basis of the truth of, say, twenty-five statements like "Tomato *A* died due to being in a

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[5] See especially LEONARD 1967: 432: "A valid proof is deductive =df. there is no statement which, if added to that valid proof as a further premise, will turn that proof into an invalid proof. A valid proof is inductive =df. there is at least one statement which, if added to that valid proof as a further premise, will turn that proof into an invalid proof." Leonard clearly wanted to use "valid" in a larger sense than simply "formally valid," so that it could apply to both sorts of proofs. Lest it be mistakenly thought that inductive proofs *should* be formally valid, I've opted for the terms "good" and "bad," without pretending to come up with a comprehensive criterion as to what is good or bad in argumentation. One negative point worth stressing is that "good" will not reduce to simply "effective" or "persuasive for such and such a group," but will always have a normative dimension – one will distinguish that which simply *does* gain adherence from that which *ought to* gain adherence. Cf. PERELMAN/OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969: 463. On various attempts to say rigorously what such goodness and badness is, see DALE HAMPLE, What is a Good Argument? In: W.L. Benoit, D. Hample and P.J. Benoit (eds.) *Readings in Argumentation* (Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis) Berlin 1992.

cold temperature of 0°," "Tomato *B* died due to being in a cold temperature of 0°," etc., the addition of the statement "Tomato *Z* survived at a temperature of -5°C" will vitiate that proof. And the fact that it does so indicates the inductiveness of the reasoning in question. On the hand, if we take a typical example of a formally valid Aristotelian syllogism, then whatever other statement we might add to the premises, the syllogism will remain formally valid for that same conclusion. No doubt there are more sophisticated additions to be made if we wish to provide rigorous *definitions* of inductiveness and deductiveness, but for the present discussion we can stop here and acquiesce in a recent writer's statement that: "however we construe it, inductive arguments have one property that sharply distinguishes them from deductions: they can be rendered invalid by *adding* a premise of the right sort."[6] This is, in effect, a restatement of what I am calling "Leonard's criterion."

If we apply these touchstones to the Buddhist proof of propositions through triply characterized reasons, then the Dignāgean type of reasoning where similar instances exclude the subject will be inductive. I say this with some caution, remembering the efforts of several people like Richard Hayes, Hans Herzberger, Claus Oetke and others to come up with different versions of just what these Dignāgean arguments would look like, some with inductive as-

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[6] See ROBIN SMITH, Logic. In: Jonathan Barnes (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.* Cambridge 1995, p. 31. Noteworthy is the fact that at some point or another we must speak of premises being of the *right sort.* George Bowles argues for a version of the deductive-inductive distinction that would include, but also go beyond, Leonard's criterion by introducing the idea of premises being "relevant" and "favorably relevant" to a conclusion: an argument is deductive if and only if conclusive favourable relevance is attributed to its premises and inductive if and only if inconclusive favourable relevance is so attributed (see BOWLES 1994).

sumptions more or less plausible to a modern logician and others with assumptions that are notably more risky or even wild.[7] In any case, as soon as you have the second characteristic reformulated as a premise along the broad lines of "Leaving aside the subject, the other possessors of the property of the reason possess that which is to be proved," the conclusion that the subject has this property, on most versions, is no longer formally implied. Using Leonard's criterion we can say that if the argument is a good one, it can nonetheless be rendered bad by the addition of a supplementary true premise stating that the subject does not have the property to be proved; hence the argument is inductive. In this vein it is noteworthy that Dignāga's disciple Īśvarasena felt obliged to add the condition that the proposition to be proved should not be falsified (*abādhita*), for he seems to have recognized that the triple characteristic did not formally guarantee the truth of the proposition and hence felt that he had to add a supplementary *ad hoc* condition.[8] He, in effect, seems to have recognized that arguments just based on triply characterized reasons *à la* Dignāga were inductive and hence fallible, but then instead of remaining satisfied with this fallibility, he took it as a potential for disaster whose avoidance warranted a somewhat heavy-handed addition to Dignāga's logic.

So much for the Dignāgean position on *sapakṣa* excluding the subject. By contrast, taking the view that *sapakṣa* does include the

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[7] See RICHARD P. HAYES, "An Interpretation of *Anyāpoha* in Diṅnāga's General Theory of Inference," and HANS G. HERZBERGER, "Three Systems of Buddhist Logic," in MATILAL/EVANS 1986: 31-57 and 59-75 respectively.; CLAUS OETKE, *Studies on the Doctrine of Trairūpya.* (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 33) Wien 1994.

[8] See T. TILLEMANS, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna), Volume 1 (k. 1-148)* (Veröffentlichungen zu den Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens 32) Wien 2000, p. 94, n. 335 and the references mentioned therein.

subject, the resultant rough and ready reformulation (disregarding for convenience the anomalies of using syllogistic forms for Buddhist arguments) [9] would yield a pretty simple argument :

All the things qualified by the property of the reason are qualified by the property to be proved.

The subject is qualified by the property of the reason.

Therefore, the subject is qualified by the property to be proved.

This paraphrased argument is obviously formally valid and would remain so whatever the addition to the premises. Once again applying the above-described criterion, it is clear that we would be dealing with a deductive proof. And therefore, going from the earlier scenario where *sapakṣa* excludes the subject to this later simplified scenario involving the subject's inclusion would be a genuine evolution towards deductiveness in the Buddhist theory of triply characterized logical reasons.

Now, what about the use of the examples? Some writers, such as B.K. Matilal in his posthumously published book, *The Character of*

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[9] I should stress that I am speaking only of an approximative, and hence even distorted, paraphrase into syllogistic forms, and am not at all backing the rather often advanced view that Buddhist or Indian logical reasonings *are* themselves Aristotelian syllogisms. One of the distortions in making this paraphrase is that Buddhist inferences-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), from Dharmakīrti on, do not (and indeed *must not*) include conclusions or statements of a thesis, whereas an Aristotelian syllogism obviously does. See "On *Parārthānumāna,* Theses and Syllogisms," reprinted in TILLEMANS 1999, 69-87. These types of reformulations of the arguments given by Buddhists or by anyone else into syllogistic may or may not be useful in certain contexts, but in adopting them there is no implication that the reasoner himself is thinking syllogistically or that the reformulation is actually in keeping with the reasoner's own views about what counts as an acceptably formulated argument.

Logic in India,[10] have made much of the fact that examples are (usually) required in Indian logical arguments, but that they would be superfluous in a purely deductive logic. This fact indicated to Matilal that it was misguided or wrong to see Indian (and not just Buddhist) logic as deductive, and suggested to him that the "first premise," i.e., the statement of the pervasion, had an "inductive nature." I quote:

> The insistence on the presence of an example should thus not be lightly dismissed as an inessential detail. For it brings to the fore the inductive nature of the first premise, and thereby exposes the "weakness" of the entire argument pattern from a purely deductive point of view. The Indian philosopher of logic did not generally think of this feature as an indicator of the weakness of their theory of inference (although the sceptics, as well as the Cārvāka or the Lokāyata, who were opponents of the idea that inference is a source of knowledge, severely attacked the theory just on this ground.) To counter this attack, the Indian logicians sought some way to accord the conclusion of this type of argument almost the same degree of certainty that is given to the conclusion of a normal deductive argument. However, the point remains that the importance attached to the citation of an example in the Indian schema ... highlights the fact that it cannot be reconstructed as a purely deductive argument, along the lines of A [i.e., along the lines of an Aristotelian syllogism in Barbara].[11]

An interesting corollary might be that if the insistence on examples shows inductiveness, the Buddhist or Jain Antarvyāptivāda, with its dispensability of examples, would be a move away from that inductiveness. In fact I don't think that either such statement would be correct, but we'll have to come back to this later to see why.

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[10] MATILAL 1998.

[11] MATILAL 1998: 16.

Matilal, in *The Character of Logic in India*, did not quite state his argument for saying that the presence of the example brings out inductiveness and militates against attributing a deductive nature to Indian logical reasoning. He did however give an implicit argument, as in the passage quoted above, that because the example would be superfluous in a typical Aristotelian syllogism, the reformulation as a syllogism with a useless appendage, i.e., an example, would not be deductive. It suffices to go back to Henry Leonard's characterisation of deductive arguments to see that this claim of Matilal, if indeed it is his claim, would not follow. The mark of deductiveness is that the argument remains formally valid, no matter what statement is added to the premises, be that statement redundant, or even in contradiction with one of the premises. Useless appendages might be terribly inelegant or puzzling in the context of Aristotelian syllogisms, but they don't affect their formal validity. In that sense, if we can tolerably well revamp an Indian argument as a formally valid syllogism in Barbara, with or without other appendages like examples, we seem to be dealing with a deductive argument, albeit one with a statement or two whose inclusion we can't seem to satisfactorily explain.[12]

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[12] Matilal's second argument, given just before the passage quoted above, is that the role of the example is to guarantee that the "first premise," i.e., the pervasion, has existential import – in other words, the example added to a premise like "All *F*'s are *G*'s" shows that there are actually some *F*'s, and that the pervasion is not true simply because of the emptiness of the antecedent. Let's look at this briefly. If we reformulate the pervasion as "For all *x* : if *x* is *F* then *x* is *G*," then it is clear that when there are no *F*'s, the whole conditional will be true simply because the antecedent is empty. This is what Medieval logicians knew as the principle of *ex falso sequitur quodlibet*, "from a falsity whatever one wishes will follow." Matilal's point, then, is that if there is an example which is both *F* and *G*, it will then be ruled out that a given pervasion is true simply because there is not or cannot be an *F*. I think that Matilal made a →

In any case, however, if we look at Matilal's introduction to the collection of papers he edited with R.D. Evans and published in 1986 under the title of *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, where he speaks of the example(s) confirming the pervasion and of Dignāga's insistence upon both positive and negative examples as bearing upon C.G. Hempel's puzzle of induction, it is quite clear that he thought that using examples *was* doing a kind of induction and that examples provided a basis or sample from which one would inductively argue for the truth of the pervasion.[13] This is, I think, a

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very valuable insight in discerning that the universal premise, or pervasion, in Indian logics has existential import. As I have argued in the introduction to *Scripture, Logic, Language* (TILLEMANS 1999, 1-23), this is one of the major differences between an Indian Buddhist logic and a Tibetan Buddhist logic as we find in indigenous Tibetan literature like *bsDus grwa*, for these Tibetan manuals of eristics *do* recognize and do regularly use "universal premises", i.e., pervasions (*khyab pa*), with an empty antecedent. That said, Matilal went in what seems to be a somewhat different direction and took the requirement for examples and existential import as somehow part and parcel of his argument against Indian logic being deductive. It is quite hard to see why, for whether we interpret universally generalized statements in Barbara-syllogisms as having or not having existential import, the formal validity and hence deductiveness of the syllogism is unaffected – whenever the premises are true, the conclusion will also be true. Whether or not existential import is demanded does not determine deductiveness or inductiveness. Let me go one step further. While I think it is important to note that pervasion in Indian logic has existential import, it is hard to see that examples are primarily destined as the guarantors of existential import in Indian Buddhist logic – they may have that result, but there are other ways to ensure existential import while eschewing the obligation to present an example. It is quite possible to be an Antarvyāptivādin, forgoing examples, and yet still demanding that the antecedent be non-empty : the instance of *F* which ensures non-emptiness is simply the subject (*dharmin*) itself. See TILLEMANS 1999: 12-17.

[13] See, e.g., MATILAL/EVANS 1986: 10-12.

widely held idea, but one to which I have considerable difficulty subscribing.

Granted, if we take the rather vague idea of induction that we find in Aristotle, i.e., reasoning from particular cases to general principles, it would seem that moving from examples to general statements of pervasion must be a case of induction. But this is far from unambiguous, for the Aristotelian notion of induction seems to vary between several distinct types of reasonings, including the establishment of a general principle by enumerating and testing all its instances, the establishment of a general principle which goes beyond the sample of data, and finally the use of well-chosen vivid cases to persuade people of the truth of a statement or to illustrate this truth.[14] To use L. Jonathan Cohen's terminology in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability*, the first kind can be called "summative induction", while the second kind is "ampliative induction."[15] It is of course this second kind, or ampliative induction, that interests most contemporary researchers on inductive logic or philosophy of science; indeed, it is this which

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[14] Another potentially undesirable result in adopting this understanding of induction is that there seem to be certain inductive or quasi-inductive reasonings which have particular, rather than general, statements as conclusions, but which could not be counted as induction on the Aristotelian criterion. See LEONARD 1967: 434; BOWLES 1994: 160. This possibility of an inductive reasoning concluding in a particular statement is relevant in an analysis of Buddhist reasoning. The pervasion is of course always general, but the conclusion of certain typical arguments (e.g., there is fire on the smoky hill) would have to be seen as a particular statement. Note also that, using Aristotle, certain seemingly deductive arguments with particular statements as the premises and as the conclusion (e.g., Sara is smarter than George, George is smarter than Tom. Ergo Sara is smarter than Tom) would be neither inductive nor deductive.

[15] See COHEN 1989: 1-2.

philosophers generally take to be induction and which poses horribly complicated technical problems, one being the potential connection with probability theory. As for the use of widely accepted and vivid cases to convince or remind people of a truth, this figures, above all, in Book II, Chapter XX of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, where one finds discussion of the use of illustrations and fables in order to clarify and dramatize certain truths–it is hardly what we would take to be induction and does not involve confirmation on the basis of statistical samples, let alone the puzzles of C.G. Hempel and Nelson Goodman.[16]

Does the use of examples to establish pervasions in Buddhist logic bear any resemblance to what we have been calling "ampliative induction?" I find it hard to imagine. My only argument against seeing the Buddhist's examples in this way would be an appeal to the Principle of Charity, but I think that it would be a strong argument, as it is an unflattering, uncharitable view on the intelligence of Buddhist logicians to say that they almost always do and demand ampliative inductions based on one case. Ampliative induction typically involves the careful constitution of a "fair sample" upon which we can generalize. It would take us much too far afield to discuss just how one comes up with such samples, but we can readily think of how educators or pollsters proceed in choosing a sample which is, as far as possible, representative of the whole population. This sample would need, *inter alia*, members chosen *randomly* from several different social, geographical, economic and religious sub-groups of the population. Imagine that we wanted to

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[16] For a summary of Aristotle's account of examples in the *Rhetoric*, see GILLES DECLERCQ, *L'Art d'argumenter. Structures rhétoriques et littéraires*. Bruxelles 1995: p. 107-114. See also W.N. THOMPSON, *Aristotle's Deduction and Induction: Introductory Analysis and Synthesis*. Amsterdam 1975: 89-96.

show that the level of historical knowledge of American students was good to excellent: obviously a sample which consisted only of members of the Harvard Junior History Buff Club would be ludicrously unfair and untrustworthy. A sample which consisted of just the top history student in America would be even more preposterous. And yet, *that* would be the kind of pseudo-argument Buddhists would be making if they were inductively establishing the pervasion from one single well known case that was "commonly recognized" (*prasiddha*) by all to be qualified by both the reason and the property to be proved. This kind of "recognized" example looks like anything but a randomly chosen fair sample, and as a result the argument, if it were to be inductive, would be called foul from the start (a bit like when a dishonest card player deals himself the desired royal flush by using a doctored deck of cards). Nor would giving a single "commonly recognized" negative example help much in inductively confirming the pervasion – it would be like citing one single case of somebody who is neither an American student nor very good in history to confirm our generalisation about American students' excellent knowledge. In short, the picture that all this would paint of the rationality and sophistication of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and co. would be dismal indeed, for rational people do not generally do ampliative induction on the basis of a single instance deliberately chosen because it exemplifies the desired outcome: they use several instances randomly picked from a sample representative of the population of people or class of things they are examining.

Here it could well be objected that the method of determining *anvaya-vyatireka* ("positive and negative concomitance" or "co-presence and co-absence") that figures prominently in Indian logic must nonetheless be inductive as it resembles so closely J.S. Mill's Method of Agreement and Difference. Thus it might be argued that citing positive and negative examples for the *anvaya*(*vyāpti*) and *vyatireka*(*vyāpti*) respectively somehow comes down to doing in-

duction. Matilal and others seem to have held this view. Once again I quote from his *The Character of Logic in India*:

> As far as the inductive character of the Indian argument pattern is concerned, it is reminiscent of J.S. Mill's theory of inference and induction. Presently we will see how the general premise is supposed to be supported by a positive as well as a negative example ... This invites comparison with Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference ... .[17]

In fact, when it comes to induction all uses of the terminology of *anvaya-vyatireka* are not equal. The parallel with Mill may well be on track when the Buddhist logician is, like Mill, using multiple and deliberately varied experiential tests to establish causal connections, but not when he is citing a single positive or negative example to support a general principle, or pervasion. For the sake of clarity let us adopt L. Jonathan Cohen's schematic summary of Mill's method:

> If circumstances A&B&C issue in *a&b&c*, and circumstances A&not-B&not-C issue in *a&not-b&not-c*, then *a* is the effect of A because its occurrence is unaffected by the presence or absence of B or C. [= Agreement] ... [I]f circumstances A&B&C issue in *a&b&c* and circumstances not-A&B&C – the control – in not-*a&b&c*, then *a* is the effect of A because its presence is adversely affected by the absence of A [= Difference]."[18]

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[17] MATILAL 1998: 17.

[18] COHEN 1989: 30-31. Cf. J.S. MILL, *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive.* London 1896: 255 and 256: "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon." "If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two →

Now, arguably, Buddhist logicians advocate something like this in establishing causation by *pratyakṣa-anupalambha*, i.e., by a threefold or fivefold series of observations of the cause and effect successively conjoined and non-observations of the effect before the cause or when the cause alone is lacking.[19] This conjunction or co-presence of cause and effect is *anvaya*, while the co-absence is *vyatireka*. And the determination of the *anvaya-vyatireka* does involve an attempt to isolate the prospective cause to be tested and exclude other irrelevant circumstances by introducing a "control." Just as for J.S. Mill, there is an attempt to formulate a *critical* perspective on observation in order to rule out, as far as possible, spurious and coincidental correlations of phenomena from being cases of cause and effect, even if it should be said that the similarity with

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instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."

[19] See, e.g., Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (ed. R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti.* Serie Orientale Roma 23, Roma 1960): 22,2-3: *yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate tat tasya kāryam* "*a* is the effect of *A* under the following conditions: (1) given a perception of [potential causal factors] *A, B, C*, [etc.], we then see the [phenomenon] *a*, which had not [previously] been observed (*anupalabdha*) but which has that character [i.e., of being perceptible]; and (2) *a* is unobserved when [just] *A* is absent from amongst those [factors *A, B, C,* etc.] (*tatraikābhāve*)." See MASAHIRO INAMI, On the Determination of Causality. In: S. Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy.* (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 32) Wien 1999, 131-154. For the details of Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation of Dharmakīrti, see p. 235-238 in HORST LASIC, "Dharmakīrti and His Successors on the Determination of Causality," in the same volume. On the threefold and fivefold series, see YUICHI KAJIYAMA, *Trikapañcakacintā*: Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality. Reprinted in K. Mimaki *et al.* (eds.), *Yuichi Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy* (*Selected Papers*). Kyoto 1989.

Mill on the strategies for eliminating such correlations is very far from total. [20] On the other hand, when a Buddhist cites a *single* positively concomitant example and single negative example to apprehend or support pervasion, it is quite strange to say that he is somehow in compliance with the essential features of Mill's inductive method, for he does not examine *several* different situations and contexts, varying some of the constituents and using a certain set of circumstances as a control. (Indeed often when a Buddhist logician cites an example, causality isn't at stake at all, but rather a quasi-semantic relation of same nature, or *tādātmya*, between terms.) The words *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are of course regularly used to express the idea that a positive example is qualified by both the property to be proved (*sādhya*) and the reason (*hetu*), and that a negative example is qualified by neither – this much is on the surface similar to the discussion of co-presence and absence in the

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[20] See the previous note for the relevant verse from Dharmakīrti. For the Buddhist, spurious correlations are eliminated at several stages in the series of perceptions and non-perceptions. E.g., they will be eliminated by the specification that the prospective effect must be *anupalabdha,* i.e., not perceived before the cause is perceived. Other spurious correlations will be eliminated by the effect's being unobserved when, all other things remaining equal, only the prospective cause is absent. The former condition, which is the requirement that the effect be a *novel occurrence*, not pre-existing already at the time of the cause, hardly resembles anything that I can see in Mill, and what Mill does in his Method of Agreement (i.e., weeding out specific background circumstances to show that the production of the effect is unaffected by the presence or absence of these circumstances) is not in the Buddhist strategy for establishing *anvaya.* On the other hand, the specification *tatraikābhāve,* meaning that *just* the prospective cause is absent (i.e., other things remain equal), is very similar to the "control" specified in the Method of Difference, for it is *only* the prospective cause's absence which should adversely affect the production of the effect.

case of causality. Nonetheless, the essential features of the Mill-like induction of causality have been largely gutted: the use of single examples completely lacks and precludes the *critical perspective* needed to avoid spurious correlations.

Having thus examined the *pūrvapakṣa* (i.e., Matilal's position) at some length, we can now finally go back to my earlier question: Is the move from Bahirvyāptivāda to Antarvyāptivāda something of a shift from an inductive logic to one which is more deductive*? I think that the answer is a cautious "Yes," but for reasons quite different from those which one might give following Matilal's line of thought.* There is a shift because there is a close link in Bahirvyāptivāda's and Antarvyāptivāda's respective positions on the need or dispensability of examples and their respective notions of *sapakṣa* as excluding or not excluding the subject. The shift from inductive to deductive is due to the above-described evolution from inductiveness to deductiveness that came from changing notions of *sapakṣa*; it is not because the Bahirvyāptivādin took the single example as somehow being a "fair sample" upon which to base induction, while the Antarvyāptivādin knew better. Briefly, the point is as follows. As I had pointed out in "On *sapakṣa*," basing myself largely on Tibetan accounts of the debate, the Bahirvyāptivādin seems to have taken "similar instance" (*sapakṣa*) and "similar example" (*sādharmyadṛṣṭānta*) as very close to synonymous – both must exclude the subject. From this perspective, to say that there must be an example is virtually the same thing as saying that the class of *sapakṣa* should not be empty, as everyone would agree it should not be if the reason is to be valid. On the other hand, on the Antarvyāptivāda point of view, there is an important split between the notion of a similar instance and that of a similar example, since the former need not exclude the subject while the latter does. It is thus possible to say that there is no example even though there are *sapakṣa*, as in the famous reasoning proving that sound is impermanent because it is audible. No similar example of an audible,

impermanent, non-sound is possible, but similar instances, or to use Ratnākaraśānti's definition, "everything that has the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmayuktaḥ sarvaḥ*),"[21] pose no such problem, for there is no difficulty at all in coming up with numerous impermanent things.

If examples are not fair samples for ampliative induction, what then are they and how is it that Bahirvyāptivādin and Antarvyāptivādin alike speak of establishing, ascertaining or apprehending the pervasion on the basis of an example? I would hypothesize, a trifle speculatively, that we would do better to regard the example as being used like a paradigm or prototype rather than as a fair sample. Although there are obvious dangers in reasoning from one paradigm case, it is a fact that rational people regularly do proceed in this way to manipulate concepts and arrive at a general conclusion. True, arriving at a general conclusion about all or most young students' woeful level of historical knowledge after witnessing a single blooper by an unfortunate college freshman could be criticized as unfair, even grotesque. On the other hand, the more that student resembles a type of paradigm case or prototype of the quintessential freshman, the more his behaviour tends to be perceived as generalizable. (This reliance upon "paradigm cases" becomes much more trustworthy when the general statement in question involves some measure of a necessary relationship, such as an analytic proposition, and not just a contingent fact such as that of college students being of an inadequate level in history.) Indeed if we accept George Lakoff's account of recent research in cognitive psychology, we *ordinarily* manipulate concepts using "best examples," "prototypes" and other such paradigmatic cases as "cognitive

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[21] See n. 3 above.

reference points" upon which we base inferences.[22] Another more Aristotelian approach, along the lines of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, would be to explore the rhetorical aspects of argumentation by example, looking at how debaters actually use examples in order to secure *adherence* to generalisations.[23] I won't delve much further into cognitive psychology nor into the "new rhetoric" or other potential approaches – it would be doing rather useless comparative philosophy, as the Buddhist texts themselves don't say much more than the usual statement that one apprehends a pervasion on the basis of a commonly recognized example. My main point in invoking contemporary parallels is to suggest that reasoning from single paradigms *need* not be either benighted prejudice or ampliative induction using fair samples. To save the rationality of the Buddhist uses of examples there is no need that they fit the very uncomfortable Procrustean bed of ampliative induction.

Finally, this paper would be incomplete without a word on *svabhāvapratibandha* ("natural connections"), although this excursus must remain brief. There undoubtedly was a very significant transition in logical theory from Dignāga and Īśvarasena to Dharmakīrti due to the latter's requirement that pervasion be grounded upon a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) rather than upon the mere non-

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[22] See G. LAKOFF, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind.* Chicago 1987, p. 40-45. See, e.g., p. 41: "[Eleanor Rosch] extended the results [of her experiments] from colors to other categories, primarily categories of physical objects ... In each case, assymmetries (called *prototype effects*) were found: subjects judged certain members of the categories as being more representative of the category than other members ... The most representative members of a category are called 'prototypical' members."

[23] See PERELMAN/OLBRECHTS-TYTECA 1969: 350-357 on argumentation by example.

observation (*adarśanamātra*) of counterexamples. Thus, for Dharmakīrti, the pervasion would be established in virtue of an ontological fact responsible for linking the reason and property to be proved and not, as for Īśvarasena, by simply not seeing any occurrences of the reason among the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*).

I think it can be relatively clearly shown by analysing some well-known passages in *Pramāṇavārttika* that the Dignāga/Īśvarasena method of *adarśanamātra* to establish pervasion was inductive in nature and that this inductiveness is fundamentally what Dharmakīrti objected to.[24] Using Leonard's criterion we can readily see that an argument with premises along the lines of "I don't see *X* at time t_n" could give, at most, plausible grounds for an uncertain conclusion "*X* does not exist at all," and that this argument would immediately be rendered bad by the truth of "I (or someone else) sees *X* at t_{n+1}." On the other hand, Dharmakīrti did not, and indeed could not, give a deductive alternative for establishing pervasion, even though he was profoundly dissatisfied with his predecessor's inductive method. This is because the necessary connections that he speaks of are, to a large degree, causal connections, and the method of observations and non-observations that he proposes to establish this causality is, whether he acknowledges it or not, inevitably going to involve arguments subject to vitiation by an ulterior observation and leading to an uncertain and fallible conclusion – in short, typical inductive arguments. To put things slightly frivolously, although causal connections, when in place, might indeed

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24 I am thinking of the anti-inductive and anti-Īśvarasena argumentation in the initial section of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter. See, e.g., the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* ad k. 13 (ed. Gnoli, p. 10): *na hi bahulaṃ pakvadarśane 'pi sthālyantargamanamātreṇa pākaḥ sidhyati vyabhicāradarśanāt.* "Although one might see that most [of the rice] is cooked, the fact of [all the rice] being cooked is not established through its merely being in the pot, for one might observe deviance."

provide the needed guarantee for general propositions, no mere mortal, Buddhist or otherwise, can ever be sure that they *are* in place. *In that sense, much of the talk about svabhāvapratibandha seems to do little more than postpone, but not resolve, doubts about pervasions being founded.* Dharmakīrti apparently thought that he was able to do something else, something which would yield certainty (*niścaya*) about pervasions founded upon causal connections in a way in which Īśvarasena's *adarśanamātra* method didn't. He seems to have thought he could arrive at the same certainty with regard to causal connections as he would with the other type of connection that he recognized, viz., the so-called "one nature connection" (*tādātmya*), which has a high degree of necessity comparable to that of analyticity. However, as Brendan Gillon pointed out, and I would agree, what Dharmakīrti ran up against and tried to solve, albeit unsuccessfully, was a version of the notoriously intractable "problem of induction."[25] And if it's so, as I think it is,

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[25] B.S. GILLON, Dharmakīrti and the Problem of Induction. In: Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition.* (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 8) Wien 1991, 53-58. Granted it may be argued, as does Lasic *op. cit.* (cf. above, n. 19), that certain specifications in the threefold and fivefold series of *pratyakṣa-anupalambha* will rule out certain specific counterexamples, perhaps even that offered by Gillon himself. Nonetheless, finding counter-examples is fairly easy. The root of the problem of determining causality is that people just have no way of knowing definitively when they have correctly isolated the true cause from the myriad other background things. Using Mill's method or that of Dharmakīrti, there can always be the doubt that, in spite of something being thought to be the cause, the presence of *that* circumstance was not in fact what was actually responsible for the effect and *its* absence was not what brought about an absence of the effect – some other hidden factor that we didn't know about, didn't think about and perhaps didn't see at all was first present and then absent at the key stages of our tests. If I'm not too much out of →

that the problem of induction actually comes back in full force in the context of establishing *svabhāvapratibandha*, then in a very important sense Dharmakīrti's and the later Buddhist philosophers' project to gain certainty through logic would have to be seen as a noble, but quite hopeless, quest for an unattainable goal. While I would not subscribe to an exaggerated scenario depicting Dharmakīrti as a disastrous step backwards, the time has surely come to abandon the rosy picture of the history of Buddhist logic as being an ever increasing progress on the road to certainty.

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my depth, let me say that this is probably a routine predicament for most scientists, be they biologists trying to determine why frogs are being born deformed or epidemiologists looking for the causes of cancer or bird flu.

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